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Political institutions have been shown to play a key role in determining economic 
outcomes. Where do these institutions come from, and how do they change over time? 
Examining the puzzle of institutional divergence on the island of Hispaniola, this 
dissertation identifies conditions under which international economic crises lead to the 
emergence of a developmental state. Haiti adjusted to the global economic crisis of the 
1930s through rent-seeking policies that reinforced existing patterns of state predation 
and economic decay. Why, despite many similarities with Haiti including geography, 
regime type, and agro-export dependency, did the Dominican Republic pursue 
developmentalist policies of import substitution when adjusting to the same crisis—
policies that transformed the economic purpose of state institutions and culminated in 
the fastest growing economy in Latin America over the second half of the twentieth 
century?  
Among non-industrialized countries I find that the costs of a prolonged foreign 
exchange crisis, and the import scarcities that ensue, are borne disproportionately by 
the middle classes. I also find that the ability of markets in non-industrialized 
countries to replace foreign imports with domestically produced substitutes is 
constrained by investment coordination problems. Thus, where income distribution 
 favors a proportionally larger middle class, the political coalitions that emerge out of 
shared economic hardship exert adaptive pressures on state institutions to resolve 
coordination problems associated with import substitution. In countries where income 
distribution favors a proportionally smaller middle class, conversely, these political 
coalitions falter and attempts at import substitution succumb to market coordination 
failure. Highlighting the importance of global trade integration beginning in the 1850s 
for reshaping class structure across Latin America, these findings challenge recent 
explanations of post-colonial development that emphasize geographic or colonial path 
dependency.  
 v 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Don Leonard was born in Fairbanks, Alaska. He graduated from A.J. Dimond High 
School in Anchorage and received an associate’s degree from the University of Alaska 
Anchorage. He transferred to the University of Massachusetts Lowell, where he 
received a Bachelor of Arts in political science and a Master of Arts in economic and 
social development. Having quenched his thirst for development theory for a time, his 
search for practical experience and tacit knowledge led him to join the U.S. Peace 
Corps, where he served for two years in Cochabamba, Bolivia. Bookending his Peace 
Corps service were three very rewarding semesters spent as an adjunct professor in the 
Department of Political Science at UMass Lowell. In 2007 he journeyed to Ithaca, 
NY, where six years spent living and learning at Cornell University culminated in a 
doctoral degree from the Department of Government. He begins his post-graduate 
career as a Niehaus postdoctoral fellow in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs at Princeton University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my mother and friend, 
Jean Danker Leonard 
 vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
“No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.” 
-John Donne (1572-1631) 
 
Thoreau may have been able to crawl into a cabin in the woods one fine autumn day 
and come out two years and two months later with a book, but I could not. I am happy 
to report that this effort towards social science was very much a social endeavor. It is a 
product of my gorges Ithacan and Latin American environs, and the institutions, 
family, friends, mentors, and colleagues who sustained me along the way. Despite my 
gratitude, I will forget some of you here. Those whom I do not forget, I will still fail to 
find adequate words to thank you for all that you have given me. Of all the errors 
committed in the pages that follow, numerous and my own, these sins of omission and 
commission are the gravest of them all.  
This dissertation is about the imaginary lines drawn by human beings, the lines 
that separate the prosperous from the materially deprived. The project was probably 
born with my own birth, into a society that combines spectacular wealth with 
spectacular inequity. Having spent much of my life straddling the lines between these 
two worlds, I have often struggled to make sense of why those lines exist and where 
they came from. The pages that follow represent my first attempt to answer that 
question with science. I do so by tapping into the experience of two proud island 
peoples that, though sharply divided by a national border and complex national and 
inter-national histories, have much to teach us about the meaning of development. 
 viii 
As a student of institutions, it is perhaps fitting that I begin by thanking the 
public school system that I am a product of, and the teachers and administrators who 
make that institution work. From the primary and secondary schools that prepared me 
for college, to the public universities that prepared me for a lifetime of learning, my 
completion of this degree is a testament to the moral and ethical commitment made by 
public educators to leave behind a more literate and learned society than the one that 
they were born into.  Mr. Birdsall, Mr. Dwyer, First Sergeant Creek, Mrs. Wagner… .  
Other institutions to thank are those that provided generous funding for the 
field research that made this project feasible. Pre-dissertation research in Washington, 
D.C., Haiti and the Dominican Republic was supported by a grant from Cornell’s 
Institute for the Social Sciences. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the 
Tinker Foundation for two separate grants in support of extended field research trips. 
Thanks also to the Einaudi Center’s Latin American Studies Program and the Cornell 
Graduate School, who provided supplemental travel funds for wrap-up dissertation 
research. My Peace Corps service also continues to reward me in inestimable ways. 
To the faculty and administrators of Cornell University, the hardest part was 
getting in. From the moment I arrived you conspired to help me succeed, showing 
patience as I learned to think and talk like a political scientist, and opening doors to 
the resources that helped me along my way.  To the Government Department graduate 
field assistant and shepherd, Tina Slater, thanks for fending off all manner of 
bureaucratic dragons and working diligently to get me and so many of us across the 
finish line. To Chris Way, the time and effort you expended as director of graduate 
studies left our program even stronger and provided us with a foundation to succeed.  
 ix 
To Peter Katzenstein, the quantity of paper drafts you asked of us during your 
seminars provides a reasonable estimate of your commitment to student development, 
but this commitment is best measured by the quality of your feedback, both in and out 
of class. It is no accident that both of the research projects that populate my C.V. had 
their genesis in your seminars. To Jonathan Kirshner, the commitment to clear 
thinking and writing that characterizes your scholarship is also reflected in your 
teaching. As a student in your graduate seminar and as a teaching assistant in your 
undergraduate courses, I was constantly inspired by your efforts to bring order and a 
welcome measure of Hitchcock-esque suspense to the study of a confusing world.  
A tremendous debt of gratitude is owed to my dissertation committee—Ken 
Roberts, Nic van de Walle, Kevin Morrison, and Tom Pepinsky—for being a source of 
inspiration, pragmatic counsel, and intellectual camaraderie. To Tom, thank you for 
being someone I could come to during those times when this project, and its author, 
were in the proverbial weeds. It is a special gift to be fiercely intelligent yet sensitive 
to the vicissitudes of the creative process. To Kevin, thank you for being willing to 
offer critical feedback regardless of whether or not it was popular. You have been a 
good friend and counselor to me throughout my years at Cornell, and the project is 
stronger for your efforts at helping me find the holes in the boat. To Nic, thank you for 
your constant support of this dissertation since its conception. Hispaniola is not 
exactly a household name, and selecting an obscure tropical island for dissertation 
research is not a risk-averse strategy. It was in no small part the value that you saw in 
the project that gave me the courage to proceed.  
 x 
To my dissertation chair, Ken, I am now and will forever remain grateful to 
you for the depth of your intellectual generosity. In a discipline that is not without 
powerful egos, you mentor your graduate students without a trace of prejudice 
regarding the direction of their research or the intellectual predispositions that guide 
them along their way. You encouraged me to choose courses and questions based on 
what I was most passionate about rather than which was closest to your own research. 
Thank you for being a true mentor.  
 I am also obliged to recognize the generosity of my external reader, Richard 
Bensel. Our conversations concerning political development date back years now. 
Although you were not a member of the committee, your willingness to read memos 
and provide thoughtful feedback during our several enjoyable meetings made the 
choice of external reader an obvious one. I am so grateful that you accepted, as the 
quality of the feedback you provided on this dissertation draft will truly light my way 
as I embark on revisions for the book manuscript.  
Different segments of this dissertation were presented at the annual meetings 
of the 2012 International Studies Association and the 2013 Western Political Science 
Association. Here I would like to express thanks for the generous and helpful 
comments from discussants Jason Enia and Parakh Hoon. I would also like to thank 
the members of Cornell’s 2011 and 2012 dissertation colloquia. Timely and 
constructive feedback from Noelle Brigden, Ron Herring, Gaurav Kampani, Jing Tao, 
Danielle Thomsen, and Chris Way were instrumental in moving the project along. 
Many thanks also to Peter Enns and Cornell’s PSAC colloquium for the opportunity to 
present my findings to the larger community of Government Department faculty and 
 xi 
graduate students; a special thanks to Val Bunce, Gustavo Flores-Macias, and Dave 
Patel for your constructive feedback there. 
 Profound debts of intellectual and personal gratitude are also owed to the 
following individuals in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. My research in Haiti 
would not have been feasible without the help of James Darbouze. First as a 
representative of the Université d’état d’Haïti, later as a friend,  you opened up the 
doors to the vibrant academic community of Port-au-Prince to a fumbling stranger, 
putting me in touch with brilliant scholars and archivists who know more about their 
country than I ever will. I am especially grateful for the rewarding exchanges I had 
with Michel Acacia, John Picard Byron, Suzy Castor, and Eddy Lucien; each of you 
shaped the direction of this project in meaningful ways. At Haiti’s Bibliothèque 
National I would like to thank Gertha Café and her staff for their eager assistance in 
helping me access the rich collection of knowledge that the Haitian people have 
accumulated and preserved over the years. At the Archives National d’Haiti I would 
like to thank Antoine Cesaire for helping me navigate the bureaucratic hurdles 
necessary to be among the first to get access to primary documents since the terrible 
earthquake of 2010. Your tireless efforts to reconstruct the collection are both a boon 
to scholars like me, who otherwise might have been forced to abandon their projects, 
and a tribute to the national patrimony. At the Institut Haitien de Statistique I would 
like to thank Renand Dorelien for permission to work with the capable staff of 
research librarians under his charge—special thanks to Sam Andre. Finally, I would 
like to pay special mention to the librarian of the Bibliotheque des Freres St. Louis, 
Ernest Even, f.i.c.  You have made the preservation of Haitian history your life’s 
 xii 
work, and despite your advanced age you began that work anew when an earthquake 
tore the library apart. Your efforts are no longer tireless, making your devotion all the 
more inspiring.  
In the Dominican Republic I am grateful for the air conditioning in the national 
archives and central bank library, but mainly for the archival materials that the 
Dominican government has dedicated itself to preserving and opening it up to the 
world. This accessibility is in no small part the labor of its national historians who, by 
necessity, act as both scholars and administrators.  A special thanks to Roberto Cassá, 
director of the Archivos Generales de la Nación, Frank Moya Pons, President of the 
Academia Dominicana de la Historia, and Franklin Franco Pichardo for taking time 
away from their responsibilities to talk Trujillo. This project benefited greatly from the 
insights of Franklin Franco’s economic history of the Republic, which first pointed me 
towards the puzzle of the developmentalist dictator. The major breakthrough came 
from reading the doctoral dissertation of Frank Moya, whose detailed survey of 
Dominican industrial history was a guiding light for the theoretical argument I 
advance below. Tremendous thanks are also owed to the Dominican librarians and 
archivists who patiently attended to me as my research topic narrowed from the vague 
and unwieldy to the narrow and (at times I’m sure) unnerving. At the Archivos 
Generales de la Nación I owe thanks to Vetelio Alfau for his knowledge of the 
Dominican historiography, and Oscar Feliz Caris for being a daily source of laughter 
and enthusiasm in building full of dusty books and newspapers. At the Oficina 
Nacional de Estadistica I would like to thank Julia del Orbe and Glenis Diaz Kirssy 
Richetti for their competent assistance. Finally, I would like to thank the entire library 
 xiii 
staff of the Banco Central for their eager help and willingness to hold my stack of 
books for weeks at a time.  
It is no exaggeration to say that I would not have had the energy to pursue a 
dissertation-length research project without the conversations shared with dear friends 
over the passed six years. Beginning with the talented cohort of women and men I 
entered the Department of Government with in August of 2007, I would like to thank 
Phil Ayoub, Berk Esen, Desmond Jagmohan, Melissa Mistretta, Sree Muppirisetty and 
Pablo Yanguas for fostering a spirit of cooperation and collaboration in our colloquia 
and throughout our time wandering the corridors of White Hall. It never felt like a 
competition between us; it was always about the ideas. I learned so much from each of 
you, and I am grateful that Cornell brought us together. A token of my sincere 
affections is owed to Igor, Phil and Pablo. Brothers on the road to becoming political 
scientists, you were always there to celebrate the victories and brush off the defeats.  
For the cohorts that came before us and helped light the way, I would 
especially like to thank Jaimie Bleck, Julie Ajinkya, Ben Brake, Mike Miller, Jen 
Hadden, Deondra Rose, Tariq Thachil, and Chris Zepeda. I didn’t always fully 
understand the magnitude of your accomplishments at the times you were 
accomplishing them, in part because I hadn’t been through the hurdles yet and in part 
because each of you walk on water in my eyes. Now that I have been through some of 
those hurdles myself, I offer a heartfelt “Wow! You did it!”  
For the cohorts that came after, bringing new friends into my life as old ones 
moved along and cohort-mates drifted in and out of town, I would like to thank Rachel 
Behler, Janice Gallagher, Triveni Ghandi, Erin Hern, Lauren Honig, Greg Thaler, and 
 xiv 
the Texas Hold’em crew for bringing much light to Ithaca’s long winter nights. You 
are already equipped with everything you need to succeed, and it will unfold faster and 
more spectacularly than you can possibly imagine.  
It must also be said that there are no friends like the friends you make when 
you are far from home. Corrie Kramer, you were a port in the storm as I was making 
my way through the bustling streets of Port-au-Prince. Our friendship dates back to 
our days in the Peace Corps, but I am so grateful we got to know each other better 
through our shared connection to Hayti. To Sabine Cadeau, our conversations about 
your nation and meanings of development that extend beyond material standards of 
living challenged me and brought great richness to my field research. Your cousins, 
Patrick and Bruce Lee, were fantastic research assistants without whose help I would 
still be in the archives. To your husband, Hank, your dissertation on the early Haitian 
Republic is a shoulder upon which all students of Haiti will stand.   
In the Dominican Republic I found a home and a family with the Collados—
Doña Altagracia, Melba, Yasmill, Reynaldo, and Willy. Les debo mucho por su 
amistad y cariño verdadero durante las visitias mías. Nunca les olvidaré. To April 
Yoder, I am so glad our PhD field research stints coincided; our friendship was the 
perfect accident.  
Finally, this project and its author were sustained over the last six years by the 
family I was given at birth and the family I met along the way. The two groups are 
indistinguishable in my heart. To my father, Dean, I thank you for seeing the best in 
me and pushing me to become that man. You have been a friend to me throughout, 
and I could not have done this without you. To my brother, André, thank you for 
 xv 
seeing me for who I am and loving me anyways. I will never be as good of a friend to 
you as you have been to me over the years, but that will not stop me from trying. To 
my sister Jess, thank you for taking up the task of keeping one of your brother’s 
ponderous feet planted in the real world with good conversation and all manner of 
Americana care packages over the years. What kind of social outcast would I be 
without The Office, Mad Men, and my really awkward guitar hero drum solo at your 
Christmas party? To my sister Vicki, I ain’t got the words. Thank you for all the 
unsolicited advice during our hiking trips over the years. You have helped me cheat 
fate time and again by passing along answers to some of life’s most daunting tests. To 
Aunt Sharon, you spoiled your nephew from near and from afar. Your care packages 
kept me caffeinated and carbohydrated through so many long library nights.  
Lastly, this dissertation is dedicated to my mother. You raised me to believe 
that we have much to learn from other peoples, and our adventures together prepared 
me to strike out into the world to encounter and to listen. Borrowing from that lanky 
president from Springfield, Abraham Lincoln, all that I am, or ever hope to be, I owe 
to you. 
 
Don Leonard 
Princeton, NJ 
August 2013 
 
 
 
 xvi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ......................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................ vii 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THE HISPANIOLA PUZZLE ....................................................................................... 1 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORY: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN 
AGRARIAN SOCIETIES ............................................................................................ 23 
 
CHAPTER 3 
CRITICAL ANTECEDENTS: TRADE INTEGRATION AND CLASS STRUCTURE   
(1850-1929) .................................................................................................................. 64 
 
CHAPTER 4 
BUILDING LEVIATHANS: DEBT DEPENDENCY, STATE FAILURE, AND 
FOREIGN INTERVENTION (1900-1929) ............................................................... 100 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CRITICAL JUNCTURE: TRADE SHOCKS AND THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC 
ADJUSTMENT (1929-1961)  .................................................................................... 133 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX  ..................................................................................... 203 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 222 
 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 255 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
The Hispaniola Puzzle 
 
 
 
 
Imagine you had been born into this world on Hispaniola, the Caribbean island that is 
home to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. If you were born on the eastern side 
of the island as the statistically average Dominican—as estimated by the United 
Nations Human Development Report (HDR 2011)—your material life would not be 
without hardship. You would stand an exceptionally good chance of being literate, 
however you would only attend school for about seven years. Your annual income 
would be around $8,000 US dollars, a far cry from the $43,000 per capita income of 
the average yanquee norteamericano. Your life expectancy, 73 years, would be about 
five years shorter than theirs. If you were to be born on the western side of the island 
as the average Haitian, however, the prospects for your material life would be 
considerably grimmer. The odds of dying before your fifth birthday would be almost 
triple what they are for your neighbors on the Dominican side. Assuming you survived 
childhood, you would have less than a 50/50 chance of ever learning how to read. This 
level of education would support an annual income of only $1,100 and a life 
expectancy that is eleven years shorter than that of the average Dominican. The 
differences in standard of living separating your life as a Dominican from your life as 
a Haitian would not be trivial.  
Why do Haiti and the Dominican Republic (DR) look so different today in 
terms of economic and social development, and what were the historical processes that 
produced this variation?  Research has established the importance of political 
  2 
institutions for shaping economic outcomes. This is observed primarily through the 
effect that the provision of public goods such as infrastructure, property rights, and the 
rule of law has on the incentives of market actors to make investments that lead to 
higher productivity. Efforts to identify the origins of ‘growth-friendly’ institutions are 
often complicated, however, by their endogenous relationship to factors like 
geography, colonial legacies, and even economic growth itself. This dissertation seeks 
to untangle the complex web of causal relationships linking institutions to 
development outcomes. It does so by leveraging a paired historical comparison of two 
countries that minimizes variation in such factors as geography and regime type in 
order to shed light on the causal processes that produce the variation in development 
outcomes that we observe today. It explains why the economies of Haiti and the DR—
two former European colonies that share the same tropical island as well as long 
histories of kleptocratic authoritarian rule—diverged so dramatically during the 
second half of the 20th century.  
In 1950 per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) across the island of 
Hispaniola was nearly identical (Maddison 2003). By the narrowest of margins the 
Dominican Republic eclipsed Haiti as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, 
with a per capita income of $1,027 in constant 1990 international dollars at purchasing 
power parity (PPP). (Figure 1.1) 
  
 
[FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Yet between 1950 and 2000 the DR entered into a period of economic dynamism that 
produced the fastest growth rates in Latin America (World Bank 2009). By the end of 
the century the Dominican economy had grown approximately five times as large as 
Haiti’s, converging with average per capita income in the region. Over the same 
period Haiti traded places with the DR as the poorest country in Latin America. It 
ended the century with collapsing political institutions, dismal levels of literacy and 
life expectancy; these basic prerequisites of human security undermined by an 
economy that could no longer provide for the basic needs of the population. Why did 
one side of Hispaniola achieve such impressive gains in economic growth and 
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Figure: GDP per capita of Haiti and the Dominican Republic  
in Comparative Perspective, 1950-2000 
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development during the second half of the 20th century while the other side 
deteriorated into a failing state?  
That Haiti generated abysmal rates of economic growth over the course of the 
twentieth century is overdetermined. The reign of successive patrimonial rulers over a 
tropical society that previously endured centuries of extractive colonial rule resulted in 
a predictably underdeveloped public sector, an economy that dependent almost 
entirely on agricultural exports, and a weak, predatory state that continues to foster 
dire poverty by distributing public resources for the benefit of a narrow group of elites. 
However, neither geography nor historical institutions can adequately account the 
economic performance of neighboring Dominican Republic, a country that historically 
shared many of the same development handicaps that continue to plague Haiti today.  
Like Haiti, the Dominican state emerged in the early 19th century from a 
history of extractive colonial rule. Also like Haiti, the DR would experience a 
dramatic rupture with its colonial institutions during the 19th century as colonial 
institutions and the traditional elites that benefited from them were replaced. The 
economic performance of the DR under the overtly kleptocratic patrimonial1 regime of 
Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-61)—a regime that endured for decades after the death 
                                                
1 Patrimonial regimes are characterized by personalistic leaders who seek public office to gain control 
over state resources and distribute them to their patron-client networks as private goods, rather than 
distributing them more programmatically as public goods. 
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of Trujillo in neo-patrimonial2 forms (Hartlyn 1994, 93)—challenges much of the 
received wisdom about the relationship between regime type and economic growth.  
Subsequent chapters demonstrate that the contrasting development outcomes 
on Hispaniola were not due to the minor differences in geography separating these two 
peoples; nor were they a direct result of differences in the French and Spanish 
institutions that governed Haiti and the DR, respectively, during colonial times. 
Rather, the development trajectories of these two agrarian societies diverged because 
they were governed differently. When confronted with comparable economic shocks 
during the 1930s and 1940s, Haitian and Dominican rulers made different choices 
about how to adjust to foreign exchange crises and import scarcity. The adjustment 
policies that followed determined whether state resources would be invested in the 
infrastructure, physical and human capital required for a strategy of import 
substitution and state-led industrialization, or whether these resources were siphoned 
off by a narrow group of elites to be squandered through private consumption. Why 
these rulers made the choices they did, and the consequences of their choices for 
shaping the economic purpose of the political institutions, is the subject of this 
dissertation.  
In order to understand how development outcomes on Hispaniola were shaped 
by variation in adjustment to crisis generally, and the institutional legacies of import 
                                                
2 Whereas traditional patrimonial regimes are often authoritarian, neo-patrimonial regimes are ones that 
adopt liberal institutional forms while permitting their rulers to engage in clientelistic behavior that 
nevertheless fails distinguish between public and private resources, “…combining an external façade of 
modern rational-legal administration with an internal patrimonial logic of dyadic exchange, 
prebendalism, and the private appropriation of public resources by state elites. Neopatrimonial systems 
tend to favor consumption over investment, they produce unsustainable economic policies, and they 
systematically underinvest in institutional capacity, which threatens power holders” (van de Walle 
2001, 16). 
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substitution industrialization (ISI) and agro-export dependency more specifically, it is 
first useful to identify the more proximate determinants of economic growth. In its 
most reduced form, growth accounting considers the product of factor inputs (such as 
land or labor) multiplied by capital (which determines the rate of output per unit of 
factor input, or productivity). Holding factor inputs constant, growth is achieved 
through productivity-enhancing investments in infrastructure, physical and human 
capital. 3  
Despite having near-identical levels of per capita national wealth in 1950 
(Figure 1, above), important differences in the determinants of productivity and 
growth had already emerged across the island of Hispaniola prior to the onset of their 
divergence in the mid-twentieth century (Table 1.1).  
[TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Over the long run, different models expect that growth takes place through changes in technology and 
innovation that are either taken as exogenous (Solow 1956) or endogenous to the choices that market 
actors make about whether to invest in innovation (Romer 1986). For the purposes of this discussion, 
however, the class of agrarian societies considered here are by and large “technology takers” rather than 
“technology makers.”  
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At the beginning of its economic takeoff in 1950, the Dominican Republic was 
qualitatively more developed than Haiti in terms of most predictors of growth. 
Measures of physical capital and infrastructure, including electrification and gross 
fixed capital formation, were two-to-three times greater in the DR than in Haiti. The 
availability and quality of labor, according to estimates of human capital including 
urbanization, health, and education, exhibited differences of a similar magnitude.  
By investing in infrastructure, physical and human capital, societies reduce the 
costs of transactions between market actors, touching off a self-reinforcing process 
that, over the long run, alters the development trajectories of nations (North 1990). It 
is not surprising, then, that the Dominican Republic enjoyed remarkably greater 
success than Haiti in achieving higher rates of investment and growth over the second 
half of the 20th century. The business environment created by the presence of basic 
Haiti Dominican Republic
Infrastructure and Physical Capital
Electrification (GwH per capita) 3.0 35.3
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (% of GDP)1 51 33
Manufacturing (% of GDP) 8.2 12.5
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP), 1963 7.3 13.8
Human Capital
Urbanization (%) 12.2 23.9
Life Expectancy, 1960 (years)2 42.2 51.8
Hospital beds, 1960 (per 1,000 persons)2 0.6 2.3
Primary School Enrollment (per 1,000 persons) 35.1 102.7
Literacy (% of total adult population)3 10 32
1Mitchell 2007
2World Bank, World Development Indicators
3Vanhanen 1997 (data are for 1948)
Source (unless footnoted): Astorga, P., A. R Bergés, and E. V.K FitzGerald. 2003. “The Oxford Latin 
American Economic History Database (OxLAD).” The Latin American Centre, Oxford University.  
Accessed online, April 2009.
Table: Investment in infrastructure, physical and human capital in Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, 1950
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infrastructure and a semi-skilled, semi-literate workforce was the primordial factor 
that drove Dominican growth during the second half of the 20th century.  
To understand why the Dominican Republic accumulated comparatively 
greater levels of infrastructure, physical and human capital by 1950 requires a theory 
that can explain why growth-friendly investment takes place in some agrarian societies 
but not others. Institutional accounts have become ubiquitous in discussions of 
pervasive poverty across the Global South. As the formal and informal rules that 
structure social interactions, institutions are believed to explain why some societies 
remain trapped in unfortunate equilibria of underinvestment and poverty while others 
do not (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; P. Collier 2007; Sachs 2005). Often tracing 
back to colonial encounters, most accounts portray institutions as structural 
endowments of geography or history—outcomes derived from exogenous processes 
that persist due to their self-reinforcing nature.  
There are two problems with existing institutional approaches: The first is one 
of equifinality. Rapid and sustained rates of economic growth have been found to 
occur under a variety of institutional environments. These run the gamut from liberal 
institutions with the power to constrain even society’s most powerful actors to 
developmentalist authoritarian regimes that operate with few institutional constraints 
on the power of the elite to expropriate.4 The second problem is the paradoxical 
correspondence between state weakness and institutional durability. The weakest 
institutions tend to be found in the poorest economies of the global south. Lacking in 
                                                
4 The concept of a stationary bandit (Olson 1993) is a prime example of developmentalist 
authoritarianism. The concenpt stands in stark relief to the inclusive institutions-growth thesis 
forwarded most recently by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), which struggles to account for growth in 
less-auspicious institutional contexts.  
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state capacity to do basic things like enforce the rule of law and collect internal tax 
revenues, these political regimes persist primarily by extracting wealth from more 
vulnerable revenue streams—taxing indirectly through the collection of customs duties 
at the ports, claiming royalties derived from vulnerable fixed assets like extracted 
minerals, and/or preying on international markets for sovereign credit and foreign aid. 
The paradox is that if existing institutions are so weak, how do they manage to persist 
and reproduce themselves over time—often despite concerted efforts by the 
international community to reform them? Which domestic attributes make weak states 
resistant to institutional change, and what are the conditions under which institutional 
change can actually occur? 
This dissertation provides an account of the diverging trajectories of economic 
and social development on the island of Hispaniola that treats institutions as 
endogenous, both an explanatory variable as well as a variable to be explained. As an 
explanatory variable, I highlight the developmentalist role played by the Dominican 
state as both investor and investment coordinator during the 1930s and 1940s, 
identifying the institutional dynamics that explain the significant gains in economic 
and social development the Dominican Republic achieved by 1950. Yet if institutions 
are the proximate causal variable accounting for why the Dominican Republic made 
crucial gains in economic and social development during the 1930s and 1940s, then an 
account of diverging development trajectories must also explain where 
developmentalist institutions come from. This dissertation identifies those critical 
domestic and international factors antecedent to the 1929 crisis that that shaped 
subsequent institutional development for these two agrarian societies.  
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The analytic narrative that emerges from the Hispaniola puzzle explains how 
class structure, and the coalitional politics that emerge from that structure, shapes the 
relationship between states and markets. This narrative demonstrates how protracted 
economic crises can create critical junctures where the continuity of historical 
institutions becomes contested. During such junctures, I show how the relative power 
of different class coalitions vying for their respective material interests can play a 
decisive role in determining whether historically inherited institutions change or 
persist.  
Among non-industrialized countries, I find that the economic costs of a 
prolonged foreign exchange crisis and the import scarcities that ensue are borne 
disproportionately by the middle classes. The ability of domestic markets to respond to 
this scarcity through import substitution is constrained by investment coordination 
problems intrinsic to the initial phases of industrialization. Thus, where income 
distribution favors a proportionally larger middle class, the political coalitions that 
emerge out of shared economic hardship exert powerful adaptive pressures on states to 
resolve these coordination problems. In countries where income distribution favors a 
proportionally smaller middle class, conversely, these political coalitions falter and 
attempts at import substitution succumb to investment coordination failures. 
Furthermore, I demonstrate how differences in international trade integration 
during the antecedent period explain why one side of the island developed a politically 
viable middle class political coalition prior to the 1930s economic crisis while the 
other side did not. Thus, by highlighting the importance of expanding global trade 
beginning in the 1850s for reshaping income distribution within Latin American 
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societies, these findings challenge recent accounts of post-colonial development that 
emphasize exogenous factors such as geographic endowments or colonial path 
dependency. This theory is summarized in Figure 1.2. 
[FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
The Argument 
The economic divergence that we observe on the island of Hispaniola pivoted around 
the politics of adjustment to the economic crisis of the 1930s and the consequences of 
those adjustments for the relationship between state and markets. During this critical 
juncture the Dominican government adjusted to a balance of payments crisis stemming 
from a collapse in the international terms of trade for agricultural commodities by 
pursuing a strategy of state-led import substitution industrialization. Meanwhile, the 
Haitian government responded to the same external shocks through increased rates of 
taxation and elite consumption of declining agro-export revenues.  
Why did the authoritarian regime of one agrarian society respond to the 
economic crisis of the 1930s by investing in the infrastructure, physical and human 
capital necessary to develop an import substitution sector while another, similar 
regime, continued to rely on the agro-export model? Outlined below is a preview of 
the theory I develop in Chapter 2.  
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  12 
Coalitional politics, import scarcity, and obstacles to early industrialization 
There are three characteristics specific to agrarian societies that are crucial for 
understanding why and under what conditions economic crises lead to 
industrialization. First, by definition these societies lack any significant industrial 
capacity. Accordingly, they rely exclusively on imports for the supply of many non-
durable consumer goods like textiles, processed foods, and hygiene products. The 
capacity of an agrarian society to import such goods is determined by the amount of 
foreign exchange it can earn, primarily a function of export volume and the relative 
prices, or terms of trade, that volume commands on international markets.  Any 
decline in foreign exchange directly impacts the material wellbeing of agrarian 
societies and their capacity to consume manufactured goods.  
Second, in agrarian societies the adjustment costs of such crises are born 
disproportionally by the middle classes. In these societies the middle classes depend 
heavily on the economic activity and demand spillover generated by cross-border 
commerce for both income-generating opportunities as well as the supply of imported 
goods. Whereas the economic livelihood and consumptive habits of the agrarian 
peasantry rely primarily on materials that are locally grown or gathered, and economic 
elites have sufficient savings to continue consuming imported goods even during 
protracted episodes of import scarcity, it is middle class merchants, tradesmen, and 
professionals who bear the heaviest burden of an extended disruption in the terms of 
trade.  
Third, during the initial phase of industrialization private entrepreneurs face 
qualitatively greater coordination problems when deciding whether or not to invest 
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capital in the domestic production of manufactured goods than market actors in 
economies where industrialization is already underway (Gerschenkron 1962; W. W. 
Rostow 1960; Wydick 2008, 34). During a period where the relative price of 
manufactured goods imports rises due to declining terms of trade for agricultural 
commodities, decreased competition from foreign producers creates a window of 
opportunity for a domestic import substitution sector to emerge. However, import 
substitution requires reliable supply chains of raw inputs, and simultaneous capital 
investment in public goods such as infrastructure and human capital as well as the 
capacity to manufacture intermediate goods; this level of investment is beyond that 
which is required by an agricultural economy.  For individual firms, then, the 
coordination problems associated with simultaneous investment in the backward and 
forward linkages that constitute the initial phase of import substitution 
industrialization can be prohibitive—their perceived probability that all necessary 
capital investments would take place simultaneously being too low to spawn 
investment. Absent well-developed domestic or foreign capital markets that might 
otherwise be capable of resolving these coordination problems, such as is the case 
during periods of international economic and financial crisis where foreign markets for 
domestically produced goods are weak, foreign exchange is scarce, and foreign capital 
is not forthcoming, import substitution requires statist intervention to direct 
investment capital towards the formation of the necessary forward and backward 
linkages—a kind of bootstrap industrialization. 
These insights help us make predictions about the conditions under which 
economic crises will lead to the kinds of institutional transformations that allow 
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agrarian economies to industrialize and grow. Deteriorating terms of trade for 
agricultural commodities both reduce the amount of income circulating within the 
domestic economy as well as constrain the supply of imported goods when foreign 
exchange reserves become depleted. During a protracted international economic crisis 
like the 1930s global depression, where neither foreign lending nor aid were 
forthcoming, the only choice available to an agrarian state is either to stumble along 
with the agro-export model and accept a contraction of the domestic economy or to 
offset such a contraction through a strategy of import substitution.  
During such a crisis, the political survival of rulers is contingent on choosing 
the adjustment policy that best provides for the material wellbeing of a winning 
political coalition. Thus, where the middle classes are proportionally larger and more 
powerful, the regime faces greater incentives to elect import substitution as a means of 
adapting to the crisis. By pursuing such a strategy, rulers not only consolidate their 
hold on political power by improving their legitimacy via greater economic 
stewardship; they also increase the size of the national economic pie that they can 
siphon resources off from. This insight helps explain why state investment is 
paradoxically compatible with the kleptocratic nature of most patrimonial 
authoritarian regimes. What follows from a strategy of import substitution is 
transformation of the economic purpose of state institutions, as well as an increase in 
state capacity as rulers set about investing resources and coordinating the production 
of domestic substitutes for those goods that the country can no longer afford to import. 
These are the characteristics of a so-called developmental state. 
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Conversely, in agrarian societies where the political power of the middle class 
is proportionally smaller and weaker, the ruling coalition is more likely to be 
constituted of economic elites with sufficient personal assets to basically maintain 
their standard of living throughout the crisis. Such a coalition permits rulers to 
continue consuming state resources privately rather than investing them in the 
infrastructure, physical and human capital required by ISI. Absent coordinated state 
investment in public goods and capital, market actors face prohibitive levels of 
uncertainty about the willingness of other private entrepreneurs to invest in the 
forward and backward linkages that constitute an industrial supply chain; thus, they 
withhold private investment. What results is a Pareto-inferior outcome where failure to 
exploit the economic opportunities created by a major disruption in the international 
flow of manufactured goods by shifting to a new equilibrium of higher value-added 
production leaves everyone worse off. Over time, these differences in investment 
shape the labor productivity rates and transaction costs that determine long-run 
trajectories of economic growth and development.  
 
 
Critical historical antecedent: Trade integration and class structure (1850-1920) 
The analytic narrative of these two countries reveals two connected historical 
processes to be crucial for explaining the different decisions rulers took when 
confronted with a prolonged economic crisis during the 1930s: variation in 
international trade integration during Latin America’s liberal reform period (roughly 
1870-1920), and the consequences of that variation for the expansion of the middle 
classes. These variables operate as critical historical antecedents, a kind of “cause of 
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causes” (Slater and Simmons 2010) that determine the value of the successive 
variable—in this case the relative size of the middle class income distribution—that in 
turn shaped the adjustment policies chosen by elites during a protracted economic 
crisis.  
Opportunities for agrarian states to integrate into the international economy 
increased dramatically during the second half of the 19th century. The demand for 
primary commodities in the early industrializing countries of England, France and 
Germany surged during this period, both as inputs for their industrial activities and for 
consumption by their rapidly expanding, urbanizing, and industrializing populations.5 
Such trade was facilitated by an equally dramatic decrease in the costs of transactions 
between nations. During this period the combination of British management of 
monetary exchange through the gold standard, as well as improvements in 
transportation introduced by technologies like the steamship and the railroad, removed 
significant barriers to exchange between the industrial core and the agrarian periphery 
(Frieden 2006).  
The greater profits to be had through international trade in primary 
commodities during this period provided the material incentives for a set of liberal 
economic reforms that swept across the decolonized states of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Between roughly the 1870s and the 1920s, countries across the region 
transitioned in varying degrees from feudal land systems inherited from the colonial 
period to commercial agriculture—particularly the transfer of communal and fallow 
                                                
5 Cite historical narrative about demand for coffee and sugar for industrial workers as a means of 
artificially increasing their productivity.  
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land to private ownership—adopting these liberal reforms in order to take advantage 
of the export opportunities presented by this increasingly lucrative system of 
international trade.  
The adoption of these liberal reforms did not go uncontested and they were not 
uniformly adopted across the Americas (Mahoney 2001b). Factors related to the 
domestic social and productive structures of agrarian societies as they emerged from 
the colonial period, and the international environment into which these newly 
independent states were born, all shaped the ability of Latin American states to 
capitalize on the economic opportunities presented by increased demand for 
agricultural commodities on the international market.  
For agrarian societies that were more successful in transitioning to commercial 
agriculture, the expansion of the agro-export sector provided opportunities for 
increased income and social mobility. This social transformation occurred directly 
through arbitrage6 and the provision of services complimentary to the export sector 
such as accounting, domestic shipping, legal services, and short-term lending. It also 
occurred indirectly through demand spillover effects in the areas of consumer goods 
retailing, cottage (artisan) manufacturing, and service provision. These occupational 
opportunities became the economic basis for the expansion of the middle classes 
during Latin America’s liberal reform period.  
The theory that emerges from a comparative historical analysis of diverging 
trajectories of institutional development and economic growth on the island of 
                                                
6 Most basically, arbitrage describes the activity of deriving profit by exploiting the difference in price 
between two markets—in this case the difference in the price for agricultural commodities across the 
domestic market  (e.g. rural hinterlands versus cities) and between domestic and international markets.  
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Hispaniola is that during a protracted economic crisis, the relative size of the middle 
classes conditions the effect of exogenous trade shocks on the industrialization of 
agrarian states. It does this by shaping the incentives rulers faced about how to provide 
for the material wellbeing of a winning political coalition and thus secure their 
political survival during a near-collapse of the agro-export model. For Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, the relative size of the middle classes was determined by those 
antecedent historical conditions that constrained or facilitated economic integration 
into expanding global markets for agricultural commodities during the late 1800s and 
early 1900s. This argument is summarized in Figure 1.3. 
[FIGURE 1.3 ABOUT HERE] 
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theoretical underpinnings of a theory of institutional continuity and change, 
highlighting the importance of social structure for pressuring states to resolve the 
coordination problems associated with bootstrap industrialization.  
Chapter 3 identifies the critical historical antecedents that explain why Haiti 
did not integrate into international markets to the same degree as the Dominican 
Republic between 1850 and 1920. I identify international and domestic-level factors 
specific to Haitian history that explain this variation, focusing on the collapse of the 
plantation system and closure to foreign investment. The empirical records of these 
two countries demonstrate the consequences of variation in integration into global 
markets during this period for occupational diversification, literacy, and the 
corresponding share of national income and political power accorded to the middle 
classes.  
Did the relative size and political power of the middle classes explain the 
economic divergences we observe in these two societies, as I argue here? Or did the 
higher levels of trade integration that we observe during the late 1800s predetermine 
their development paths independent of class structure and the political mechanisms I 
emphasize? Where Chapter 3 discusses the differences in trade integration and social 
structure that emerged on Hispaniola during the nineteenth century, Chapter 4 
documents the underlying similarities connecting these two agrarian societies at the 
turn of the twentieth century. Governed by weak states on the verge of collapse, these 
countries shared an institutional logic of economic predation; namely, the extraction of 
wealth from the agro-export sector without the provision of state goods and services in 
return. While the Haitian economy did not integrate with international markets as 
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deeply as the DR on the basis of per capita trade value, in terms of foreign borrowing 
Haiti exhibited the same level of debt dependency.  
In both cases, exploitative foreign lending emerged as the banks of major 
powers jockeyed with one-another over spheres of interest in the Caribbean. This 
exacerbated the fragility of the already weak political institutions governing these two 
societies. Access to sovereign debt played on the patrimonial logic of these regimes, 
pitting regional caudillo warlords against one another and the incumbent as they 
competed for the spoils of state power. Mounting political instability quickly attracted 
the attention of the U.S., whose general interest in dominating the region was 
heightened by its interest in protecting the shipping lanes to the Panama Canal. This 
led the U.S. government to broker the acquisition by its financial sector of all 
sovereign debt held by European banks. Eventually, state collapse on both sides of the 
island triggered twin U.S. military interventions that built centralized states and 
restored the capacity of these agrarian societies to repay their sovereign debts by 
maintaining customs receiverships that lasted until 1947.  
In Chapter 5, I show how differences in middle class political power emerging 
from the liberal reform period conditioned the economic policies of Haitian and 
Dominican rulers during the critical juncture of the 1930s. In the Dominican Republic, 
the Trujillo regime simultaneously acquired great material wealth and maintained the 
support of his middle class coalition by adjusting to the foreign exchange crisis of the 
1930s through a coordinated set of import substitution policies. In Haiti, by contrast, 
the middle class was relegated to the periphery of President Vincent’s ruling coalition. 
Because they did not pose a serious threat to the political survival of the oligarchy or 
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their prevailing mode of accumulation—arbitrage and confiscatory taxation of the 
meager export crop—the economic crisis of the 1930s failed to translate into the same 
adaptive pressures for import substitution as it did in the DR. I show how both the 
developmentalist adjustment strategy of import substitution in the DR and the 
predatory adjustment strategy of rent-seeking that targeted peasant agro-export 
producers in Haiti was reinforced by the international events of WWII and Korea, 
where wartime mobilization by the industrialized countries simultaneously improved 
the terms of trade for agricultural commodities while at the same time contributing to 
an ongoing scarcity of manufactured goods imports. This configuration of relative 
prices rewarded both the import substitution mode of accumulation that was emerging 
in the Dominican Republic as well as the agro-export model that persisted in Haiti.  
Chapter 5 also features a statistical appendix that evaluates the generalizability 
of this analytic narrative cross-nationally. Using pooled cross-sectional data spanning 
three historical junctures between 1870 and 1960, I compare the analytic narrative of 
industrialization presented here against the empirical record of 20 Latin American 
states. The first stage provides a snapshot of trade integration and changing class 
structure during the liberal reform period (1870s-1920s). The second juncture provides 
a baseline measure of class structure and industrialization just prior to the onset of the 
global depression in 1929. Finally, I provide a third-stage analysis of changing levels 
of industrialization between 1925 and 1960. The results of this three-stage model 
provide preliminary evidence consistent with my argument linking pre-1929 class 
structure in Latin America to industrialization over the 1930s-1950s. I also test two 
alternative hypotheses: First, I consider the possibility that trade exerted an 
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independent effect on the likelihood of future industrialization, suggesting that class 
structure was merely an epiphenomenal outcome of the gains from trade and the move 
towards capitalist modes of production. Second, I test my politics hypothesis 
concerning the relative size and power of the middle classes against the alternative 
markets hypothesis of Murphy et al. (1989a) that it is the absolute size of the middle 
classes, and the attendant opportunities for economies of scale that class size provides 
for, that constrains industrialization. In both cases the statistical evidence rejects these 
alternative hypotheses; this suggests that it was the politics of adjustment to economic 
crisis, rather than any independent effect that trade or internal market size might have 
had on the prospects for industrialization, that account for differences in political and 
economic development on either side of the island.  
Chapter 6 concludes by placing the development trajectories of Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic in cross-regional perspective, drawing upon comparative 
evidence of East Asian developmental states and the late-decolonized countries of 
Africa and southern Asia to shed further light on the conditions under which the 
foreign exchange crises and import scarcity lead to the emergence of a developmental 
state. Lastly, it surveys the contributions this theory makes to the enduring question of 
whether trade leads to development, identifying important conditions related to 
whether or not the gains from trade alter the distribution of income within a society.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Theory: Institutional development and industrialization in agrarian societies 
 
 
Why were some agrarian societies more successful than others in embarking down the 
path of industrialization during the 20th century?7 Whether it is through formal 
institutions like property rights that promote productive activity and investment (North 
1990), or through informal institutions of norms and beliefs that reduce uncertainty 
during market transactions (Greif 2006), the idea that institutions shape economic 
outcomes has become received wisdom. In his seminal work examining the different 
pathways to industrialization followed by Europe’s early and late-industrializers, 
Gerschenkron (1962) identified a central role for the state as investor and investment 
coordinator among those “late-late” industrializing countries that lacked well-
organized domestic capital markets. More recently, the literature on the so-called East 
Asian economic miracle brought into question many of the assumptions of liberal 
economic theory; these studies find that highly interventionist economic policies 
pursued by “developmental states” were integral to the viability of the export-oriented 
industrialization model (Amsden 2001; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; 
Evans 1995; Haggard 2004). Even more recently, scholars of Latin American 
economic development have begun to rethink the development legacy of import 
substitution industrialization, arguing that it is best understood as a variant of the same 
                                                
7 This project concerns itself with the population of non-industrialized countries that Gerschenkron 
(1962) might have called the “late-late-late developers”—countries that, by the dawn of the 20th 
century, remained predominantly agrarian and poor. 
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kinds of state-led industrialization that we observe in other regions (Bértola and 
Ocampo 2012). In order to make sense of the puzzling variation in industrialization 
among agrarian societies, we must account for why developmentalist state institutions 
emerge in some agrarian societies but not others.  
This question is motivated by the dramatic divergence in institutional 
development and economic growth evidenced by Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 
two agrarian states that share the same tropical island as well as a host of other 
features often believed to matter for shaping development outcomes. I find that 
historical antecedents related to variation in income distribution during the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, and the way that these different patterns of income distribution 
determined the relative size of the middle classes in each society, explain the policies 
governments chose in order to adjust to the international economic crisis of the 1930s 
and the disruption in the flow of manufactured goods imports from the industrialized 
world that lasted through the end of World War II and the Korean War. Differences in 
the way that economic crises affect the middle classes as compared to the peasantry 
and the oligarchy, combined with differences in the political power of the middle class 
relative to the other two sectors of society, exerted distinct political and economic 
pressures on the political class in each of these countries. Different constellations of 
incentives and pressure, in turn, conditioned the decisions of the ruling elite about 
whether state resources should be used solely to sustain the private consumption, or 
whether they should be invested in the development of domestic substitutes for the 
increasingly scarce imports. Finally, the decision to favor consumption or investment 
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during the 1930s and 40s had important consequences for the long-run determinants of 
economic and social development. 
This answer sheds new light on where institutions come from and how they 
develop over time. Challenging existing historical institutionalist accounts, my theory 
helps us understand why the continuity or discontinuity of institutions is contingent 
upon the distributional preferences of the ruling coalition. When the distributional 
preferences of that coalition to change, or when the distribution of power within the 
national political arena is altered in such a way that the composition of the ruling 
coalition itself changes, the continuity of state institutions becomes contested. Under 
such circumstances, it is the relative power of different political coalitions united 
primarily by shared distributional interests that determines whether historically 
inherited institutions change or persist.  
The idea that external shocks can promote institutional change and state 
development is not a new insight. At least since the warmaking-statemaking 
formulations of Tilly (1985, 1992) and Spruyt (1994), scholars of comparative politics 
have taken seriously the prospect that external forces related to international threat 
play a crucial role in shaping and reshaping domestic institutions, generating adaptive 
pressures and selection effects that promote the formation and development of 
stronger states (Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005; Zhu 2002). By employing a research 
design that minimizes variation in a variety of potentially confounding variables, 
including international threat environment, I am able to identify conditions under 
which international economic crises lead to the emergence of a developmental state—
one capable of acting as a catalyst for industrial transformation.  
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Before proceeding, it should be noted that the logic of this argument does not 
depend on whether these changes to the political and institutional landscapes happen 
gradually over time, or whether the social system exhibits behavior that has been 
referred to as punctuated equilibria—distinct breaks in institutional continuity usually 
brought about by exogenous shocks. While recent scholarship on institutional change 
has attempted to distinguish between these punctuated, exogenously-driven pathways 
to institutional change from gradual and presumably more endogenous pathways 
(Lewis and Steinmo 2012; Mahoney and Thelen 2010), the political dynamics driving 
institutional change in my account are identical. Following Riker (1980), I argue that 
institutions are the congealed preferences of the powerful; if they remain stable over 
time it is because the underlying political terrain of power and preference of a given 
society is also stable.  
This theory furthermore demonstrates how a developmentalist relationship 
between state and markets can emerge from states of comparatively low initial levels 
of bureaucratic capacity. Contrary to the expectations of Kohli (2004), the formation 
of cohesive states during the colonial period was not a necessary condition for agrarian 
societies to pursue state-led industrialization. Following Haber, Razo, and Maurer 
(2003), I show that a meaningful agenda of state-led developmentalism can be pursued 
even under initial conditions where the bureaucracy lacks cohesive capacity, as well as 
the kinds of autonomy from the incumbent ruler that Evans (1995) finds to be a 
necessary condition for industrial transformation. I challenge structural narratives that 
take institutional development to be exogenously determined by geographic 
endowments or colonial encounters. 
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In this chapter I unpack the several dimensions of this theory. What emerges is 
an analytic narrative (Bates et al. 1998) that identifies those critical historical 
antecedents (Slater and Simmons 2010) related to relative class size that exert a causal 
effect on the policy choices of political elites during a protracted economic crisis. I 
begin with a discussion of the historical origins of variation in social structure, 
highlighting the ways that international trade integration during Latin America’s 
liberal reform period (ca. 1870-1920) created opportunities for the expansion of the 
middle classes. I then discuss two types of exogenous trade shocks, the international 
economic crisis of the 1930s and the mobilization for war in the industrialized world 
during the 1940s, emphasizing the economic adjustment problem these trade shocks 
posed for agrarian societies. Here I preview the different consequences of the trade 
shocks for different sectors of society, examining the consequences of declining terms 
of trade for the ability of an agrarian society to continue importing and consuming 
manufactured goods. 
Next I discuss in greater detail what the adjustment policy options available to 
these states were. I argue that the two fundamental choices available to the ruling class 
were either to engage in greater taxation on other sectors of society in order to sustain 
elite consumption, or to alleviate the pressure on the national balance of trade posed 
by expensive imports through investment in the development of domestic substitutes. I 
go on to discuss the role of the state in coordinating the investments required to sustain 
such a policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI), observing that the 
formation of “pro-growth” political institutions is endogenous to the economic 
preferences of the political class. I show how the material security of the middle 
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classes were the ones most directly threatened by the trade shocks of the 1930s and 
discuss how their political power to press their grievances on the state was a function 
of their stock of human capital and their relative class size. I also attempt to illustrate 
how the rulers of agrarian societies, when confronted with the political incentives to 
adjust to a terms of trade crisis via ISI, can pursue a developmentalist strategy that is 
consistent with the patrimonial character of their regime.  
Finally, I conclude with a preliminary attempt at operationalizing this causal 
narrative as an adjustment problem. First, I derive the microfoundational preferences 
of actors in different sectors of the society based on their share of the national income. 
Second, I make predictions based on these preferences about how they shape the 
adjustment policy choice of the ruler. This exposition illustrates how the historical 
antecedents that combined to produce variation in the relative size and class power of 
the middle classes conditioned the effect of the global depression of the 1930s on 
institutional development and industrialization. 
 
Critical Antecedent: Trade Integration and Changing Class Structure  
Before exploring the political consequences of international economic crises for 
agrarian societies, and the effect that different patterns of middle class income 
distribution have on the incentives a government faces for choosing an adjustment 
strategy in response to such a crisis, I introduce one historical variable that I 
hypothesize to have a significant impact on income distribution within agrarian 
societies—international trade integration between roughly 1850 and 1929. Within the 
framework presented here this variable operates as a critical historical antecedent 
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(Slater and Simmons 2010), a kind of “cause of causes” that determines the value of a 
successive variable, income distribution, that in turn determined the economic 
adjustment policies selected by elites during a prolonged international economic crisis 
by conditioning the effect of the crisis on the distributional politics of the regime.  
 Opportunities for agrarian societies to integrate into the international economy 
increased dramatically during the second half of the 19th century. The demand for 
primary commodities among the early industrializing countries of England, France and 
Germany surged during this period, providing raw inputs for their industrial activities 
and providing for the consumptive needs of their rapidly expanding, urbanizing 
populations.8 Such trade was facilitated by an equally dramatic decrease in the costs of 
transactions between nations. The combination of British management of monetary 
exchange through the gold standard and improvements in transportation, introduced by 
technologies like the steamship and the railroad, removed significant barriers to 
exchange between the industrial core and the agrarian periphery (Frieden 2006).  
 The greater profits to be had through international trade in primary 
commodities during this period provided the external material incentives for a set of 
domestic liberal economic reforms that swept across the decolonized states of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Between roughly the 1870s and the 1920s, countries 
across the region transitioned in varying degrees from feudal land systems inherited 
from the colonial period to commercial agriculture, especially the transfer of 
communal and unused land to private ownership, adopting these liberal reforms in 
                                                
8 Cite historical narrative about demand for coffee and sugar for industrial workers as a means of 
artificially increasing their productivity.  
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order to take advantage of the export opportunities presented by this increasingly 
vibrant system of international trade (Mahoney 2001b).  
 The adoption of these liberal reforms did not go uncontested within Latin 
American societies and was not uniform across the region. As I explore in greater 
detail in the following chapter, factors related to the domestic social and productive 
structures of agrarian societies as they emerged from the colonial period, and the 
international environment into which these newly independent states were born, all 
shaped the ability of these states to capitalize on the economic opportunities presented 
by increased demand for agricultural commodities on the international market.  
For those agrarian societies that achieved higher levels of trade integration 
during this period, the expansion of global markets provided opportunities for greater 
income potential and social mobility for the middle class. This social transformation 
occurred directly through economic activities related to arbitrage9 and the provision of 
services complimentary to the export sector such as accounting, domestic shipping, 
legal services, and banking. It also occurred indirectly through demand spillover 
effects in the areas of consumer goods retailing, cottage (artisan) manufacturing, and 
services. These occupational opportunities became the economic basis for the 
expansion of the middle classes.  
In their influential volume Capitalist Development and Democracy, 
Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) argue that the prospects for democracy 
have depended historically on the relative power of the working class, the middle-class 
                                                
9 Most basically, arbitrage describes the activity of deriving profit by exploiting the difference in price 
between two markets—in this case the difference in the price for agricultural commodities across 
domestic and international markets.  
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“petit bourgeoisie,” and the land-owning oligarchy. In their model the working class 
always support democratization due to its prospects for greater political and economic 
equality. The landed oligarchy always opposes it for similar reasons. The middle class 
may support democracy if the working class isn't so powerful and autonomous that it 
threatens their propertied interests. In those instances where the petit bourgeoisie 
perceived such a threat from the working class, these authors argue that the middle 
class have historically allied with the traditional oligarchy against lower class political 
inclusion. But under specific “constellations of class interest and power” (63) where 
the landed oligarchy is weakened, often due to the development of new modes of 
production that favor capitalist markets over feudalistic structures of accumulation, 
and working class mobilization isn't too threatening to the material interests of the 
middle class, a coalition may form between them that favors greater political 
inclusion.  
 Whereas Rueschmeyer et al.  (1992) are concerned primarily with regime type 
outcomes, this focus on the landscape of social power within a country has since been 
applied to explain relative levels of development within the Americas. Recent 
scholarship has attempted to identify the mechanisms linking income inequality and 
the size of the middle classes with economic growth and development. Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) argue that initial conditions such 
as native populations that survived colonial contact and could be enslaved, as well as 
climates and soils conducive to labor-intensive commodities like cotton or sugar that 
profited from abundant labor, shape long-run development levels by generating highly 
unequal social structures. These social structures are believed to lead to economic 
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underdevelopment through self-reinforcing patterns of elite privilege that limited 
liberal economic competition and human capital formation. Eventually, these patterns 
of social relations become institutionalized over time, reproducing the inequalities in 
wealth, human capital, and political power that we observe today. 
 The work of William Easterly et al. (2006; 2001, 2007) extends the findings of 
Sokoloff and Engerman beyond the Americas, observing significant and robust 
worldwide correlations between commodity endowments, the size of the middle class, 
and economic development during the second half of the twentieth century. Like 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), they consider mechanisms by which human capital 
endows the middle classes with the political power to press their economic interests 
upon the state, illustrating why industrial reforms are consistent with those interests.  
The commodity endowment mechanism theorized by Engerman and Sokoloff 
is not able to account for underdevelopment in Haiti. Climates and soils were initially 
comparable with those of the DR, the pre-colonial population was exterminated on 
both sides of the island well before independence,10 and sugar plantations were 
abolished and land was redistributed into smallholder plots within 20 years after the 
end of the 1804 revolution. Furthermore, the reliance on available cross-national 
statistics that don’t begin until the 1950s forward complicates the efforts of Easterly et 
al. to identify the underlying causal process(es) that connected social structure with 
economic growth during the 20th century.  
                                                
10 The coercive labor policy of slave mineral extraction adopted by the Spanish crown during the 15th 
and 16th centuries, coupled with the spread of European diseases, exhausted much of the accessible 
precious mineral wealth of the island and at the same time all but exterminated the indigenous Taíno 
peoples who inhabited the island. 
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Nevertheless, this literature makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of the relationship between political institutions and economic growth. 
In their exploration of the relationship between human capital, class power, and the 
political will to pursue economic change they illuminate the crucial point that 
economic institutions are not always given but are often merely the congealed 
preferences of those who wield political power (Riker 1980). Under conditions where 
the economic interests of the middle classes are threatened by an international 
economic crisis, the political will to adopt economic reforms and construct the 
political institutions to implement those reforms depends more primordially upon the 
relative political power of that class.  
As I elaborate in greater detail further below, variation in the social structure of 
the agrarian societies that emerged from early globalization, due in part to differences 
in the level of international trade integration and the opportunities for occupational 
diversification that resulted, had important consequences for middle class income 
distribution and the political power of this class to pursue their economic interests 
during the subsequent economic crisis of the 1930s.  
It should be clear to the reader that a thriving agro-export sector at the turn of 
the twentieth century is but one cause of historical variation in the class structure of 
agrarian societies. In other contexts, historical differences in social organization that 
emerge from colonial rule (Mahoney 2010) and ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
(Easterly 2001), might also be expected to shape income distribution and class 
structure. The central point is that, whatever the determinants of income distribution 
for a given agrarian society, the politics of economic adjustment during a foreign 
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exchange crisis will generate different outcomes depending upon the relative power of 
these classes. In the next section I elaborate on this form of economic crisis, or “trade 
shock.” 
 
International Trade Shocks 
A trade shock is an acute change in the relative prices of different goods on 
international markets, one that exerts pressure on states through its effect on the 
international terms of trade for a given country.  The domestic consequences of these 
exogenous changes in the national terms of trade vary in the degree to which they 
generate both trade and fiscal surpluses or deficits, the degree that they alter the 
income and occupational opportunities of the domestic population, and also in the 
degree to which they alter the competitiveness of domestic producers vis-à-vis their 
international competition.  
 For an agrarian society—a country whose economic production consists almost 
entirely of agricultural commodities and who depends largely on imports to satisfy 
domestic demand for manufactured goods—such changes in the terms of trade usually 
come in the form of fluctuations in international demand for a particular agricultural 
commodity, a dramatic change in the availability of manufactured goods from the 
industrialized world on international markets, or both. During the first half of the 20th 
century agrarian societies experienced three such shocks to their international terms of 
trade. These trade shocks came in the form of two world wars that simultaneously 
inflated the price of their commodity exports and disrupted the supply of 
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manufactured goods,11 punctuated by an international economic depression during the 
1930s. This latter shock set the stage for diverging rates of industrialization among 
agrarian societies by disproportionally undercutting international prices of 
commodities from the agrarian periphery relative to the price of manufactured goods 
from the industrialized core. The subsequent trade shocks born of the mobilization of 
the global economy for war during the 1940s reinforced the adjustment policies 
previously adopted in response to the critical juncture of the depression, helping to 
lock these countries in on path-dependent trajectories of development.  
 
Trade shock 1: Global depression and the terms of trade for agricultural commodities 
Volatility in the relative prices of exports and imports on the international market, the 
terms of trade, are an enduring feature of globalization. The more integrated a 
country’s economy is with international markets, and the less diversified the export 
sector, the more vulnerable they are to these shocks in the terms of trade. If the value 
of a country’s exports falls dramatically below the value of the imported goods 
demanded by domestic markets, such trade shocks can push the trade balance into 
deficit and compromise the ability of societies to consume imported goods.12 For 
agrarian societies that, by definition, have not developed the industrial capacity to 
produce manufactured goods, such trade shocks present an economic crisis for those 
individuals of the middle and upper classes whom have grown accustomed to life with 
                                                
11 Coming in the wake of WWII, the Korean War essentially prolonged and accentuated the wartime 
economy for those agrarian states who were close trading partners of the United States.  
12 International borrowing can help alleviate this gap between domestic demand for imports and the 
amount of foreign exchange a country receives from exports, however during the 1930s the lack of 
liquidity on international markets effectively eliminated the possibility of taking on additional sovereign 
debt.  
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such goods. These include consumer light manufactures—items such as textiles, 
toiletries and pharmaceuticals—as well as appliances and machinery. Sharp and 
sustained declines in the capacity of the middle and upper classes to consume and 
save, as well as losses in income to those agricultural workers who produce for the 
export sector, can touch off acute political crises with profound implications for long-
run development of state capacity and economic modernization in agrarian societies.  
 Accordingly, the onset of the international depression represented a rupture in 
the coherence of the agro-export model of development that prevailed during the 
initial expansion of global that began in the mid-1800s. For those countries that had 
undertaken more-extensive reforms towards commercial export agriculture, national 
income plummeted during the 1930s as the price of agricultural commodities in 
international markets fell below the cost of production. Such an outcome threatened 
both the livelihoods of peasant producers and middle class brokers, as well as the 
savings of wealthy agro-export merchants and landholders. Similarly, the organs of the 
state and the economic interests of the political class were compromised as the state 
revenues derived from taxation of international trade—customs duties and tariffs— 
were decimated.  In Latin America this turn of events generated a wave of political 
crises that culminated in no fewer than fourteen coups across the region as entire 
societies struggled to formulate a political response to the economic crisis (Wiarda 
1998, 38).  
 En total, although different segments of the societies of agrarian societies were 
affected differently by the trade shocks of the 1930s, virtually every member of 
society except the self-sufficient peasant experienced a significant threat to their 
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livelihood during this period.  The political crisis that ensued in these countries 
touched off a vigorous policy debate about how to adjust to the economic crisis. 
Further below I more fully describe the political dynamics of the strategic interaction 
between these social sectors and the political class over adjustment policy choices.  
 
Trade shock 2: Global war 
In the trade shock described above, the capacity of an agrarian society to import and 
consume manufactured goods was constrained by a terms of trade crisis that put the 
national trade balance into deficit and drew down foreign currency reserves. A 
conceptually distinct form of trade shock from the one that occurred in the 1930s 
affected agrarian societies during the 1940s as the wartime economy of the Second 
World War (1939-1945) brought an end to the global depression of the 1930s. During 
this period the price of primary commodities on the international market boomed 
while imports remained scarce as demand for inputs for the war effort increased 
dramatically meanwhile manufacturing capacity was re-tasked to warmaking, and 
rationing set in across the industrialized world. In many countries the result of this 
external trade shock for agro-export economies was a balance of payments surplus as 
commodity exports increased but imports remained scarce and expensive. Besides 
contributing to the accumulation of capital in the form of large foreign exchange 
reserves, it also had the effect of insulating domestic producers from international 
competition. For those agrarian economies that were closely tied to US markets, 
mobilization for the Korean War (1950-53) generated a similar effect. 
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 The timing and sequence of these trade shocks were crucial for the 
development trajectories of Latin America’s agrarian societies. As I explore in greater 
empirical detail in Chapter 5, countries like the Dominican Republic that adjusted to 
the first trade shock during the 1930s13 through statist investments in import 
substitution, World War II and the Korean War reinforced these policies by 
simultaneously sheltering domestic producers from international competition while 
allowing for the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves that might be used after 
the war to import additional capital stock and accelerate the process of import 
substitution industrialization (Moya Pons 1987). For agrarian societies like Haiti 
whose political class responded to the global depression with additional predation on 
the already strained surplus value of peasant export cash crop production (Trouillot 
1990, 102–103), the international wartime economy of the 1940s and 50s also 
reinforced the chosen state adjustment policy by generating greater windfalls from the 
agro-export model (Smith 2009, 118).   
 
Adjustment Problem: State Predation or State-led Investment? 
The policy problem confronted by virtually every agro-export economy during the 
early 1930s, then, was how to cope with the dramatic loss of national income brought 
about by plummeting terms of trade for agricultural commodities. The prolonged 
balance of trade crisis brought about by declining terms of trade at the onset of the 
global depression in 1929 undermined the case for the agricultural commodity export 
                                                
13 It should be noted that World War I (1914-1918) had a similar effect on the trade balances of agrarian 
states, although its sequencing before the global depression of the 1930s had different consequences for 
the future of the agro-export model than the trade shocks that followed the depression. 
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liberalization model as a viable model for national development. Confronted with a 
pending collapse of the prevailing model due to this trade shock and the reluctance of 
different sectors of society to accept the losses to consumption inflicted by the shock, 
the political classes in agrarian societies were faced with two fundamental choices: 
Hobble along with the status quo model, forcing the ruling social coalition to squeeze 
greater tax revenue from those sectors of society to which the government is not 
accountable in order to continue servicing the patronage networks of those sectors to 
which they are accountable, or alleviate pressure on the current account by developing 
domestic substitutes for those imported goods that the society can no longer afford. 
 The first alternative, continuing with the agro-export model under the 
condition of adverse terms of trade, would signify that the ongoing consumption of 
processed and manufactured goods such as textiles, shampoo, wine, and machines 
would be a luxury to be afforded only by those who possessed the means to continue 
importing such goods. In an agrarian economy with no other significant source of 
foreign exchange currency other than income derived from agro-exports, this group 
consists of the wealthiest elites who had sufficient savings to draw from in order to 
weather the economic crisis and pay the relatively higher prices for such goods. For 
the political elites, the set of civilian and military officeholders that are sometimes 
drawn from the oligarchy but not necessarily (Winters 2011), their capacity to 
continue consuming manufactured goods under the condition of a prolonged terms of 
trade crisis depends upon increasing the income they extract through domestic taxation 
and/or foreign borrowing. Those segments of the middle classes who formed a part of 
the ruling political coalition can often count on some measure of this wealth to trickle 
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down via continued patronage from the political elite. Finally, those of the middle and 
peasant classes who were dependent upon export revenue for their livelihood would be 
forced to do without, returning if possible to subsistence agriculture.  
 The second option would require a transformation of the economy as the raw 
inputs and intermediate stages of product transformation are lined up in order to 
sustain the rapid development of an import substitution sector. In order to understand 
the policy implications of such an import substitution strategy, it is important to 
recognize the investment coordination problems that exist among firms at the 
developmental stage of a non-industrialized agrarian economy and the statist 
imperative that such coordination problems introduce.14  
The basket of goods imported and consumed by agrarian societies during the 
first quarter of the 20th century was a mix that included durable goods like machinery, 
as well as consumer goods ranging from light manufactures like textiles, cosmetics 
and pharmaceuticals, to processed goods like cooking oils and personal hygiene 
products. It also included semi-raw materials such as cement, lubricants and paper 
products, as well as unprocessed agricultural commodities like rice and wheat for 
which there existed domestic demand but insufficient domestic production. 
Consumption of each of these goods required foreign exchange reserves that were in 
short supply during the trade shock of the 1930s.  
                                                
14 On the statist imperative for late industrialization see especially Kozul-Wright (1995), "The myth of 
Anglo-Saxon Capitalism: Reconstructing the history of the American State" in Chang, Ha-Joon, and 
Bob Rowthorn. 1995. The role of the state in economic change. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press. 
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For an agrarian society confronting the need to develop domestic substitutes 
for these imported goods, the development of a supply chain of forward and backward 
linkages in order to produce these goods necessitates coordinated investments in raw 
inputs, manufacturing capital, and infrastructure. Two principal constraints confront 
societies that would pursue an economic policy of import substitution: First the 
availability of capital for market actors to invest in the forward and backward linkages 
required for the production of manufactured goods. Second, the degree of uncertainty 
faced by market actors that the associated upstream and downstream investments will 
be made.  
 Among non-industrialized countries, acute uncertainty that market actors in 
such economies face concerning the likelihood that complimentary investments in 
upstream inputs, physical capital, and infrastructure will be made generates a powerful 
ideological and practical impetus for the state to emerge as a market actor—making 
available the required investment capital and coordinating the simultaneous upstream 
and downstream investments necessary to pursue a policy course of import 
substitution. For agrarian societies, then, the formation of institutions that are “good” 
for growth during the 20th century was endogenous to the adaptive pressures they 
faced in response to exogenous international shocks.  
This insight runs counter to many theories of economic growth that view the 
historical formation of political institutions as deterministic for development 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Evans 1995; Haggard 2004; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). The type of kleptocratic patrimonial regime that 
emerges on both sides of the island of Hispaniola following independence is often 
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viewed as intrinsically incompatible with economic growth. The co-occurrence of both 
pervasive political clientelism and state developmentalism in the DR between 1930 
and 1961, under the Rafael Trujillo’s unquestionably patrimonial authoritarian regime, 
thus challenge some of the most basic assumptions of the political economy of 
development literature regarding the consequences of these types of regimes for 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa today (van de Walle 2001). This causal 
narrative also challenges institutional theories about the East Asian developmental 
state contending that a professionalized and responsive bureaucracy is a necessary 
precondition for state-led industrialization (Evans 1995; Kohli 2004). These studies 
have emphasized the need for strong state institutions that can cooperate with private 
sector actors without either being captured by them or becoming so powerful as to 
simply extort revenue from them without providing public goods or industrial 
coordination functions in exchange. The puzzle, then, is what is the ‘right’ kind of 
state intervention and where does it come from? Does the developmental state require 
a professional bureaucracy to keep policymakers both autonomous from rent-seeking 
entrepreneurs while at the same time closely embedded with them by institutional 
(rather than personal) ties, as Evans (1995) suggests, or can state-led development 
policy be driven by entrepreneurs who rely on personal commitments from the 
government or are integrated into the state itself, as the work of Haber et al (2003) 
suggests? 
As I explore in greater detail in Chapter 5, the Dominican state under Trujillo 
played a crucial role in coordinating investments in the forward and backward 
linkages of domestic production required to transition from an agrarian to an 
  43 
industrializing economy. However, its political institutions exhibited neither the 
institutional constraints on the state’s power to expropriate private property, nor the 
“good” colonial legacies of bureaucratic capacity, that are believed to matter for 
implementing state-led economic development. What emerges from this analysis of 
the process of adjustment to international economic crisis on the island of Hispaniola, 
then, is a richer understanding of the different modes of accumulation that can exist 
under patrimonial authoritarian regimes, as well as a reassessment of the possibilities 
for state-led development in poor institutional contexts.  
 
Endogenous Institutions and the Political Determinants of Economic Growth  
Contemporary economics accounts for economic growth using the Solow (1956) 
exogenous growth model. Growth depends on achieving greater labor productivity—
the amount of output a worker produces per unit input. In the Solow model labor 
productivity can be improved through investments that increase the ratio of capital to 
labor and through changes in technology that yield increases in productivity per unit of 
capital. Over time, market mechanisms are expected to push firms to increase the ratio 
of capital to labor until it converges upon an equilibrium of constant returns to scale, 
at which point it is only through exogenous changes in technology that societies find 
the increases in productivity that sustain economic growth. Consequently, this is 
known as the exogenous growth model. Other models such as Romer (1986) focus on 
endogenous sources of increased productivity and growth through enlightened public 
policies, particularly investments in knowledge capital such as research & 
development and education. Together, these models describe a process by which 
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poorer countries can expand their national incomes by making or inviting foreigners to 
make the kinds of strategic investments in physical and human capital that result in 
increased productivity and economic growth.  
 Why do some societies make the kinds of capital investments required to 
sustain a measure of industrialization and economic growth while others do not? The 
exogenous growth model assumes that firms will automatically make capital 
investments under the condition of increasing returns to scale until they reach a 
steady-state equilibrium where an additional unit of investment in capital would yield 
diminishing returns. Though elegant in its parsimony, this model fails to consider 
conditions in which firm profit depends on coordinated investments in the backward 
linkages—inputs like reliable supply chains of primary commodity inputs and a 
educated, healthy labor force—and forward linkages of infrastructure and 
manufacturing capacity required to transform upstream commodity and labor inputs 
into downstream manufactured goods.  
 
Agrarian industrialization: The role of the state 
In his seminal work attempting to map out the different paths to industrialization taken 
by “backward” countries in response to England’s move from cottage manufacturing 
to full-blown industrialization, Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) compared the 
industrialization processes of “late” industrializing countries such as France and 
Germany to “late-late” industrializers like czarist Russia. Differences in the timing of 
industrialization vis-à-vis international competitor-states, as well as domestic-level 
factors such as social structure and natural resource endowments, determined both the 
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amount of pressure faced by the “backward” states to industrialize as well as the 
opportunities and constraints they encountered in pursuit of that goal. Where the threat 
of declining relative economic power or military domination by an industrialized 
country pervaded, latecomers to industrialization manifested ideologies of economic 
nationalism—in part as a means to organize the resources of society away from short-
run consumption and towards long-run investments in “big push” industrialization.  
Gerschenkron observes that in France and Germany this allocation of resources 
was facilitated by the prior emergence of industrial banking during the mid-1800s. 
Private capital, working in conjunction with the state, established lines of long-term 
credit that financed construction of the infrastructure and physical capital necessary to 
sustain an accelerated industrial takeoff of the scope and scale necessary to catch up 
with England. In Russia, where financial markets with the private capital necessary to 
fund an industrial push had not developed by the time of their push for 
industrialization, the state emerged as the industrial entrepreneur-investor actor 
responsible for coordinating the construction of railways and factories. And whereas 
French and German industrialization enjoyed significant advantages, not only in terms 
of the availability of long-term private capital markets but also the increasingly 
urbanized configuration of their labor markets, the weakness of banks in Russia was 
matched to a social structure that placed significant constraints on industrialization—
namely a reluctant landed oligarchy and a mostly rural labor market characterized by 
peasant serfdom. Gerschenkron finds that it is was only with the mounting pressures 
for industrialization posed by military threats along its extensive frontier, and the 
greater availability of technology imports from the industrialized world, that Russia 
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was able to overcome the obstacles to economic modernization posed by weak capital 
markets, a conservative oligarchy, and a small manufacturing labor market that was 
poor in human capital. Ultimately, these challenges delayed the beginning of Russia’s 
industrialization by approximately 20 years relative to the “late-developers,” 
producing a distinctive, state-led process of industrial development. 
Though scholars have spent much ink elaborating on the investment 
coordination problems faced by late-industrializing countries, to the best of my 
knowledge no one has formally addressed the theoretical dilemmas related to 
simultaneous upstream and downstream investment coordination problems during the 
initial phase of industrialization. Murphy, Vishny and Shleifer come closest in their 
discussions of the way that integration into agro-export markets (1989a) or 
simultaneous “big push” industrialization across multiple sectors (1989b) create 
demand spillover effects that permit industrialization to unfold in agrarian economies 
with the “scope and scale” envisioned by Gerschenkron. However, their emphasis on 
the problems of economic scale faced by industrializing agrarian economies leaves 
two questions unanswered. First, how do we explain variation in industrialization 
among agrarian economies with the same absolute size of domestic markets for 
manufactured goods? As they correctly note, larger countries can generate domestic 
markets for such goods under the condition of higher proportional inequality (Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1989a, 538). In Chapter 5 and its statistical appendix I explore 
how Haiti, due to its larger population, possessed roughly the same absolute size of a 
potential domestic market for manufactured goods even though the size of their 
middle and upper class was proportionally one-third of the size of the Dominican and 
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Central American states. My empirical findings show that, at least at the early stages 
of import substitution focused on the production of non-durable consumer goods, 
absolute market size does not appear to have been an important constraining factor for 
early industrialization in Latin America. The primary constraint facing agrarian 
societies attempting big push industrialization is not the size of the internal market but 
the investment coordination problems faced by market actors. If the resolution of such 
coordination problems requires state intervention, where does the political will for 
such intervention come from?  
In order to improve our understanding of the relationship between coordinated 
investment and economic growth, Wydick (2008, 34) forwards  a preliminary 
analytical framework for understanding this problem by applying game theory to the 
scholarship of the economic historians of early American industrialization who 
explore the important economic interdependencies of the railroad, coal, and steel 
industries (Fishlow 1965; Fogel 1964; W. Rostow 1960). To achieve the type of 
dynamic economic growth like the "big push" industrialization (Rosenstein-Rodan 
1943) that took place across Western Europe and North America during the 18th and 
19th centuries, he notes that economies must generate complementarities created by 
forward and backward linkages, coordination across firms needed to produce those 
linkages, and confidence among individual firms that their investments will be 
matched by those of the other players whose productive activities are necessary for a 
given firm to realize a profit.  
Wydick uses the historical example of American industrialization to create a 
generalizable three-player investment game. The players are Railroad, Coal, and Steel. 
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Coal is a necessary input for the production of steel, coal and steel are necessary 
inputs for the building and operation of railroads, and railroads are necessary to move 
coal from the mines to the steel mills. If one player fails to invest (defects), then 
industrialization does not take place. There are two Nash equilibria15 in this game: one 
where all three players invest and one where all three players withhold investment, for 
if only one or two of the three players invest they will lose money due to the absence 
of the necessary complimentary linkages. This takes on the game form of a stag hunt, 
where “all players would like to take risky action, but only if they are confident that 
they won't get burned” (Wydick 2008, 37). The investment strategy of each player is 
conditional on the perceived probability, or confidence, that the other players will 
invest.  
Industrialization, in this framework, represents a cooperative game in which 
political institutions can act as a “visible hand” to guide the investment behavior of 
market actors. This allows us to understand why a patrimonial dictator could preside 
over a period of rapid development and industrialization by marshaling state 
resources, making certain the probability that investments in complimentary backward 
and forward linkages would be made.  
Faced with the political and economic incentives to deliver basic manufactured 
goods during the 1930s-50s to an internal market that had grown to a sufficient size 
during the period of agro-export liberalism in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and 
capitalizing on the opportunity to profit from such production, Trujillo’s government 
                                                
15 A Nash equilibrium is one where no player in a game has an incentive to deviate from her strategy 
given the strategies of the other players. 
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invested in both the physical and human capital that sustained Dominican economic 
growth throughout the second half of the 20th century. Why did neighboring Haiti 
become trapped in a Pareto-inferior but sub-game perfect (i.e. “rational”) equilibrium 
where well-entrenched Haitian elites failed to invest in productivity-enhancing 
physical and human capital despite the fact that all sectors of society would have been 
better off if they had done so? 
The decision to adjust to the economic crisis of the 1930s through greater 
taxation for elite consumption versus state-led investment in import substitution rested 
upon the consequences of the terms of trade crisis for the material wellbeing of the 
middle classes. How do the middle classes translate relative class size into political 
power, and how does that power shape economic outcomes? 
 
Relative class size, human capital, and political power 
Political institutions, and the degree of competition that they foster, have been found 
to exert a non-monotonic effect on the incentives rulers face to invest in 
industrialization through a “political replacement effect” (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006). Intermediate levels of political competition can act as a disincentive for 
incumbent rulers to make otherwise Pareto-optimal investments out of the fear that 
their ability to hold state power and extract rents from such power could be threatened 
by economic change. It is not the economic interests of the ruling class in maintaining 
an outdated economic model, per say, that lead them to block industrialization reforms 
but, rather, their interest in political survival. Under higher levels of political 
competition, political survival depends on the ability of rulers to innovate in order to 
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increase the income of the citizens, making blocking less likely. Under lower levels of 
political competition, Acemoglu and Robinson argue, elites also face fewer incentives 
for blocking such an economic transformation because their hold on power is 
perceived to be secure and thus they feel certain to capture the future rents that would 
be produced by growing a modernizing economy. It is under intermediate levels of 
political competition where rulers, fearing replacement, view industrialization as a 
threat to their hold on power and the rents they derive from that power, and thus 
discount future payoffs from economic change.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also expect levels of human capital to behave 
non-monotonically. On the one hand, higher levels of human capital improve upon the 
chances for successful industrialization and, because of the improved prospects for 
additional rents, diminish incentives for elite blocking. On the other hand, they note 
that raising the level of human capital in the process of promoting industrialization 
may also work against the survival of incumbent rulers by increasing the political 
power of different sectors of society. Citing the work of Bourguignon and Verdier 
(2000), who seek to unpack the correlation between democracy, inequality, and 
economic growth, Acemoglu and Robinson follow a long tradition of social science 
scholarship beginning at least with Verba et al. (1978) in arguing that determinants of 
socioeconomic status such as education translate directly into political power by 
endowing  individuals with the resources to participate in political life.  
In the model presented here, measures of human capital and socioeconomic 
status like education are not taken as endogenous to the preferences of rulers but are 
exogenously determined by historical factors—namely prior trade integration during 
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Latin America’s liberal reform period (ca. 1870-1920)—and the effect that the 
resulting income distribution had on the relative size of the middle classes going into 
the international economic crisis of the 1930s. When confronted with such an external 
economic threat, the political survival of the ruler in an agrarian society depended 
upon their ability to provide for the material interests of a winning political coalition. 
As I demonstrate in greater detail further below, it was precisely these middle classes 
who lost the most from the economic crisis in material terms. In agrarian societies 
where political resources like literacy were narrowly distributed, the ruling coalition 
consisted of an oligarchy that could draw from their savings to weather the economic 
crisis and a small middle class that could be coopted through networks of state 
patronage. In societies with a substantially larger middle class, the ability of the ruling 
class to hold power depended on their ability to provide the middle classes with 
domestic substitutes for those imported goods that they could no longer afford to 
purchase from abroad.  
 
Developmentalist patrimonialism?  
How do such extract rent from the ISI model without compromising the development 
project? I assume that patrimonial leaders by definition will seek to find a way to 
extract rent from the economic reforms that follow a transition to the import 
substitution model. To better understand the distributional logic underpinning this 
assumption, it is necessary to unpack the concepts of private and public goods and 
their consequences for a ruler’s political survival. 
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The divergent economic development trajectories on Hispaniola are primarily 
the product of the different ways that authoritarian regimes chose to transform, 
distribute, and consume state resources during the 1930s-50s. When rulers distribute 
state revenue for private consumption, it can only be expected to have a marginal 
positive effect on economic growth through small increases in private consumption. If 
that revenue is extracted through taxes on society, at rates that reduce the profits of 
market actors below the threshold where they would prefer leisure to productive 
activity, it has a profoundly negative effect on economic growth. But where rulers 
invest in public or collective goods that reinforce markets, by developing human 
capital and increasing the ratio of physical capital to labor, economic growth follows.  
The developmentalist investment behavior pursued by Trujillo is puzzling to 
existing theories of patrimonial regimes, which expect a ruler unconstrained by 
institutions of political accountability to use their autonomy to prey on the value of 
market surpluses, channeling a portion of that surplus value towards private 
consumption by the ruler and their narrow political coalition. The theoretical 
framework I advance here explores the possible impacts of international economic 
crises on the distributional preferences of authoritarian rulers. Variation in economic 
development outcomes on the island of Hispaniola is the cumulative result of iterated 
strategic interactions between rulers and domestic market actors who make rational 
choices about economic production under a given set of structural opportunities and 
constraints, bargaining for the distribution of state resources and responding to 
international shocks in ways that generate equilibria of economic growth or decay.  
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To explain why some authoritarian regimes achieve greater economic 
performance than others, first it is necessary to understand the distributional choices 
these rulers face. The distribution of state resources in the form of programmatic or 
public goods such as property rights has been shown to contribute to a self-reinforcing 
process of economic growth and political development (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003; North 1990). Clientelism, the targeted (as opposed to programmatic) 
distribution of state resources as private goods to individuals and groups in exchange 
for political patronage, is a form of distributional behavior that is often correlated with 
both illiberal political regimes and low economic growth (BDM et al. 2003).  
Much of the existing scholarship on public goods has mistakenly treated the 
distributional behavior of rulers as a dichotomous choice between providing 
clientelistic private goods or egalitarian public goods—concepts that ignore collective 
goods that are either rivalrous (where consumption by one precludes consumption by 
another), excludable (where provision for one does not necessitate provision for all), 
or both, but nevertheless are capable of exerting positive effects on economic growth. 
In order to understand the logic behind the kind of patrimonial developmentalism we 
observe in the Dominican Republic during the reign of Trujillo (1930-1961), a 
conceptual distinction must be made between true public goods and collective goods 
that, however beneficial for certain markets actors, are nonetheless excludable and 
thus selectively distributed.  
Attempts by market actors to mobilize political coalitions in support of 
collective, state-provided goods are distributed publicly—that is, in a non-
exclusionary manner over a wide segment of society—have been shown to suffer 
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problems of free-riding (Geddes 1994). The incentive to take political risks over 
public goods payoffs is low because, by definition, you would still receive them 
regardless of whether or not you participated in the coalition. Alternatively, while this 
argument may apply to large groups of undifferentiated actors, small coalitions of 
producers may face selective incentives (Olson 1965) that allow the coalition to press 
the state for access to collective goods with less free-riding.  
The literature on economic development has only begun to examine ways in 
which the non-programmatic distribution of state resources can still generate positive 
externalities. 16  Scholarship on clientelism in Africa has attempted to unpack the 
concept of clientelism by distinguishing traditional conceptions of “elite clientelism” 
from other types of “mass clientelism” that use public resources to gain the political 
support of a much larger coalition (van de Walle 2007). This latter type of clientelism, 
although non-programmatic, is believed to be more conducive to democratic 
outcomes. Recent scholarship on historical and contemporary applications of 
clientelism and economic growth in Mexico has shown that the failure to explore the 
excludability of selectively distributed collective goods like property rights misses 
important politics about the choices involved in deciding who receives collective 
goods and who doesn’t (Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeres, and 
Estevez 2007).  
                                                
16 “We are, in short, a long way from any general theory about the economics and politics of 
governance systems in which property rights enforcement is selective rather than universal... We 
therefore build upon the extant literatures on property rights and credible commitments in order to 
explore how a governance system in which property rights are enforced as a private good can produce 
positive rates of investment and growth. We also explore the conditions under which such a system 
would be robust to political instability” (Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003, 20). 
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Examining why Mexico was able to sustain economic growth during times of 
political crisis at the turn of the 20th century, Haber et al. (2003) show how political 
regimes that are able to credibly commit to recognize and defend property rights 
selectively, to even a small but crucial segment of market actors, can sustain private 
investment, economic growth, and tax revenues even during times of great political 
instability. Their central innovations are that governments may choose to enforce 
property rights selectively and that asset holders do not demand that the government 
protect everyone’s property rights (22). The specification of property rights is 
inherently a private good, as the government is granting something that is excludable 
and rivalrous to a constituent. The enforcement of property rights can either be 
public (non-exclusionary) or private (that is, selectively enforced). The credibility of 
government commitments to provide property rights selectively and abstain from 
expropriation in these cases comes from one or more of the following conditions: 1) 
knowledge that the government is already maximizing returns without confiscation 
(such as if the asset-holder has a particular technical capacity that the government 
lacks, e.g. mineral extraction); 2) third party enforcement by an actor such as a foreign 
state that receives rent from the asset-holder and is capable of constraining the 
behavior of the state; and 3) Vertical Political Integration (VPI) (Haber, Razo, and 
Maurer 2003, 37).  
This last concept of VPI, which Haber et al. (2003) adapt from microeconomic 
theories of firm behavior, bears particular relevance to the problem of coordinated 
investments for industrialization in agrarian societies. Corporations that require 
coordination from different firms in order to operate their supply chains often merge 
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these firms into a vertically integrated corporation in order to reduce the costs of 
monitoring contracts between different businesses. This effectively "blurs the line" 
between firms and the overall supply chain.  Similarly, Haber et al. argue, asset 
holders can blur the line between the economic class and the political class; this can be 
achieved formally through the incorporation of business elites into government 
structures, or informally through spoken agreements between authoritarian leaders and 
asset-holders. For asset holders, VPI provides the ability to shape the policies that 
govern their economic activities, the ability to monitor the government, and the ability 
to signal the government when they are not happy. Through VPI the government, on 
the other hand, gains "the confidence of a select group of asset holders that their 
property rights are secure. These asset holders will now be more likely to deploy more 
of their wealth in productive investment, thereby generating tax revenues for the 
government” (31).  
These insights provide the basis for understanding why patrimonial leaders 
ruling outside the constraints of political competition and institutionalized 
accountability may engage in forms of clientelism that reinforce market operations and 
enhance economic growth. Traditional patrimonialism, as we encounter in Haiti, 
features elites that capture the state as a means to acquire and distribute a society’s 
resources privately through clientelistic networks. This predatory behavior represents 
“low-road” patrimonialism. Alternatively, elites like Trujillo can capture the state as a 
means of vertically integrating the political and economic decisions required to 
coordinate investment in collective goods like infrastructure and human capital. Doing 
so increases the confidence of market actors that the forward and backward supply 
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chain linkages required to sustain investments in industrialization will be maintained. 
This represents “high-road”17 or developmentalist patrimonialism, and is distinct from 
more familiar patterns of elite clientelism that undermine markets by discouraging 
private investment.  
 
Dependent Variables: Adjustment choices and development outcomes 
Having explored the macro- and meso-level political dynamics underpinning 
adjustment to international trade shocks, I now provide a framework for understanding 
the micro-foundations of actor preferences in the context of agrarian economies. For 
individual members of society, the consequences of the international depression of the 
1930s, and thus their individual preferences over policy responses, depended on where 
they were situated in the national economy. For peasants who derive their living 
primarily from food they grow for themselves, residing in houses that they constructed 
and furnished largely out of locally available raw materials, the loss to subsistence-
based consumption caused by a disruption in agro-export markets is minimal.18  
 Similarly, the burgeoning middle classes in these agrarian societies typically 
derive their livelihood from providing goods and services in direct support of the 
export sector, or to provide for the market demand generated by those among the 
                                                
17 I cannot emphasize enough how the terminology of “high-road” patrimonialism I use here, and 
general references to the constructive contributions of the Trujillo dictatorship throughout this work, are 
strictly confined to the economic domain. It is certainly not lost on the author that, during the 31 years 
of Trujillo’s rule, tens of thousands of people were murdered and many, many more suffered under the 
oppression of a cruel and often merciless dictator.  
18 Conversely, for peasants who had converted to smallholder cash cropping or plantation wage-labor in 
order to maintain their livelihood, the loss of income from declining agro-export prices posed a more 
direct threat to their livelihood. This insight draws from the exceptional treatment of agrarian politics 
during the great depression provided by Paige (1997) in Coffee and Power, especially his discussion of 
the impact of the transition to peasant wage labor in El Salvador during the liberal reform period on the 
degree of political instability during the great depression. 
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domestic population who profited from the agro-export sector. By the early decades of 
the 20th century middle class livelihood in agrarian societies had come to encompass 
not only access to improved food and lodgings, but also a modest capacity to consume 
an assortment of manufactured goods that had to be imported from the industrialized 
world. During the 1930s the shrinking domestic demand for their goods and services 
due to the decline in international prices for agro-export commodities, and the 
increasing relative price of imports, resulted in a dramatic decline in the livelihood, or 
consumptive capacity, of the middle classes. 
For the wealthiest elites, the oligarchy, the loss of income derived from the 
extraction of surplus value of domestically produced agricultural goods bound for 
export markets meant that in order to maintain some measure of their prior level of 
consumption—particularly of manufactured goods—they were required to dip into 
their savings and/or liquidate some of their accumulated assets.  
 Finally, the worsening terms of trade for agrarian economies during the 
international economic depression of the 1930s led not only to trade deficits but also 
fiscal shortfalls. For the government and the political elite that depended on it for their 
livelihood, the decline in international trade corresponded with a loss of the primary 
source of tax revenue—customs tariffs and duties. This posed a threat not only to the 
material livelihood of the political elite, but also the government’s ability to sustain 
the networks of clientelism and patronage underpinning the legitimacy of the regime 
vis-à-vis their political coalition.  
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Model 
The analytic narrative that emerges here is comprised of an economic reform game set 
in an agrarian society where three classes of actor with distinct material interests and 
associated preferences, the peasant, the middle-class, and the oligarchy, are competing 
over an economic policy (state-led import substitution or intensified predation of 
status quo) to be implemented by a fourth actor-class—the political elite. The 
preferences of these actors are differentiated based on their capacity to consume and 
save above the basic level of subsistence. Following Murphy et al. (1989a), I 
conceptualize the lower peasant class as the set of individuals who command only 
enough resources to provide for their basic subsistence (food and shelter). The middle 
classes consist of the set of individuals who make enough money to provide for their 
subsistence and still have disposable income left over during normal economic times 
for the purchase and consumption of manufactured goods. Extrapolating from the 
conceptual treatment of oligarchy provided by Winters (2011), I posit that a third, 
upper-class, oligarchy, can be operationalized as individuals who make enough money 
to provide for their subsistence and their consumption of manufactured goods, while 
still maintaining a very high rate of savings during normal economic times.19 Finally, 
the political elite consists of the set of civilian and military office-holders who rely 
upon state power and the revenue the state extracts from society in order to provide 
income for their private consumption. Like the middle classes, these actors do not 
                                                
19 I assume that the oligarchy at all times are constrained in their consumption of manufactured goods 
only by the effect of diminishing marginal utility from additional units of consumption. 
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have adequate savings to provide for their consumption during hard economic times 
and rely on the constant flow of revenue from state resources.20  
This reform game plays out in agrarian societies that (again, by definition) 
have very little domestic manufacturing capacity at the onset of the game. It takes 
place under the condition of a foreign exchange crisis brought about by a sharp 
reduction in the terms of trade for agricultural commodities. The international 
economic crisis is an exogenous constant, or scope condition, that impacts all societies 
in this game. The only exogenous variable is the level of prior trade integration in each 
agrarian economy and the distribution of income that such a given level of trade 
provides for.  
In one case (e.g. Haiti), per capita income from agricultural exports is low 
before the economic crisis, and the income is distributed in a highly unequal manner 
that yields a social structure where only a very narrow group of oligarchs and political 
elites possess sufficient surplus income to consume manufactured goods and influence 
political outcomes. This narrow group of elites rules over a broad class of peasants 
whose consumption is comprised primarily of subsistence with only marginal effort 
directed towards the production of agro-export cash crops. In another case (e.g. the 
DR), class structure consists of a modest but not insubstantial middle class, a narrow 
group of elites, and a peasant class that comprises a narrower majority of the 
population than in the first case. In these agrarian societies, both the oligarchy and the 
middle classes have sufficient income to consume manufactured goods during normal 
                                                
20 As Winters 2011 argues, the oligarchy, though sometimes also members of the governing political 
elite, are a distinct, economic class, who possess great political power during normal times but often 
exert it indirectly through proxies selected from among the political class rather than holding public 
office themselves.   
  61 
economic times—prior to the onset of economic crisis. The peasant class is only able 
to consume near the subsistence level. 
The central insight of this model is that during a sharp and prolonged 
contraction in the international terms of trade for agricultural commodities the losses 
to consumption in agrarian states are distributed unevenly, both across classes and 
across countries with different levels of prior international trade integration, 
generating profound political effects. During such a crisis the consumption of 
manufactured goods falls to zero for the middle classes due to the loss of income from 
exports, meanwhile the oligarchy maintain consumption simply by lowering their 
savings rate or even allowing it to go negative for the duration of the crisis.  
 
Predictions 
Where the peasantry derives its livelihood from smallholder agriculture rather than 
plantation wages, this class is able to maintain consumption levels during a protracted 
trade crisis because they are able to adjust their mix of cash cropping and subsistence 
cultivation. Thus, in agrarian societies dominated by a smallholder peasantry and a 
small oligarchy, an exogenous economic crisis would not be expected to generate 
especially strong political pressure for a radical economic adjustment away from the 
agro-export model. 
Conversely, the loss of national income brought about by a protracted terms of 
trade crisis would be expected to undermine the ability of urbanized middle classes to 
provide for their own material wellbeing and maintain consumption at the levels they 
had come to expect during normal economic times. In particular, the ability of this 
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class to import and consume basic manufactured consumer goods becomes 
compromised. Thus, in agrarian societies where the distribution of income supports a 
relatively larger middle class, I expect a protracted economic crisis to translate into 
political pressure for radical economic adjustment away from export dependency and 
towards a strategy of import substitution. 
Finally, the policy choice faced by the political elite at the time of the crisis is 
between the status quo agro-export model and the reform model of ISI. Where the 
ruling coalition consists primarily of members of the economic oligarchy, rulers are 
able to service their coalition and thus achieve political survival by increasing the rate 
of extraction of the peasant surplus. Where the ruling coalition is comprised primarily 
of the middle classes, conversely, political survival depends on the incumbent’s ability 
to provide domestic substitutes for those goods that the country can no longer afford to 
import.  
 
Conclusion 
The theory presented here has considered the impact of a protracted terms of trade 
crisis on the material interests of different classes within an agrarian society, and the 
likely political consequences of such a crisis depending on the relative size and 
political power of those classes. It demonstrates why political arenas comprised of 
proportionally larger and more powerful middle classes would be expected to generate 
greater political pressure for the regime to adjust to the crisis by abandoning the agro-
export model in favor of a state-led import substitution industrialization model. 
Underpinning the logic of this theory are a series of insights related to the constraints 
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agrarian societies face when attempting to execute import substitution—namely the 
investment coordination problems intrinsic to bootstrap industrialization. I explain 
why rulers, even those that preside over patrimonial authoritarian regimes, face 
incentives to allocate state resources towards growth-friendly investments in 
infrastructure, physical and human capital.  
In the coming three chapters I present the empirical evidence of Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic from which this theory is derived. As the record will demonstrate 
over subsequent chapters, the consequences of the adjustment choices made by the 
ruling class during the international economic crisis of the 1930s had a profound 
impact on long-run development trajectories. At the moment when the agro-export 
model was at its weakest, rulers of some agro-export economies decided to stay the 
course, maintaining the capacity of the political class to consume imported goods by 
transferring the cost of the economic crisis onto the peasantry by increasing customs 
taxes on the export crops they produced. Meanwhile, other governments responded to 
the crisis by investing state resources in the formation of new modes of accumulation 
that combined ongoing agro-exportation with the domestic production of import 
substitutes. I illustrate how the decision to continue with the agro-export model or 
pursue economic reforms through ISI had a dramatic effect on the level of investment 
in infrastructure, physical and human capital by 1950. These differences in the 
determinants of economic productivity and growth compounded over the second half 
of the twentieth century, producing the variation in material wellbeing that we observe 
across Hispaniola today  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Critical Antecedents: International trade integration and class structure (1850-
1929) 
 
 
 
Latin America underwent a period of economic liberalization between roughly 1870 
and 1920 that is commonly referred to as the liberal reform period. These reforms 
were prompted by a rapid expansion of international trade over the second half of the 
nineteenth century. During this time semi-feudal patterns of land tenure and economic 
exchange began to give way to commercial agriculture, causing a dramatic shift in the 
distribution of economic and political power within Latin American societies. The 
influx of wealth from commodity exports provided greater opportunities for social 
mobility, creating demand for new occupations that provided the material basis for the 
expansion of the middle classes. Greater exposure to international trade during the 
liberal reform period and the resulting expansion of the middle classes, in turn, had 
important consequences for the way that Haiti and the Dominican Republic adjusted to 
international trade shocks during the 1930s and 1940s. These adjustment choices 
shaped the patterns of extraction and investment by the state institutions on either side 
of the island, determining the levels of productivity and economic growth over the 
second half of the twentieth century. As such, the relationship between trade 
integration and class structure, and the sources of variation underlying these two 
variables, represent those antecedent conditions that were critical for explaining the 
diverging trajectories institutional development and economic growth on Hispaniola.  
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Integration into Global Markets 
The expansion of international trade during the nineteenth century was driven in part 
by industrialization. Product differentiation increased the prospective gains that trade 
afforded global consumers as machines began to transform the types of goods that 
could be produced and the kinds of materials that they could be manufactured from. At 
the same time, new technologies made traded goods more affordable. The 
development of capital stock like the automatic textile loom in the mid-1700s steadily 
reduced the amount of labor required to produce manufactured goods. Meanwhile, the 
invention of steam engines and refrigeration technologies over the course of the 1800s 
expanded the class of goods that could be traded internationally, reducing 
transportation costs and providing for the storage requirements of perishable 
commodities like meats and tropical fruits. During this period the duration of 
transatlantic ocean crossings was reduced from more than one month to less than one 
week.  
This initial phase of globalization was further enabled by a period of relative 
international stability that extended from the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 
1815 to the commencement of World War I in 1914. Commonly referred to as the 
Hundred Years Peace, or Pax Britannica, this period saw Great Britain emerge as an 
international hegemon. Economic elites in gradually began to favor new, liberal trade 
policies over existing mercantilist protectionism because it allowed domestic 
producers to profit from the tremendous amounts of comparative advantage accruing 
from early industrialization in Britain. These policies included the expansion of the 
British Navy in order open and defend shipping lanes, as well as the establishment of a 
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gold standard system of international currency exchange that reduced the transaction 
costs associated with trade between nations (Frieden 2006). 
As industrialization spread from England to Western Europe and its more 
privileged former colonies over the course of the nineteenth century, urbanization in 
the industrial core drove up demand for agricultural imports—including wheat and 
beef from temperate zones as well as tropical commodities like sugar, coffee, and 
bananas. With the cultivation and exportation of these products becoming more 
lucrative, the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean began reshaping patterns 
of agricultural production and state governance in support of the development of 
commercial agro-export sectors. The political consequences of liberal economic 
reforms varied from country to country based on the extent of the reforms, the speed at 
which they were implemented, and the impact they had on smallholder farmers 
(Mahoney 2001b, 13). In most cases, it was during this period between 1870 and 
1920, rather than the waves of independence under Simon Bolivar in the 1820s, that 
the traditional oligarchic orders held over from the colonial period were displaced by 
new economic elites tied to the agro-export sector.  
The Dominican Republic was no exception to this trend of agro-export 
expansion sweeping Latin America. The absolute value of Dominican and Haitian 
trade volumes was identical prior to the onset of World War I, around $19 million 
USD in current (1913) prices (see Figure 3.1 below).  On a per capital basis, however, 
the export sector of the Dominican economy surpassed Haiti’s during the final decade 
of the 1800s, attaining a level of commercialization equal to that of the average 
Central American state (Figure 3.2). In Haiti, by contrast, the relative (per capita) level 
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of integration with international markets during the early part of the 20th century was a 
fraction of that exhibited by the DR ($10.44 in exports + imports per capita in Haiti 
versus $24.36 in the DR by 1913).  
[FIGURE 3.1 HERE] 
 
[FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE] 
DR 
$19m 
Haiti  
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
19
05
 
19
06
 
19
07
 
19
08
 
19
09
 
19
10
 
19
11
 
19
12
 
19
13
 
19
14
 
19
15
 
19
16
 
19
17
 
19
18
 
19
19
 
19
20
 
19
21
 
19
22
 
19
23
 
19
24
 
19
25
 
19
26
 
19
27
 
19
28
 
19
29
 
Source: Montevideo - Oxford  Latin American Economic History Database (MOxLAD 2011). 
Figure: Exports + Imports in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1905-1929  
(million current US$) 
  68 
 
Despite being pre-industrial agrarian societies that shared similar geography, the 
Haitian and the Dominican economies responded very differently to the opportunities 
for international trade in primary commodities that presented themselves during this 
time period. By the time of the onset of the international economic crisis in 1929 there 
existed a qualitative difference in the levels of trade integration that had taken place on 
either side of Hispaniola.  
For Dominicans, the expansion of global markets generated opportunities for 
increased income, both directly through arbitrage21 as well as through the demand for 
provision of complimentary services that emerged alongside the export trade. These 
opportunities provided the economic basis for the expansion of the middle classes. For 
a variety of reasons, both international and domestic, Haiti did not undertake the 
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liberal reforms that would have been required in order to more fully integrate its 
economy into international markets to the same degree as the Dominican Republic. In 
the following sections I identify several factors that account for this variation in 
international trade integration across the island of Hispaniola.  
 
Greater integration into international markets in the Dominican Republic 
At the time of its national independence in 1822 the Dominican Republic was largely 
disconnected from the international economy (Turits 2003, Chapter 1). A small, semi-
feudal system based primarily on pastoral ranching and logging was the economic 
legacy of Spanish colonialism. Peasants were largely engaged in hunting and 
gathering and marginal subsistence agriculture, operating under a pre-enclosure land 
system that, lacking an effective system of land titling, was not conducive to the 
formation of a commercial agriculture sector.  
Integration into international markets began during the 1840s, stimulated by the 
arrival of foreign tobacco merchants in the north of the country. German merchants 
propagated an elaborate and decentralized system for extracting and transporting 
tobacco from smallholder peasants in the Cibao valley through a network of native 
merchants who acted as intermediaries, to the coastal city of Puerto Plata and on to the 
German ports of Hamburg and Bremen (Baud 1987). Baud offers a concise description 
of the 19th century tobacco economy of the DR, pivoting on the relationship between 
peasant tobacco producer, local shopkeeper, and the foreign merchant: 
                                                                                                                                       
21 Most basically, arbitrage describes the activity of deriving profit by exploiting the difference in price 
between two markets—in this case the difference in the price for agricultural commodities between 
domestic and international markets.  
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[The peasant] sows the tobacco and offers to sell it to a shopkeeper, if the 
latter will give him what he and his family need. The shopkeeper does not have 
the means to do so because the revolutions have devoured his savings. But 
he recognizes good business and runs to the foreign merchant, whom he asks 
for an advance. The merchant, who already knows that the peasant has sown 
the tobacco and that it will only take four months for the tobacco to be dried 
and packed, gives the money to the shopkeeper with interest. The 
shopkeeper passes it on with more interest to the peasant, who is now able to 
look after himself and his family. (137) 
 
The new way of generating income in the DR through intensive agricultural 
cultivation during the second half of the 19th century touched off a political conflict 
during the 1860s and 70s between the pre-capitalist feudal caciques of the south that 
came to be known as the Partido Rojo and liberal merchants of the northern Cibao that 
came to be known as the Partido Azul. The southern economy and social structure was 
a holdover from the colonial period, characterized by a peasantry that relied mainly on 
subsistence agriculture and a narrow class of landed gentry who derived their means 
from ranching and the logging of Mahogany. By the late 1870s the primary economic 
basis of southern elites, logging, was in crisis due to resource depletion By this time 
the northern economy was based largely on the cultivation of export crops, and in 
1879 the Rojos were finally eclipsed by this rising Azules coalition of merchant-
bourgeoisie (Moya Pons 1992, 403). This group acquired economic and political 
resources through their involvement in the export of coffee, cacao, tobacco, 
mahogany, and, increasingly, their involvement in import arbitrage (Cassá 2004a; 
Moya Pons 1990).  
Concentrated in urban areas, the Azules held power between 1879 and 1899, 
during which time they actively sought to use the Dominican state to transform the 
territory into a platform for export-dependent capitalism. The Dominican state began 
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implementing a variety of anti-vagrancy and enclosure laws intended to extend state 
control into rural areas for the purpose of encouraging peasant labor to begin 
generating a surplus. However the lack of state capacity made these laws largely 
ineffectual. Rather “attempts at commercialization remained relatively toothless 
throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s until the arrival of Trujillo [in 1930]” 
(Turits 2003, 52-3). Ruled during this period by the dictatorship of Ulises “Lilis” 
Heureaux (1883-1899), the Azules actively sought foreign investment in agricultural 
production and borrowed comparatively large sums of money from various European 
creditors for the financing of railways and telegraph wires to support national 
development through the expansion of the agro-export sector.  
Changing prices on the international market during this period led to dramatic 
restructuring of the chains of production and trade. Sharp declines in terms of trade for 
tobacco and sugar during the international economic shocks of the 1870s and 1880s 
decimated the German export business in the north and forced out the less-efficient 
smallholder sugar producers of the south. In the north, the indigenous capitalists that 
had served as intermediaries between smallholder tobacco farmers and the now-
defunct German export houses in Puerto Plata began encouraging the decentralized 
network of peasants in the Cibao to switch their cash cropping from tobacco to cacao. 
By the 1880s cacao fetched much higher prices than tobacco, the international market 
for the latter having been saturated with the entry of Brazilian and Indian tobacco 
during the 1870s.  With the exit of the German merchants during the same decade, this 
left the full chain of production and exportation of cacao to Dominican entrepreneurs. 
“Production was overseen by peasant families or Dominican capitalists who had 
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accumulated their money in the tobacco trade. Dominican enterprises also played a 
major role in the cocoa trade, which gave the Cibao commercial bourgeoisie the 
opportunity to consolidate and increase its strength. The De Moya, Grullón, Guzmán, 
and García family names became well known during this period and still are” (Baud 
1987, 139). 
 At the same time the tobacco market was in decline in the north, a separate 
agro-export economy was developing in the south of the country. Until the 1870s, 
ranching and small-scale subsistence agriculture, rather than liberal agro-exports, 
defined the economy of the south and east. Cuban immigrants fleeing the Ten Year 
War (1868-78) established the first large-scale Dominican sugar plantations based on 
their centrales model. Over time these plantations contributed dramatically to the 
growth of the southern port city of San Pedro de Macorís and, later, Santo Domingo 
and La Romana. The elimination of smallholder sugar production due to the sharp 
decline in export prices in 1883 was quickly followed by the elimination of many 
nascent Dominican sugar capitalists who did not have sufficient reserves to whether 
the crisis. The pressures to economize sugar production following the sugar crisis led 
the remaining foreign plantation owners to dramatically expand the scale of 
production, substituting relatively scarce and comparatively expensive Dominican 
peasant labor with cheaper immigrants for the labor-intensive nature of cane-cutting.22 
                                                
22 The population density of the Dominican Republic during the liberal reform period was much lower 
than that of Haiti. In 1900 there were approximately 31 persons per square mile in the DR, compared to 
approximately 123 persons per square mile in Haiti. The Dominican population does not overtake the 
Haitian population in absolute terms until the late 1990s. With nearly twice the surface area of Haiti, the 
DR has never approached it in terms of population density.  
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This began in 1884 with the arrival of so-called “cocolos” from the English Antilles 
and, following the US military intervention in 1916, Haitian migrant labor.  
By the end of the 19th century there were two distinct Dominican economies in 
exchange with world markets. The northern Cibao was characterized by a system of 
smallholder peasant agriculture specializing in cacao and coffee export crops in the 
rural areas and Dominican import/export bourgeoisie in the urban areas; the southeast, 
in turn, was dominated by foreign-owned sugar enclaves exploiting cheaper immigrant 
labor. 
In both the north and the south the revenues generated from agro-exports 
created an increasingly powerful import bourgeoisie in the port cities. International 
economic crisis in the late 1890s touched off a period of internal conflict among the 
Azules that led to the assassination of Heureaux in 1899. This marked the beginning of 
a period of political instability that culminated in state collapse. This instability 
compromised the ability of the DR to service its debts, triggering foreign intervention 
by the United States (Atkins and Wilson 1998). This period will be treated in greater 
detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Lesser integration into international markets in Haiti 
If the development profile of the Dominican Republic broadly conforms to Latin 
America’s general pattern of liberal economic reform during the late 1800s and early 
1900s, the failure to intensify agro-export production in Haiti during this period 
represents a puzzling regional outlier. Haiti never implemented liberal reforms in 
response to expanding markets for tropical commodities in the industrializing world. 
  74 
At the same time that neighboring DR, Cuba, and Puerto Rico were transforming their 
modes of accumulation from semi-feudal systems based on subsistence agriculture on 
rented or communal land to an agro-export model featuring greater privatization and 
commercialization, the means of accumulation for the Haitian peasant remained one of 
subsistence agriculture complemented by marginal coffee cash-cropping on untitled 
squatter land.  This class, which at the time constituted 95% of Haitian society by one 
estimate (Castor 1988), provided the basic means of accumulation for a narrow 
oligarchy of foreign export merchants, as well as those Haitian mulattos whose 
livelihood depended on the customs tax revenues and resulting state patronage that 
Haiti’s modest export sector allowed for.  
As late as 1931, as the reform period was coming to an end and the rest of the 
region was pivoting away from agro-export dependency, progressive Haitian thinker 
and politician Jean Price Mars was still advocating basic liberal reforms as a stepping-
stone to lift Haiti out of poverty. In response to the economic crisis of 1929, Price-
Mars' view on how to resolve the employment question rested on the diversification of 
primary agricultural production to include other export crops besides coffee. By 
improving the balance of payments through increasing commodity exports, he thought 
that Haiti could finance “an appropriate agricultural education to the proletariat in 
order that they might become more apt and more efficient as producers and that they 
might evolve into consumers by means of the elevation of their standard of living” 
(Shannon 1996, 113). Why didn’t Haiti undergo liberal reforms and integrate itself 
into global markets during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the same 
degree as neighboring countries? 
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Before the onset of its revolution, Haiti was arguably the most integrated 
economy in the world. Producing nearly half of Europe’s coffee and sugar, by some 
accounts it was the wealthiest colony in the world (Buck-Morss 2000, 833). Yet 
within the first half-century following independence sugar production had all but 
collapsed as the flames of the French revolution spread to Saint Domingue—its 
liberation discourse provoking an uprising by Haitian slaves against their French 
colonial masters in 1791 that ultimately forced the French Republic’s legislature to 
reluctantly pass the first general decree of emancipation in Haiti, and indeed in the 
Americas, in 1793 (Gonzalez 2012).  
The promise of liberation under the French emancipation decree was short-
lived, however. The slave system was quickly replaced by other forms of coercive 
labor enforced by Haiti's increasingly powerful and privileged affranchis—a class 
comprised of those Haitians who were predominantly mulatto offpsring of mixed 
African and French descent. Replacing the construct of the slave was the Cultivateur, 
a peasant who was nominally free but bound to a particular plantation and without 
rights to move around (30-31). Even this dismal measure of emancipation was 
reversed by the decree of Napoleonic France, triggering a final thrust for Haitian 
independence that was successfully concluded in 1804.   
Haiti's revolution did not end with the conclusion of hostilities against France. 
Coffee production, though having become Haiti’s most important export commodity 
following the collapse of sugar—providing more than 80% of all customs export 
revenue in 1908 (Gaillard-Pourchet 1990, 118)—quickly fell to a fraction of what it 
was before Haitian independence (Houzel 1935, 52). Political and economic forces 
  76 
continued to reshape the Haitian landscape for decades after independence as different 
groups pursued their material wellbeing, none of which were conducive to the 
formation of a vibrant agro-export economy (Gonzalez 2012). Why didn’t Haiti’s 
agrarian economy respond to the trade opportunities afforded by the rapidly 
globalizing world economy of the late 1800s by re-establishing itself as a platform for 
agro-exports? 
Domestically, there are two historical reasons rooted in the decolonization 
experience that explain why Haitian elites were unable to turn to the system of agro-
export liberalism as a viable means of accumulation. First, the structure of production 
of Haiti’s predominant export crop—sugar—was incompatible with the ideas 
underpinning Haitian independence. Whereas in the DR latifundia estates and 
plantations had taken root with the diffusion of sugar cultivation in the Caribbean in 
the 1870s, in Haiti large-scale plantations were gradually eliminated during the early 
years of independence, leaving behind a productive structure, marronage, based on 
smallholder agriculture (Lundahl and Nalin 1992a, 1992b).  
Scholars have attributed enduring attribute of the Haitian peasant to the 
ideological salience of the slave rebellion, which emphasized liberation from coercive 
forms of labor relations (Dupuy 1989). At the time of the revolution, Haitian society 
was divided starkly between a narrow group of mulatto elite who had acquired some 
measure of wealth and privilege under the French and the mass of black peasants, the 
majority of whom were slaves up until the revolution. The mulatto elite, as well as a 
slightly larger segment of blacks who had distinguished themselves through military 
service during the revolution, attempted to restart the plantation system as a means of 
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accumulating wealth (Castor 1988; Gonzalez 2012). At the time of independence 
nearly all Haitian elites favored the continuation of the planation economy; their 
attempts to restore the earlier mode of accumulation inherited from the French being 
made under the guise of generating export revenues necessary to arm the fledgling 
Republic against the possibility of further military incursions by the French. 
Aversion to plantation labor following the revolution drove most Haitian 
peasants into squatter smallholder agriculture in the mountains, however, where 
uncertain land tenure and constant extortion by the Haitian army predictably 
undermined the willingness of these farmers to invest in more intensive means of 
cultivation. As coercive efforts towards re-imposing plantation agriculture made by 
early Haitian rulers Dessalines, Christophe and, to a lesser extent, Petión faltered, 
squatting became all the more pervasive. During the 1820s, with landowners 
struggling to find peasants to harvest their crops, the government under President 
Boyer (1818-1843) attempted to force peasants back onto these plantations through 
vagrancy laws called the Code Rural (Nicholls 1996, 68). These efforts failed as well 
owing to the prohibitive costs of repression, sending more peasants fleeing to the 
mountains to escape forced labor and coercive taxation.  
As a consequence, the volume of Haitian sugar exports plummeted from 2.5 
million pounds in 1820 to six thousand pounds in 1842, leaving only the cultivation of 
crops that did not require plantation-scale production such as coffee, cacao, cotton, 
and timber (Nicholls 1996, 69). The result was a Haitian economy comprised largely 
of untitled (that is, unreformed) smallholder agriculture conducted by peasants who 
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grew enough food to subsist, perhaps selling a small surplus, augmented with a 
meager cash crop (typically of coffee) at a nearby market.  
The second domestic dimension to Haiti’s relatively low level of integration 
into world markets during the 19th century pertains to its historical aversion to foreign 
investments like the kinds that made Dominican sugar production viable in the 
southeast. Since independence there has existed a powerful opposition to foreign land 
ownership, one that served to restrict meaningful opportunities for attracting 
international capital. Understood as an expression of “racial equality and human 
dignity” (Nicholls 1996, 103), foreign direct investment remained prohibited by 
Haitian law until the US military occupation overturned it in 1918 (53).23 Fear of 
future penetration by European powers was coupled with a nationalistic ideology of 
self-determination that stemmed from Haiti’s proud decolonization process. This 
generated a domestic political culture that was strongly averse to foreign ownership. 
Thus, the same entry of Cuban sugar plantation capital and technical capacity that the 
Dominican Republic experienced during the 1870s was not possible in Haiti.  
The net result of the domestic factors of the elimination of coffee and sugar 
plantations and low penetration by foreign investors partially explain why Haitian 
exports fall off during the 19th century. The reflections of a foreign merchant in the 
1820s lament an agrarian economy that is not oriented towards participation in 
international markets: 
                                                
23 Despite such an overturning, it is notable that virtually every attempt by the US occupation to enact 
liberal land reform and pave the way for foreign investment was resisted not only by the peasants, who 
were suspicious of the white occupation and angered by earlier attempts by the occupation to construct 
national roads through a system of forced labor (the Corvée), but also by Haitian elites who were 
successful in tying up land ownership questions in the still-independent courts (Schmidt 1971). 
  79 
Foreign visitors to Haiti observed the dilapidated state of the large plantations, 
and the prevalence of smallholdings on which peasants grew enough to support 
their families, selling the surplus at the local market. “Hayti abounds with these 
small proprietors”, wrote Franklin, “their patches of land, with their huts upon 
them, are generally situate [sic] in the mountains, in the recesses, or on the most 
elevated parts, or spots, as the poet described, ‘the most inaccessible by shepards 
[sic] trod’. They are therefore lost for the purposes of agriculture. Much of the 
coffee and of the other crops exported at this time was also grown by these small 
farmers, rather than on large estates, and the coffee was gathered from trees 
planted many years earlier which were growing almost wild. Franklin lamented 
the lack of interest among the peasants in growing crops for export, and also 
noted that they did not appear to be particularly keen on consuming imported 
goods. It was, in fact, according to this writer, Boyer's plan “to keep his people 
ignorant of artificial wants”, a policy which, if successful, spelt doom for foreign 
speculators and Franklin himself. (Nicholls 1996, 69) 
 
Yet while the unavailability of plantation labor following the revolution 
precluded Haitian elites from maintaining the level of sugar production that existed 
under the French, coffee can be cultivated profitably at either plantation or smallholder 
scale. Why didn’t Haiti’s smallholder farmers respond to global demand with 
intensified coffee production as effectively as the minifundista peasant producers in 
the Cibao valley of the Dominican Republic?  
The ban on foreign ownership of Haitian land was a hindrance, but not an 
insurmountable obstacle, to the entry of foreign merchants. The cultivation of coffee 
(and to a lesser extent cacao and cotton) during the 19th century remained both an 
integral part of the Haitian economy and a draw for the same class of foreign 
(increasingly German by mid-century) merchants that gained access to Dominican 
tobacco production via Puerto Plata (Girault 1981, 159). Though foreign merchants 
were prohibited by every Haitian constitution since independence from acquiring real 
estate or conducting business anywhere but in those ports designated as open for 
foreign trade, European merchants frequently circumvented these law by marrying 
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into local Haitian (typically mulatto) families (Girault 1981, 160). Often young and 
single, intermarriage between these expatriate merchants and mulattos allowed 
foreigners to own property under the name of their spouse while simultaneously 
reinforcing the economic privilege of the mulatto class.  
Given that foreign merchants were successful in gaining access to the Haitian 
agro-export sector during the 19th century, bringing global demand to Haitian ports, 
the low intensity of coffee cultivation in Haiti in the century following independence 
was due to the inability of peasants to defend their surplus from a predatory state. 
Without access to labor by which to resume plantation agriculture, Haitian elites were 
forced to resort to a non-capitalist model of accumulation that depended on the capture 
of the state and the tax revenues it collected. Dominican liberal reformers, the Azules, 
sought to use the state both as a vehicle for patrimonialism as well as an institution for 
coordinating the development of the DR as a profitable agro-export platform. 
Conversely, the Haitian oligarchy, which that had ruled directly or indirectly since 
independence, taxed coffee production at a level that made it economically trivial as a 
cash crop for peasants. To understand why the political economies of Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic evolved differently in respect to the taxation of agro-exports, we 
must look at the international context in which Haiti was situated during the 19th 
century.  
Along the international dimension, two factors conspired to reinforce the 
predatory dynamic of state-society relations that emerged following the revolution: 
trade embargos on Haiti during the first decades following independence, and the size 
of the indemnity Haiti was forced to pay France for diplomatic recognition. Shortly 
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after independence Haiti found itself under embargo from its two natural trading 
partners—the United States and France. Only five hundred miles from Hispaniola, the 
US was Haiti's most important trading partner for the first two years of its 
independence. This lasted only until domestic concerns related to slave relations in the 
American south, as well as pressure from France—Haiti’s traditional export market—
led the US government to impose a trade embargo on Haiti in 1806 (Nichols 37).24 
Appeasing its former colonizer, then, became the central foreign policy objective of 
the Haitian state during the first decades of independence. 
It was not until the Haitian government under Boyer agreed in 1825 to provide 
France with privileged customs rates and pay France an indemnity of 150 million 
francs25 for the seizing of the ‘property’ of French citizens during the revolution that 
Haiti achieved a measure of international recognition. 26 The Haitian state serviced this 
debt by raising export duties and forcing the army to extract tribute from Haitian 
farmers—tribute that served to line the pockets of many levels of state officials, what 
Castor (1988) called “the parasitic sectors,” and service an international debt that 
yielded no material benefit to those being taxed. According to Nicholls, the pursuit of 
French recognition in the early years of Haitian independence had three consequences: 
First, the government was made unpopular by trying to raise the money for the 
indemnity through taxes—a task delegated to the predominantly black army in the 
                                                
24 In part, France was successful in seeking to isolate Haiti from the United States during this time by 
leveraging its bargaining position vis-à-vis the Louisiana Purchase (Nicholls 1996, 37).  
25 By comparison, total Haitian annual foreign exchange revenue from exports at the time of 
negotiations (1823) has been estimated to be approximately 30 million francs. “The initial agreement 
between France and the young republic called on Haiti to pay the whole 150 million francs in five 
annual payments of 30 million gold francs. That proved impossible for Haiti, which was forced under 
the pact to take out a loan from a French bank to pay the first 30 million francs. In 1838, France agreed 
to reduce the debt to 60 million francs to be paid over a period of 30 years. In 1883, Haiti made the final 
payment” (De Córdoba 2004). 
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countryside and the predominantly mulatto customs officers in the ports. Second, the 
imposition of the indemnity brought foreign financial involvement to Haiti as Boyer 
was thus forced to look to international lending from European banks—beginning with 
a sum of 24 million francs—to act as a down payment on the indemnity. Third, the 
lowering of customs duties on French commerce to half of the rate of other countries 
further reduced sources of state revenue generation, exacerbating the decline in the net 
value of exports and imports due to the collapse of the sugar plantations (Nicholls 
1996, 65). By dramatically increasing the Haitian state’s need for tax revenue and 
depriving it of the financial resources that might have been otherwise invested 
elsewhere, the trade concessions and the French indemnity only further undermined 
the social contract connecting Haiti’s peasant producer and the state.  
This burden of tax revenue, born almost exclusively by Haiti’s small coffee 
producers, was of a predatory nature that lacked any form of reciprocal benefit such as 
state provision of schools or health centers in rural areas (Girault 1981). Taxation on 
the surplus value of coffee reached a rate that compromised the incentives of the 
Haitian peasant to intensify cultivation and undermined the formation of Haiti’s 
internal consumer market (1981, 187–202). As North (1981) would expect, extraction 
by the Haitian state since independence approached the limit where producers are 
indifferent between investing time and resources into greater economic production or 
simply engaging in subsistence agriculture and leisure. The low intensity of coffee 
cultivation in Haiti was a consequence of the inability of peasants to defend their 
surplus from the predatory taxation of the state—both indirectly at the customs houses 
                                                                                                                                       
26 The US did not recognize Haitian statehood until 1862. 
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of the ports and by the Haitian army in the countryside. The burden on the value of 
coffee imposed by the state, minus the profits extracted by the foreign exporters and 
domestic intermediaries, yielded a residual profit for the Haitian peasant producer so 
low that Haitian coffee production stagnated (Girault 1981, 202). The political 
economy that emerged from the 19th century was one where the Haitian state, and the 
mulatto elites that comprised the ruling coalition, relied overwhelmingly on revenue 
from coffee exports to service the debts held by international creditors as well as the 
consumptive interests of the ruling class. This was not a political economy conducive 
to the development of a productive commodity export sector. 
There are alternative explanations for why Haiti might not have been able to 
develop a more-intensive agro-export sector following independence. It is plausible 
that the political culture emerging from Haiti’s slave revolt made commercial 
agriculture untenable due to the overt rejection of the sugar plantation model. 
Gonzalez (2012) downplays the importance of international factors like the U.S. 
embargo or the French indemnity. Rather, the roots of Haitian underdevelopment were 
laid in the smallholder subsistence agriculture model adopted by Haitian peasants 
(212-3). He argues that it was the aversion of Haitian peasants to "slave-like" coercive 
labor relations—namely the plantation system and the repeated but futile attempts of 
foreign occupiers and Haitian elites to attempt to re-impose such plantations—that 
kept Haitian development at a stalemate.  
The comparative evidence on the Dominican Republic presented above 
reduces confidence in the sugar-centric hypothesis. It should be noted that the 
economic basis for the emergence of liberal economic reforms in the DR was the 
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expansion of smallholder agriculture across the untitled lands of the northern Cibao. 
While Haiti’s unique political culture can account for the economy’s failure to restore 
sugar cultivation to anything near pre-revolution levels, it cannot fully account for its 
inability to generate additional revenue through investments in intensified coffee 
cultivation. Rather, pressing debt and indemnity payments imposed by a hostile 
international environment, combined with those factors related to the elimination of 
large-scale domestic agricultural production that Gonzalez emphasizes, locked Haitian 
rulers in a state of permanent financial crisis and reinforced the predatory logic of the 
regime. 
Alternatively, others have questioned the geographic comparability of these 
two cases. In his preliminary examination of development variation on the island of 
Hispaniola, Diamond (Diamond 2010) argues against treating the island as a 
geographical constant, emphasizing differences in precipitation, deforestation, terrain, 
and population density on the western and eastern parts of the island. Because the 
trade winds blow from east to west, the Dominican Republic receives a greater 
proportion of the annual precipitation today than does Haiti. The mountain ranges that 
traverse the island feature more valleys suitable for cultivation on the Dominican side, 
especially the fertile and economically important Cibao valley. Finally, Diamond 
notes that the greater population density of Haiti, whose surface area is approximately 
half the size of the DR, introduces greater pressure on the environment and contributes 
to the deforestation that has reduced both arable land and the availability of 
subsistence fuel. 
  85 
 A closer examination of the determinants of economic growth on the island 
raises important questions for Diamond’s thesis and suggests that, in geographic 
terms, Haiti and the DR are sufficiently comparable. Jaramillo and Sancak (2009) find 
historical evidence that the majority of Haitian deforestation took place after 1960, and 
thus can be considered endogenous to other structural factors. They also report 
evidence of average annual precipitation rates during the 1930s as being nearly equal 
on the eastern and western sides of the island. This suggests that the uneven 
precipitation we observe today may be at least partly endogenous to the deforestation 
that took place during the second half of the twentieth century. Such an outcome 
would be consistent with Diamond’s own findings in his analysis of Easter Island in 
the same 2010 study, where he finds that a dramatic reduction in forest acreage 
reduced subsequent precipitation rates. Reinforcing the claim that these are 
comparable tropical countries, Jaramillo and Sancak observe that malaria rates on 
either side of Hispaniola were identical at the time of colonization (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Regarding labor endowments, they also note that 
population density has been found to be positively correlated with economic growth 
between 1960 and 2005—especially in the top-performing east-Asian economies 
(Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999). Concerning the amount of arable land on either 
side of the island, Jaramillo and Sancak note that Haiti’s ability to supply the majority 
of Europe’s sugar and coffee during the 18th century argues against claims that Haiti’s 
mountainous terrain was an obstacle to agricultural development. The evidence 
suggests that it was political events, namely the Haitian revolution and the political 
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economy that emerges from that historical juncture, not geographic constraints, that 
explain why Haiti fails to re-establish itself as a major agro-export country.  
 Finally, political instability represents another competing hypothesis for why 
the Haitian economy did not develop as vibrant an agro-export sector as did the DR. 
The empirical evidence is not consistent with this explanation, either. First, on a 
comparative basis the mulatto regimes of the 19th century exhibited greater political 
stability than existed in the DR, where initial independence was compromised by 
Haitian occupation (1822-1844), as well as a brief return of the Spanish crown 
between 1861-65 in an effort by the traditionalist Rojo faction to gain an upper hand in 
their political conflict with the Azules liberal reformers. By comparison, Nicholls notes 
that “apart from the years 1842-7 [Haiti] enjoyed political stability under three heads 
of state; Boyer (1818-43), Soulouque (1847-59) and Geffrard (1859-67). The 1843 
revolution which overthrew Boyer was itself a gentlemanly affair between rival 
factions of the mulatto elite" (Nicholls 1996, 69–70). As the next chapter discusses, 
Haiti did not experience chronic political instability until the early years of the 
twentieth century when both it and the Dominican Republic were swept under by 
competing warlords and predatory foreign lenders.  
In sum, the decline of sugar production due to the lack of available plantation 
labor after independence in 1804 eliminated one of Haiti’s most lucrative export crops. 
The confluence of domestic and international factors that followed contributed to the 
relatively low intensity cultivation of the other leading export crop, coffee, producing 
an export sector that was rapidly being eclipsed by the Dominican Republic at the end 
of the 19th century (Table 3.1). 
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[TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
While the average value of exports on either side of the island was identical during the 
final decade of the 19th century, on a per capita basis the Dominican agro-export sector 
was nearly twice as large as Haiti’s.  
The final section examines the consequences of the liberal reform period for 
occupational and income demographics in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 
illustrating the effect that greater trade integration on the Dominican side had on social 
structure—namely the expansion of the middle classes. 
 
The Effect of Trade on Class Structure in the Dominican Republic 
For agrarian societies like the Dominican Republic that became more tightly 
integrated into world markets during the liberal reform period, class structure was 
transformed from one featuring a narrow, feudalistic oligarchy ruling over a largely 
subsistence peasantry to another structure featuring an emerging group of middle 
Table: Value of Exports 1890-1898 (in thousands of current gold dollars)
Year Haiti Dom. Rep.
1890 3,306       1,948       
1891 3,120       1,463       
1892 3,164       1,822       
1893 3,301       2,829       
1894 3,007       2,692       
1895 3,310       -
1896 2,500       2,199       
1897 2,993       4,661       
1898 3,212       5,790       
Average export value, 1890-1898 3,101       2,925       
Average export value per capita, 1890-1898 2.44$       5.74$       
Sources: For trade: Gaillard Pourchet (1990),  Gomez (1979). For 
population: Lubin (1951), Lozano (1985).
Note: Export value per capita is calculated in gold dollars per person. For 
Haiti, the population estimates for per capita trade are from 1900 (1,270,000 
persons). For the Dominican Republic, they are calculated by taking the 
average of population estimates from 1887 and 1908 (510,106 persons).
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classes who earned their livelihood by engaging in those economic activities that 
complimented the primary export sector and the income that it produced (Baer 1972, 
96–97). Meanwhile, in agrarian states like Haiti where the export sector remained 
relatively small, social structure remained sharply divided between the peasant masses 
and a narrow, highly extractive, and patrimonial oligarchy.   
While income distribution data for Haiti and the Dominican Republic are non-
existent for this period, two other measures can be used to approximate the relative 
size of the middle classes on either side of the island. Figure 3.3 below shows that in 
1858, just prior to the onset of the liberal reform period, the social structures of Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic were comparable by two measures: the percentage of the 
population employed in non-agricultural occupations, and the percentage of the adult 
population who were literate.  
[FIGURE 3.3 ABOUT HERE] 
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Following Boix (2003), I draw upon data from Vanhanen (1997) in order to measure 
the size of the middle class income distribution indirectly. I argue that these measures 
of occupational diversification and literacy serve as proxies that I expect to correlate 
strongly with the (unobserved) size of the middle classes in these two countries.27 
Over the course of the liberal reform period we can observe the effect of higher and 
                                                
27 Note that the variables from Vanhanen’s dataset that I use to proxy economic inequality are different 
from those chosen by Boix (2003). His use of Vanhanen’s variable “Family Farms (as a percentage of 
total cultivated area or of total area of holdings)” as a measure of economic equality assumes a land 
structure where family farms are contrasted with more feudalistic latifundia landholding patterns. In the 
Haitian case, high values on this measure due to the virtual elimination of the plantation system 
following the revolution would seem to imply a high level of economic equality in the country. This 
would be misleading, as the revenue that generated income inequality was generated not through 
latifundia-scale agriculture in Haiti but through state customs revenues and patrimonialism. In point of 
fact, there was a great deal of economic equality among these small-holder peasant farmers. However, 
for the purposes of comparing the social structures of Haiti and the Dominican Republic during the 
liberal reform period and predicting the level of demand for manufactured goods imports that emerges 
by the end of this period, the greater income opportunities provided by non-agricultural employment 
and the literacy required to function in such occupations provide more useful proxies for measuring 
economic equality.  
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lower intensity agro-export cultivation on the occupational diversification and 
education of Dominicans and Haitians. 
While the political economy of the Dominican Republic, along with that of 
much of Latin America, was being transformed during the late 1800s, stagnating agro-
export production in Haiti provided more limited opportunities for the expansion of 
the middle classes. Thus, while the Dominican Republic developed a third, middle 
class sector, Haiti was left with a sharply defined two-class social structure comprised 
of low intensity peasant agriculture for ninety percent of the citizens and state 
patrimonialism by the other ten percent. 
What was the mechanism connecting intensive agro-export production with the 
kinds of social transformations we observe in the Dominican Republic during the 
liberal reform period? In respect to the theoretical framework I advance in Chapter 2, 
variation in levels of trade integration would be expected to have important 
consequences for the transformation of occupational opportunities and country’s 
overall income demographics. The influx of national income produced by the export 
sector, and the demand for complementary services to support that sector and the 
greater levels of consumption it generated, provided entrepreneurial opportunities that 
formed the material basis for the emergence of a larger middle class.  
Contrasting the emerging tobacco export economy of the northern Cibao with that 
of the pre-liberal feudal system of subsistence agriculture, logging, and ranching in the 
Dominican south that existed prior to the arrival of the Cuban sugar plantations in the 
1870s, Moya Pons (1992) nicely illustrates the impact international trade integration 
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had for generating the kinds of economic opportunities that led to the transformation 
of Dominican society. I quote him at length here (translated by author): 
These very different systems of productions—tobacco and wood—that developed 
due to diverse ecological and economic conditions, created two societies that 
were very unequal in their distinct modes of thinking. … [I]n the south the 
absence of an agricultural system contrasted with that of the northern provinces 
wherein agriculture was the principal economic activity of the inhabitants. The 
south lived off of a gatherer-economy that did not stimulate the development of 
job creation among the population of this region as the wood was not cut more 
than seasonally and [laborers] passed the rest of the time idly without anything to 
do. Neither did the low productivity of the land provide much enthusiasm for 
dedicating themselves to agriculture. 
The Cibao, on the other hand, with an agriculture and an industry 
established in the 18th century, kept all of its population occupied in the cyclical 
production of tobacco, putting into motion all of the energy of the region. The 
tobacco was both a job and an income-multiplying industry and, as such, was 
democratizing in its social effects. Not just the peasant growers worked in the 
production of tobacco, but also the women who picked and prepared it, the men 
that wrapped and packed it, the owners of the pack animals that transported it to 
the villages and later to the export ports. In the workshops there were men who 
worked in fermentation and packing until it was on the ships that exported it. This 
entire process put into motion an enormous mass of farmers and their families, 
pack animals, peasants, rope-makers, container manufacturers, packers, cigar 
rollers, tobacconists, merchants, negotiators, moneylenders, and brokers for the 
commercialization of the harvest. It also gave way to a dynamic economic cycle 
that put in circulation a large amount of cash that stimulated the importation and 
sale of merchandise to satisfy the demand of a numerous population that earned 
money regularly and consumed every class of goods. (Moya Pons 1992, 405–406) 
 
For the Dominican Republic, the result of gearing a large portion of its agricultural 
production towards servicing global markets was an increase both in the size of the 
national income as well as in the equality of income distribution. The reductions in 
income inequality that we observe are due to the different occupations made available 
to Dominicans as a result of the expansion of the export trade. The decentralized 
tobacco export network operated by the Germans in the Northern Cibao during the 
mid-1800s provided extensive opportunities for Dominican intermediaries to profit 
from the production, sale, and transportation of the export crop to the foreign merchant 
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at the port city. Tobacco produced by the smallholders of the Cibao valley was 
transported to the market city of Santiago, where it was purchased and prepared for 
international shipment via the port city of Puerto Plata to the north.  
The proportion of export revenues captured by Dominican intermediaries only 
increased during the late 1800s when the collapse of the tobacco market drove the 
Germans out and created space for a select group of Dominican merchants to step 
forward as import/export merchants in the port cities. This growing class of 
Dominican entrepreneurs instrumentally brokered a transition towards the cultivation 
of more profitable export crops like cacao and coffee when tobacco prices plummeted 
in the 1870s. The transition to cacao during the late 1800s altered the commercial 
networks of the northern DR, enhancing the importance of La Vega and the nearby 
port of Sánchez in Samaná Bay as important centers of commercial activity (Baud 
1987). At the time of the first national census in 1920 the market hubs of the Cibao 
valley, Santiago and La Vega, were the largest cities in the country at 72,150 and 
58,466 persons, respectively (Gobierno Provisional de la República Dominicana 
1920).  
This process of integration into world markets accelerated as smallholder 
agricultural production in the north was supplemented with the arrival of foreign sugar 
plantation agriculture in the south and east of the country during the 1870s and 1880s. 
This eventuality dramatically increased the importance of Santo Domingo and San 
Pedro de Macorís as additional commercial hubs for the country. A privately produced 
national commercial directory at the turn of the century nicely illustrates how the 
occupational landscape of the Dominican Republic was significantly transformed 
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during the liberal reform period (Deschamps 1907). In the capital city of Santo 
Domingo, the Dominican Republic’s busiest port city with a 1920 population of 
45,007, politics and commerce sustained a community of 340 merchants and service 
providers broken down Table 3.3 below.  
[TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table: Santo Domingo, DR: Occupational Diversity ca. 1900
Occupation No. of firms
Professionals 115
Law firms 47
Notaries Public 5
Surveyors 11
Dentists 6
Druggists 18
Engineers 8
Doctors 20
Services 67
Insurance companies 3
Banks 5
Shipbuilders 17
Maritime agencies 2
Gambling houses 6
Misc foreign agents 2
Carpenters/masons 8
Photographers and painters 4
Maritime shipping houses 7
Hotels 2
Restaurants 4
Metalworks (blacksmiths, brassworkers, jewelers) 7
Goods Manufacturing and Distribution 24
Distilleries (alcoholic beverages) 4
Lumber 3
Funeral agencies 2
Commercial agencies 3
Hardware dealers 4
Food factories (cookies, pasta, etc…) 3
Consumer goods factories (textiles, candles, soap, matches) 5
Consumer goods trades 92
Barbershops 13
Tailors and seamstresses 11
Pharmacies 11
Bookstores 4
Furriers 10
Bakeries 8
Harness shops 3
Hat makers 2
Tobacco stores 11
Shoemakers 19
Source: Deschamps (1907)
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Similar figures for the number of merchant and service firms in the Dominican 
Republic’s other leading trade cities at the time include Santiago (345 firms), La Vega 
(140), Puerto Plata (128), Baní (102), and San Pedro de Macorís (82). (See Figure 3.4 
below). 
[FIGURE 3.4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Note that, with the exception of the capital city, the vast majority of non-agricultural 
firms are located in the northern Cibao region. In contrast, the enclave structure of the 
foreign-owned sugar plantations near San Pedro and La Romana failed to generate the 
same level of demand spillover as the smallholder agro-export model of the north. As 
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Chapter 5 discusses, it is not a coincidence that the northern Cibao was the incubator 
for the middle class revolt in 1930 that ultimately swept the developmentalist dictator 
Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-1961) to power.  
It was thus that the social structure of the Dominican Republic began its 
transformation during the liberal reform period, moving from a pre-capitalist society 
dominated by caudillo families tracing back to the colonial period to a social structure 
characterized by a mix of liberal capitalists and traditional pre-capitalist elites vying 
for control of the state. The victory of the liberal Azules over the traditional Rojos led 
to the further opening of the country to foreign investment and even the beginnings of 
investment in a national infrastructure.  
 Nevertheless, the Dominican state of the liberal reform period should not be 
mistaken for a cohesive, developmentalist institution. Despite the achievements of the 
Dominican Republic in completing a small railroad network linking the Cibao valley 
with the port city of Puerto Plata, Dominican historians downplay the development 
achievements of Azules liberal reformers like the long-serving dictator Heureaux 
(1883-1899). Critical of the weak ability of the bourgeoisie to accumulate capital, 
Cassá (1982b) argues that these early investments were more a consequence of their 
mode of accumulation—what he refers to as “simple mercantile production”—than a 
coherent national development strategy (57). Investments were made in consolidating 
positions to benefit from trade, he argues, rather than investing directly in intensified 
production. It was not until the occupation by US military forces (1916-1924) that true 
modernization of the export system—including the development of national 
transportation and communications infrastructure, as well as land reform—began.  
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 Yet however primitive the mode of accumulation of the Dominican economy 
may have been at the onset of the US military intervention, the comparatively greater 
level of integration into international markets that it managed to achieve by the end of 
the 19th century, compared not only to Haiti but other Latin American countries, had 
important consequences for the formation of the middle classes. By 1920, when the 
first national census of the Dominican Republic was conducted at the behest of the 
U.S. military government, it was estimated that nearly one-third of the working adult 
population was employed in a non-agricultural occupation (Gobierno Provisional de la 
República Dominicana 1920, 137). In the same study it is also notable, although 
perhaps not surprising, that unemployment rates were lowest in those provinces that 
contained a major international trade port—namely Santo Domingo, San Pedro de 
Macorís, and Puerto Plata. The demand spillover effects generated by the expansion of 
foreign commerce created opportunities for new, urban occupations. The changes in 
class structure that accompanied these jobs would prove crucial in the years to come.  
 
Conclusion 
If the Dominican Republic is a story of economic and social transformation over the 
second half of the nineteenth century, Haiti’s is a story of continuity in terms of both 
economic and social structure. By the time of the liberal reform period the only 
surviving remnants of Haiti’s vast colonial export economy were those crops that 
could be profitably cultivated at small scales. Unable to re-impose the French colonial 
model of plantation agriculture on the black peasants following the revolution, the 
mulatto elite quickly retreated to the port cities where they extracted wealth from them 
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through the indirect taxation of cash crops, primarily coffee, that the peasants 
cultivated in order to supplement their subsistence livelihoods. The predatory nature of 
this broken fiscal contract between tax collector and taxpayer, coupled with an 
unreformed system of land tenure that left farmers uncertain of future returns, 
provided powerful disincentives for Haitian farmers to invest in more-intensive 
production.  This unfortunate equilibrium of state predation and underinvestment 
remains basically unchanged through the present-day.  
 The lingering question is whether or not the Dominican Republic’s success in 
moving from a pastoral economy to one with a growing agro-export sector, 
converging with and surpassing Haiti’s in the final decade of the nineteenth century, 
directly account for its remarkable economic divergence from Haiti during the 
twentieth century. Does international trade liberalization translate into robust state 
institutions with the incentives and capacity to execute a coordinating a strategy of 
state-led development?  
As the next chapter demonstrates, neither the Dominican Republic’s embrace 
of international trade and foreign investment during the liberal reform period nor 
Haiti’s failure to do so produced state institutions with the capacity or incentives to 
implement a policy of import substitution industrialization in response to the collapse 
of the global economy during the 1930s. Quite the opposite, foreign lending and 
domestic competition over the spoils of state power led both countries to the brink of 
state failure by 1915. In both cases, this failure triggered foreign intervention by U.S. 
military forces on a mission of statebuilding and debt collection. As Chapter 5 
demonstrates, it was the relative size and political power of the middle classes with the 
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during the critical juncture of the 1930s, and the distributional consequences of those 
differences, that produced a developmentalist state on the Dominican side of the island 
but not the Haitian.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
 
Building Leviathans: Debt dependency, state failure, and foreign intervention in 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1900-1929) 
 
 
How comparable were Haiti and the Dominican Republic prior to the onset of the 
critical juncture in 1929? As the previous chapter demonstrated, the first wave of 
globalization that extended from the second half of the nineteenth century through the 
end of the 1920s was a watershed for the transformation of class structure in agrarian 
societies. Changes in technology ushered in by the industrial revolution reduced the 
costs of international commerce at the same time that they increased its benefits for 
potential trading partners—principally through greater product differentiation. This 
period witnessed heightened demand for primary commodities from the global 
periphery as inputs for the industrializing, and increasingly urbanizing societies of 
Europe and North America. Those agrarian societies that were able to reform their 
economic institutions in order to meet this demand experienced an influx of wealth 
and new demand for goods and services within their domestic economies. Along with 
new demand came new occupations, from “professional” vocations such as medicine, 
law, and finance, to “blue-collar” work in construction, artisan manufacturing, and 
merchandising. Along with these non-agricultural occupations came increased demand 
for literate, educated labor.  
Yet, as the previous chapter demonstrated, while the middle classes in both 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic were expanding, they were not expanding at the 
same rate. Domestic and international-level factors produced differences in the size 
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and productivity of their respective agro-export sectors. Thus, Dominican society 
entered the 1920s with a more vibrant commercial economy that supported a larger 
middle class compared to their neighbors to the west.  
Given that the Dominican Republic managed to develop a larger agro-export 
sector during the late 1800s, it is conceivable that this early economic advantage, 
compounded over time, was responsible for the differences in prosperity we observe 
today. Perhaps the development trajectories of these two agrarian societies were 
already decided by the turn of the twentieth century, and socio-political factors related 
to the size of the middle classes were simply epiphenomenal or second-order causal 
forces.  
A closer examination of the process by which these two societies developed 
suggests otherwise. No one standing on the shores of Haiti or the Dominican Republic 
in the early 1900s could have predicted the dramatic divergence that would take place 
on the island of Hispaniola over the century to come. Despite important differences in 
trade integration and class structure, at the dawn of the twentieth century these were 
two decidedly agrarian societies both governed by weak, predatory states that taxed 
the import-export sector without providing goods like basic sanitation, schools, or 
hospitals in return. With the exception of a few attempts on either side of the island to 
construct railroad networks to connect the agricultural hinterlands with the port cities, 
the failure of these states to provide basic transportation and communications 
infrastructure allowed entire regions of Haiti and the DR to remain isolated from their 
capitals both politically and economically. Having become addicted to predatory 
sovereign lending by international capital markets during the late 1800s, by the early 
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1900s these weak and extractive political regimes collapsed as internecine warfare 
erupted between regional strongmen over the spoils of power—state treasuries 
comprised almost entirely of customs revenues and foreign loans. Between 1910 and 
1915 this competition deteriorated into vicious cycles of political instability 
characterized by a rapid succession of often-violent political turnovers. This cronic 
instability, coupled with fear of further European encroachment into the Western 
Hemisphere, led the United States to install military governments on either side of the 
island to secure repayment of foreign debts and conduct statebuilding operations.  
Before examining the political and economic consequences of the 1930s global 
depression for Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the chapter that follows, I identify 
the salient features of these agrarian societies in the run up to that critical juncture. 
The empirical picture that emerges is of two weak, extractive regimes reduced to 
failing states in the 1910s by warring caudillos—regional strongmen vying for control 
over government revenues. Political instability helped draw these countries into a 
fierce geopolitical standoff between the competing imperial ambitions of Germany 
and the United States in the run up to World War I (1914-1918). For the Western 
powers the stakes included debt repayment and access to tropical commodities. More 
pressingly, however, they entailed power over an island of great strategic import for 
the approaches to the Panama Canal. The tactics employed in the standoff between 
these competing powers were financial, consisting of foreign lending and the 
confiscation of Haitian and Dominican customs revenue as collateral for the sovereign 
debts owed by these agrarian societies.  
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Eventually, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic found themselves under 
the rule of military dictatorships operated by the U.S. Marine Corps. Their early 
twentieth century development became a proving ground for evolving U.S. foreign 
policy towards the hemisphere, including Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine and Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy. Finally, these countries ended up as early 
examples Wilson’s liberal interventionism as U.S. forces were sent in to end the 
caudillo wars and build strong states that would be capable of resisting European 
incursions. In both cases the foreign military occupations beget by Wilson failed to 
install constitutional democracies. However they succeeded in leaving behind strong 
states with centralized political authority that would become the basis for repressive 
authoritarian regimes for decades to come. Their other accomplishment was to push 
these agrarian economies further into the fold of U.S. markets through policies that 
deepened export monoculture and nurtured a dependency on trade that would lead to 
economic disaster during the economic crisis to come.  
The principal difference between Haiti and the Dominican Republic as they 
emerged from their respective military occupations and entered the critical juncture of 
the 1930s was the relative size and power of their middle classes within the national 
political arena. As the following chapter demonstrates, whether agrarian societies 
adjusted to the international economic crisis of the 1930s through developmentalist 
policies of state-led import substitution or predatory policies of intensified tax 
extraction depended on the distributional preferences of the powerful. Where the 
ruling coalition was comprised of leaders drawn from the middle classes, the state 
emerged as a more-powerful economic actor willing to coordinate investment in a 
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strategy of import substitution industrialization. Where the ruling coalition was 
comprised of leaders drawn from the traditional oligarchy, the economy remained 
dependent on the agro-export sector and the state retained its historical role as a 
parasitic institution.  
 
State Failure (1900-1915) 
For the Dominican Republic, political instability following independence has historic 
roots in the violent contest between an emerging agro-export coalition of the northern 
Cibao region (the Partido Liberal Nacionalista, or blue party) and a conservative 
coalition of latifundista landholders from the south and east (the Partido 
Tradicionalista, or red party). Carryovers from the colonial period tied to a feudalistic, 
pastoral economy of ranching and logging, leaders of this latter party invited the 
Spanish crown to return to the DR in 1861 in part to bolster its pre-capitalist political 
economy against the competing logic of commercial agriculture that was emerging in 
the north. The Dominican Republic’s third and last war for independence ended in 
1865 but spilled over into a civil war between the blues, who had fought under the 
banner of opposition to Spanish re-colonization, and the reds. This war culminated in a 
victory for the liberals in 1879, producing twenty years of relative stability mostly 
under the dictatorship of Ulysses Heureaux (1882-1899).28 Rapidly deteriorating 
economic conditions during the later part of the 1890s, however, driven primarily by a 
collapse in international prices for Dominican agricultural commodities, undermined 
support for the dictatorship. Opposition began to coalesce around a group of 
                                                
28 Heureaux ruled indirectly through proxies between 1884 and 1887.  
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Dominican caudillos who considered themselves to be of a better stock, so-called 
gente de la primera such as Horacio Vasquez and Juan Isidro Jimenes. Declining 
economic prospects and elite aversion to Heureaux’s humble socioeconomic roots as 
gente de la segunda led to the dictator’s assassination in 1899 (Hoetink 1986, 298).  
The collapse of the Heureaux regime touched off a 16-year period of 
considerable political instability. Between 1900 and 1915 the Dominican presidency 
changed hands 11 times, six of those handoffs occurring between 1910 and 1915. 
Many of these transitions became violent as a variety of regional caudillos and their 
regional coalitions—most prominent among them the Horacistas tied to Vasquez and 
the Jimenistas allied with Jimenes—jockeyed for control of the state. Neither of these 
caudillos could be differentiated on ideological grounds; both were tied to the 
merchant bourgeoisie and the liberal, agro-export dependent model of capital 
accumulation that underpinned this class (Cassá 2004a, 199–200). What differentiated 
them were the political coalitions they answered to. As one contemporary observer to 
the period, an American economist, put it in 1907, “‘Dominican revolution might be 
briefly defined as the attempt of a bandit guerilla to seize a custom house’” (Lundahl 
and Vedovato 1989, 47). 
For Haiti, the early twentieth century also marked the end of a period of 
relative political stability. In the 42 years between 1870 and 1911 Haiti was governed 
by nine heads of state, yielding an average tenure of four and a half years per 
government (Nicholls 1986, 312). As in the Dominican Republic, political 
competition in Haiti during the second half of the nineteenth century was structured 
around two parties: the Liberal Party and the National Party. The Liberals were 
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predominantly mulatto and nominally tied to the domestic merchant bourgeoisie. The 
Nationals were predominantly black, a coalition of large landholders. In practice, 
however, both of these parties contained prominent examples of the other and are best 
understood as rival factions within the same agro-export oligarchy (Nicholls 1996, 9–
10). Haitian Liberals such as Edmond Paul, Hérard Roy, and Joseph Justin denounced 
the predatory customs taxes that the state inflicted on peasant coffee producers, 
however when in power they did little to change this state of affairs (Trouillot 1990, 
63–4). Similarly, the Nationals under President Lysius Salomon (1879-1888), a 
southern landholder, pursued such liberal reforms as the lowering of the coffee tax, the 
promotion of public education, and the distribution of land to those peasants who 
agreed to use it for the cultivation agro-export crops (Trouillot 1990, 99). Although 
the Liberals as a political party were virtually eliminated by the late 1880s (Castor and 
Garafola 1974, 257), the alliance between ruling-class urban bourgeoisie, landholding 
caudillo warlords, and the merchant oligarchy persisted, stabilizing Haitian politics 
from the 1870s through the first decade of the twentieth century (Trouillot 1990, 69–
71).  
 During the 1910s, however, the alliance underpinning Haiti’s political stability 
collapsed.  As Trouillot summarizes, “after a few undistinguished regimes—Simon 
Sam (1896-1902), Alexis (1902-8), and Simon (1908-11), Haiti went through six 
presidents from August 1911 to July 1915. Four of these were killed in office, 
including Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, whose body was cut in pieces on the street by an 
elite-led mob on July 28, 1915” (1990, 99–100). As was occurring on the Dominican 
side of the island, the vicious cycle of political instability that gripped Haiti was driven 
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by intensified competition among regional caudillos for the spoils of state power. 
Gradually these spoils had grown increasingly scarce. By 1915, mounting debt 
obligations owed to foreign creditors absorbed 80 percent of annual government 
expenditures (Schmidt 1971, 43). When the regime of President Michele Oreste 
(1913-1914) attempted to raise taxes on the foreign merchants29 in order to purchase 
the political allegiance, or at least acquiescence, of the caudillos, the merchants 
responded by providing the caudillos with the financing to stage further insurrections 
(Plummer 1988, Chapter 6). What ensued in 1914 was a violent succession of revolts 
led by Oreste Zamor and General Davilmar Théodore. Zamor and Théodore each held 
state power briefly before being undone by the same financial constraints that had 
permitted them to topple the previous government. This vicious cycle only came to an 
end in July of 1915 when the unceremonious death of Guillaume Sam, the third 
caudillo from the north to hold state power in less than 12 months, triggered US 
military intervention.  
The political instability that swept across Hispaniola in the run-up to U.S. 
military occupation was not the product of ideological conflict. Rather, it was a 
conflict over the spoils of state power. As much as these agrarian societies were 
dependent on the exportation of primary commodities for their ability to import and 
consume manufactured goods, their governments depended on rents from the agro-
                                                
29 As scholarship has established, discussions related to the nationality of economic actors in Haiti are 
problematic (Plummer 1984, 1988). The complications arise from historically restrictive Haitian laws 
concerning foreign ownership that prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in commerce beyond a 
certain distance from commercial ports. Oftentimes, foreign merchants—commonly referred to by 
Haitians as the Bord de Mer (Trouillot 1990)— circumvented these laws by marrying into Haitian 
families and establishing varying forms of dual nationality that permitted them to do business in Haiti 
without sacrificing the connection to their respective metropole.  
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export sector for their political survival. These spoils of power came not only from the 
parasitic extraction of the surplus value of agricultural products through customs 
taxes; the export sectors and customs revenues of Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
also provided their states with collateral by which to borrow funds on international 
capital markets. Predatory lending enabled these predatory states to acquire vast sums 
of sovereign debt over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sums that would 
cost them their sovereignty and soak up significant portions of government revenue 
for decades to come. 
 
Sovereign Debt and Foreign Intervention  
On both sides of Hispaniola, domestic factions vying for control of government 
coffers increasingly found themselves pitted against European and American financial 
interests in pursuit of the same ends. Over the course of the liberal reform period, the 
Dominican and Haitian states acquired disproportionately large sums of sovereign 
debt relative to the size of their economies. The originators of these loans were 
comprised of European—increasingly German—financial interests (Atkins and 
Wilson 1998; Roorda 1998; Schmidt 1971). Ostensibly used to finance liberal 
development projects such as the construction of railroads to connect agricultural 
hinterlands with the ports, these foreign loans supplied rival caudillo factions with the 
means to finance, alternatingly, their insurrectionary bids for state power and their 
political survival once in power (Schmidt 1971, 35). Collapsing regime stability in 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, partly fueled by the financial entanglements these 
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regimes acquired with European and U.S. creditors, in turn contributed to their 
subjugation to foreign intervention and occupation.   
Competition between world powers for influence in the political affairs of 
foreign countries in the lead up to WWI was increasingly being played out through 
their respective financial sectors. For international capital markets there was a clear 
willingness to profit from political instability, and the effects that such instability had 
on the diminished time horizons of sovereign borrowers. This manifested itself 
principally by loans to foreign governments made under poor terms and burdened with 
high fees. However, predatory international lending and the sovereign debts that 
accumulated also translated into an instrument in the unfolding game of balance of 
power politics that was being played out. Disputes over the repayment of foreign debt 
provided a pretext for drawing the island-states of Hispaniola into this competition 
over spheres of influence. This was especially true for Germany and the United States, 
two rising powers actively engaged in carving out new spheres of influence for their 
imperial ambitions among those corners of the globe not already dominated by one 
European power or another.  
In the Dominican Republic, U.S. financial and economic interests intensified in 
1892 following the entrance of a conglomerate of American investors called the San 
Domingo Improvement Company, which acquired sovereign debt and the rights to 
administer Dominican customhouses from the recently-bankrupted Dutch firm, 
Westendorp. When the political turmoil that ensued following the collapse of the 
Heureaux regime in 1899 resulted in an interruption in debt repayments to European 
creditors, the remaining European creditor states to the Dominican government—
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France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands—took to stationing warships off of the 
coast of the capital in order to press the demand for repayment on behalf of their 
domestic financial institutions and island expatriates (Hoetink 1986, 299; Roorda 
1998, 13). These European incursions into what the United States perceived to be its 
sphere of influence culminated in the first application of Roosevelt’s so-called 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: an executive order leading to the seizure of 
Dominican customs houses by U.S. forces in 1905. The United States government 
intervened directly in order to secure the financial interests of its nationals, as well as 
its geopolitical position as regional hegemon. Establishing a customs receivership to 
be operated by the U.S. War Department, the Roosevelt administration ensured that a 
significant portion of collected customs revenues (55 percent) would be allocated 
towards repayment of debts to U.S. and European creditors (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 
43). This was a precursor to the 1907 treaty between the Dominican government and 
the U.S. Congress, also brokered by Roosevelt, which institutionalized the 
receivership under Dominican law and ensured that it would continue to operate until 
the total balance of foreign debts had been repaid. In order to further establish U.S. 
hegemony over Dominican affairs, the treaty provided for the consolidation of the 
remaining Dominican debt held by European states, amounting to $20 million, by 
issuing bonds in U.S. markets. These bonds were to be held by American financial 
institutions—namely the National City Bank of New York (Roorda 1998, 14).  
 In Haiti, the experiment with sovereign debt began earlier than it did in the 
DR. The first instance of state borrowing from domestic and foreign merchants began 
in 1808, just four years after Haitian independence (Trouillot 1990, 68). Ostensibly 
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these loans were purposed finance Haiti’s defense against further threats of military 
incursion by the French, as well as internal threats from the northern and southern 
factions that emerged within the early Republic. In 1825 foreign debt had become a 
structural feature of the Haitian political economy when the French government 
imposed a crushing indemnity of 150 million francs on the Haitian state as the price 
for diplomatic recognition and restoration of bilateral trade.30 Consequently, the Boyer 
government took out the first of many loans from French creditors in order to service 
that sovereign debt (Castor and Garafola 1974, 262; Trouillot 1990, 68–9). The arrival 
of German trade merchants in the mid-1800s steadily continued through the early 
1900s, providing additional quasi-domestic sources of credit for the Haitian state. 
Foreign financing from Germany and the U.S. began in 1876 as the Haitian state set 
about developing national railroad infrastructure (Schmidt 1971, 36–8).  These liberal 
policies continued under President Salomon, who deepened the involvement of French 
capital in the Republic in 1880 with the creation of Banque Nationale de la 
République d’Haiti (BNRH), a central bank operated by the French (Nicholls 1986, 
311–2). Despite enduring French involvement in the Haitian economy and the 
emergence of the U.S. as an imperial force, by the turn of the twentieth century 
German interests in Haiti eclipsed those of both France and the United States. After 
1908 German nationals were regularly financing the insurrections of various Haitian 
Caudillos and government incumbents, meanwhile calling upon Berlin to intervene in 
                                                
30 As Gonzalez (2012, 212) notes, the Haitian indemnity may be the first occurrence of a former colony 
assuming a large sovereign debt.  
 
  112 
defense of their propertied interests during the political instability that ensued 
(Nicholls 1996, 143; Schmidt 1971, 35).  
French and German influence in Haiti did not go unanswered by the United 
States. In response to a 1910 Franco-German bid to obtain a controlling share of the 
BNRH, the U.S. State Department in cooperation with the National City Bank of New 
York went on a diplomatic offensive to secure the controlling share, successfully 
transferring administration of the bank from French to U.S. personnel (Schmidt 1971, 
38–9). Despite this and other maneuvers by the Taft administration to expand U.S. 
influence through its so-called dollar diplomacy, however, at the onset of WWI the 
German expatriates controlled an estimated 80 percent of the Haitian economy and 
continued to exact usurious terms for internal loans made to competing factions in the 
caudillo wars of the 1910s (Nicholls 1996, 143). In response to this vicious cycle of 
insolvency, foreign interference, and political instability, the administration of U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) made repeated demands to take control of 
Haitian finances by establishing a Dominican-style customs receivership in exchange 
for financial assistance (Plummer 1988, 200). Yet despite the desperate need of 
Haitian rulers for the finance that would allow them to consolidate their rule, none of 
the several Haitian governments of this period would agree to surrender sovereign 
control over state revenues. Once it was clear to the Wilson administration that Haiti 
would not concede to its demands for financial control, in 1915 it seized upon the 
political instability of the caudillo wars as a pretext for U.S. intervention so as to 
impose the customs receivership by force.  
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It was the strategic and geopolitical interests of the United States, rather than 
its commercial interests, that drew it deeper into the financial and political fray 
unfolding on Hispaniola. To be certain the burgeoning commercial interests of the 
United States in the Caribbean basin were an explicit motivation of American 
interventionism in the Caribbean basin, as seen in both internal U.S. government 
deliberations as well as its negotiations with other states. This motivation grew under 
the “Dollar Diplomacy” policies of President William Howard Taft (1909-1913), who 
actively encouraged U.S. businesses to make investments and loans in the basin and 
made available the threat of military intervention so as to enforce the terms of those 
business contracts should it become necessary. 
However, it was the strategic location of Hispaniola, more than any vested 
commercial interests, that underlaid U.S. policy towards the island (Atkins and Wilson 
1998; Calder 1984; Hall 2000, 40–1; Schmidt 1971). Prior to the onset of the military 
occupations of Haiti in July of 1915 and the Dominican Republic in May of 1916, 
U.S. and European investments on Hispaniola were negligible as compared to their 
investments in other Latin American countries (Calder 1984, 23; Schmidt 1971, 41). 
Examining Haiti in regards to the regional context, Schmidt (1971) notes that 
Much of the rivalry between American, German, and French interests was based 
on political considerations and expectations of future economic development, 
rather than on prospects of spectacular short-term profits. Haiti was a poor 
country, and was insignificant in terms of the overall Latin-American investment 
market. During the decade preceding 1914 there had been a boom in foreign 
investments in Latin America, which, unlike previous booms in 1820 and 1860, 
had included French, German, and United States capital as well as British. The 
total nominal value of foreign investments in Latin America in 1914 was about 
$8.5 billion, or about one-fifth of worldwide long-term foreign investments. The 
Latin-American total of $8.5 billion was broken down as follows: Britain $3.7 
billion; United States $1.7 billion; France $1.2 billion; Germany $.9 billion; and 
others $1.0 billion.' Foreign investments in Haiti in 1915 consisted mainly of the 
  114 
$21.5 million owed to French bondholders as a result of the 1875, 1896, and 1910 
loans. German and British direct investments were of little consequence. 
United States investments in Haiti in 1913 amounted to about $4 million as 
against $800 million in Mexico and $220 million in Cuba. The $4 million 
invested in Haiti constituted only 0.32 percent of total United States investments 
in Latin America. (41) 
 
The insignificance of Haitian debt to American and European creditors holds for 
Dominican debt as well. The $20 million that had been consolidated by U.S. banks 
through Dominican customs receivership treaty of 1907 was even smaller than Haiti’s 
arrears of $25 million. 
To a greater extent, it was the desire to secure the shipping lanes connecting 
the western and eastern portions of the United States through Central America that 
motivated U.S. policymakers to intercede in Hispaniola. The stated policy of 
opposition to further European incursions into the Western Hemisphere first declared 
by President James Monroe in 1823 took on renewed importance in the region 
following the decision by President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) to construct the 
Panama Canal. Beginning in the mid-1800s U.S. imperial interests in the Caribbean 
basin heightened as shipping between the Atlantic seaboard and the Pacific became 
reliant on Central America’s overland trade routes (Atkins and Wilson 1998). Situated 
between Cuba and Puerto Rico along these shipping lanes, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic found themselves at the center of a shifting geopolitical contest between the 
North Atlantic powers. As early as 1848, U.S. naval planners explored establishing a 
U.S. naval base in either the Dominican Republic’s Samaná Bay or Haiti’s Môle-
Saint-Nicolas before finally settling on a location in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Roorda 
1998, 11; Schmidt 1971, 30–31). The difficulties associated with managing America’s 
bicoastal project were brought into stark relief during the 1898 Spanish-American War 
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when military operations were delayed by the distances involved with redeploying 
U.S. naval assets between the Pacific and Atlantic theaters (Schmidt 1971, 4). 
Combined with the obvious commercial advantages of the proposed canal and 
France’s desire to abandon their earlier attempt to construct one, a growing number of 
U.S. policymakers became convinced that it was in the national interest to take over 
the French project. In 1903 President Roosevelt conspired for and facilitated the 
secession of Panama from Colombia, and by 1904 the French canal project had been 
acquired and resumed by the Americans. It was finally completed in 1914. Before and 
since, America’s strategic interests concerning trans-Caribbean shipping played a 
decisive role in shaping its posture towards the island of Hispaniola. 
Prior to the outbreak of WWI, the threat of a rising Germany manifested itself 
as fear that the Germans were exploiting the deteriorating political stability on the 
island in order to establish naval facilities or coaling stations in the same locations that 
had earlier attracted the attention of U.S. naval planners. President Wilson ultimately 
concluded that instability was bad for U.S. security and that insecurity in the 
Caribbean basin stemmed from the absence of constitutional democracy. As he 
remarked during his first year in office, “I am going to teach the South American 
republics to elect good men.” Concern that political instability in Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic might interrupt the collection of customs revenues provided the 
pretext for Wilson’s military expeditions on Hispaniola.31  
 
                                                
31 American military occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic were accompanied by Wilson’s 
interventions in Mexico (1914), Cuba (1917), and Panama (1918), as well as his continuation of the 
Nicaraguan occupation (1909-1933). 
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U.S. Military Occupation  
When separate U.S. Marine brigades landed in Haiti in July of 1915 and the 
Dominican Republic the following May to begin extended military occupations, they 
encountered agrarian societies featuring predatory state institutions that were 
collapsing under the weight of insurrectionary regional warlords, prohibitive sovereign 
debt burdens, and the destabilizing consequences of great power rivalry in the region. 
The objectives of the occupational governments the Marines installed were to restore 
the solvency of the central governments and their autonomy from domestic 
insurrection and to put their economies on a sounder footing as platforms for 
agricultural commodity production and exportation. The Wilson administration argued 
that American security would be served through these statebuilding efforts, which it 
hoped would provide the necessary preconditions for the emergence of stable 
democratic institutions. Yet despite more than eight years of occupation in the 
Dominican Republic (1916-1924) and nearly twenty in Haiti (1915-1934),32 these 
statebuilding experiments were spectacular failures as incubators of democracy. In 
both cases authoritarianism persisted in patrimonial and neopatrimonial forms 
throughout most of the twentieth century (Haggard 1985; Hartlyn 1994).  
Yet while theirs was not a legacy of democratization, these parallel foreign 
occupations succeeded in several areas. First and foremost, they established the 
autonomy of the central governments, providing them with an enduring monopoly on 
violence by disarming or defeating regional caudillos and by training and equipping 
                                                
32 Although in practice the U.S. military government in Haiti was dismantled in 1930 in response to 
widespread protest.  
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professional constabularies. In the Dominican Republic, attempts by the occupation to 
disarm the regional strongmen touched off a guerilla war, as violent resistance to US 
occupation by three caudillo warlords in the remote eastern portion of DR began just 
one year after US intervention. Initial resistance was quickly put down, seeing the 
surrender and execution of the leadership. And for most of 1918 guerilla activity in the 
eastern region was virtually eliminated. The insurgency resumed in 1919 and lasted 
through the end of the occupation, however by the time of U.S. withdrawal in 1924 the 
Guardia Nacional had become sufficiently effective as a fighting force that no 
caudillo band was henceforth able to successfully challenge the state’s monopoly on 
violence. When two prominent caudillos (Desiderio Arias and Cipriano Bencosme) 
tried to mount such a challenge in the early years of the Trujillo dictatorship they were 
swiftly eliminated (Calder 1984, 239).  
In Haiti, a violent revolt against the occupation began almost immediately after 
the arrival of American forces; it was waged by the same class of regional strongmen 
and mercenary cacos that had provoked the U.S. occupation in the first place. The 
Marines were initially successful in disarming rebels through bribery. However, 
mounting opposition to the occupation’s repressive and racist policies including the 
use of a forced labor law, Corvée, that dated back to the French colonial system, 
reignited a sustained nationalist insurrection in a remote, mountainous part of the 
island (Schmidt 1971, Chapter 5). Lasting from 1918 to 1919, the insurgency was 
ultimately put down by the occupying Marines after at least 2,250 Haitians and their 
guerilla leader were killed. As in the Dominican case, by the end of the occupation the 
Americans had successfully consolidated the Gendarmerie d'Haiti constabulary 
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forces. The creation of a national army responsive to the central government changed 
the balance of power between the state and civil society, foreclosing the possibility of 
armed rebellion and eliminating the only means by which the society had historically 
checked the power of their central government (Trouillot 1990, 16–17).  
In addition to the political stability imposed by U.S. forces, macroeconomic 
stability was achieved in both cases when the occupations seized control of state 
finances. They also institutionalized U.S. customs receiverships, prioritizing the 
regular servicing of the sovereign debt over all other government responsibilities. The 
receiverships were left in place until the foreign debts of both Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic had been fully retired in 1947.  
The economic policies adopted by the military occupations also increased the 
dependence of these agrarian societies on international markets for agricultural 
commodity exports and manufactured goods imports. During the First World War, 
scarcities of manufactured goods imports provided structural conditions conducive to 
the emergence of domestic industry across Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas 1995, 73). 
Yet the military governments on Hispaniola promoted export monoculture at the 
expense of the island’s embryonic manufacturing sectors and European trade balances, 
using the customs receiverships as a pretense to manipulate tariff rates on both sides of 
the island. This systematic effort by the foreign occupations on Hispaniola to integrate 
the island into U.S. markets for primary commodity imports and manufactured goods 
exports resulted in the deindustrialization of whatever nascent manufacturing had 
emerged by the early 20th century. By 1925 the percentage of the population employed 
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in factories comprised only three-tenths of one percent in the Dominican Republic and 
two-tenths in Haiti (Economic Commission for Latin America 1966, 17).  
Prior to the outbreak of WWI, Dominican imports were comprised of 62 
percent U.S. origin, 20 percent German origin, and 9 percent of U.K. origin 
(Dominican Customs Receivership 1914, 22). Following three years of military 
occupation and trade dislocation during WWI, the U.S. share of Dominican imports 
had leapt to 82 percent, with its protectorate Puerto Rico comprising an additional 13 
percent (Dominican Customs Receivership 1919). As the Dominican national historian 
Frank Moya Pons documents, the tariff law of 1919 adopted by the U.S. occupation of 
the DR through Executive Order No. 332 decimated its nascent artisan manufacturing 
sector—cottage industries that included lumber, light beverages, rum distilleries, and 
confectionaries—by exposing the domestic market to duty free imports of higher-
quality manufactured goods from the United States (1987, 10–14). Moya Pons (1987, 
16) translates a passage from the memoirs of Dominican politician Luis Felipe Mejía: 
There existed, up to the American intervention, shoe shops, saddleries, tanneries 
and tailor shops, as well as furniture, hats and shirts. The intervention placed 
special zeal in making us consuming [sic] goods produced by the American 
industry. The import duties on shoes, apparel, furniture, hats, shirts, soap, hides, 
cigarettes and matches were reduced in the customs tariff decreed by the 
Executive Order No. 332, of September 25, 1919. As if this measure were not 
enough, the Executive Order No. 247, of October 31, 1919, abolished all internal 
revenue taxes on imported merchandise. However, our sugar continued to pay the 
same high customs tariff in the United States. We had the disadvantages inherent 
to a colonial economy without enjoying, in compensation, the protection it 
procures. In a few years, the shoe shops and tanneries disappeared; the number of 
tailor shops was greatly reduced, the manufacture of native furniture also 
diminished, only the match factory being saved… . (Mejia 1944, 288) 
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What little manufacturing that had managed to emerge during the liberal reform period 
and especially WWI was extinguished by the occupation’s economic policies 
promoting American trade interests.  
Dominican trade dependency was not limited to manufactured goods. Despite 
having developed a commercial agriculture sector during the liberal reform period, its 
reliance on foreign markets for basic foodstuffs was increasing as well. Between 1917 
and 1924 the proportion of Dominican imports comprised of imported food and 
beverages increased from 14.4 to 26.9 percent of all imports (Dominican Customs 
Receivership 1919, 1927). Attempts by the U.S. to alter the national trade composition 
did not end with the withdrawal of American forces from the Dominican Republic. As 
part of U.S. terms of withdrawal, the Dominican-American Convention of 1924 
provided for the continuation of the 1907 customs receivership through the end of the 
1940s and prohibiting the modification of the customs tariffs of 1919 without securing 
U.S. Government approval (Moya Pons 1987, 17).33 
In Haiti as well, the American occupation set about a wholesale restructuring 
of the tariff structures, increasing the penetration of U.S. goods while minimizing the 
competitiveness of European imports and domestic manufacturing. The military 
occupation abrogated the 1907 trade agreement between Haiti and France—the 
principal consumer of Haiti’s most lucrative export crop, coffee. This agreement had 
provided special tariffs for French imports to Haiti in exchange for most-favored-
                                                
33 While this agreement prevented the Dominican government under Trujillo from changing the 1919 
tariffs on capital stock in order to promote import substitution industrialization in the mid-1930s (Moya 
Pons 1987, 25), it did allow the Dominican government to manipulate various internal taxes, which it 
did throughout the late 1920s and 1930s through Law 190, a consumption tax targeting imported 
manufactures (Moya Pons 1987, 18).  
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nation status in French markets (Schmidt 1971, Chapter 9). Repeated demands by 
American receivership officials to update the Haitian customs law of 1905, which was 
principally derived from a cumbersome 1872 law, finally produced the tariff reforms 
of 1926. These reforms further increased taxes on predominantly French imports like 
wine and perfume while reducing them for products imported from the U.S. (Plummer 
1988). The American occupation pursued this policy at the expense of French trade 
imbalances with Haiti, despite the fact that the U.S. trade balance with Haiti was 
already favorable. In fiscal year 1916-1917, U.S. goods comprised 87 percent of total 
Haitian imports, meanwhile it only made up 54 percent of Haiti’s export market 
(Haitian Customs Receivership 1919). Once WWI had drawn to a close and the 
French market for Haitian coffee was restored, the trade imbalance between the U.S. 
and Haiti grew even larger still.  
What was the net result of these American-imposed commercial policies 
during the occupation? By 1928, just prior to the economic dislocations that were to 
ensue following the international financial crisis of 1929, the French market made up 
55 percent of Haiti’s exports but only 8 percent of its import purchases (Haitian 
Customs Receivership 1929, 9). Inversely, 70 percent of Haitian imports originated 
from the United States in that year while only comprising 8 percent of its export 
market—a balance of trade that decidedly favored the United States. During this 
period the tariffs on primary materials required for artisan manufacturing were also 
taxed at higher rates than finished goods, further undermining domestic industry by 
raising the costs of their input factors (Plummer 1988, 235–6).  
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As a compliment to the coercive nature of U.S. trade reforms across the island, 
the occupations also undertook massive programs of public works, constructing roads, 
schools, hospital clinics, and basic sanitation infrastructure that furthered the interests 
of the United States to develop the island as an agro-export platform for U.S. markets.  
Finally, the exploitative, repressive, and oftentimes overtly racist character of 
the U.S. occupations succeeded in unifying political elite in both Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic under banners of nationalist anti-imperialism. 
Yet while both the statebuilding missions and the characteristics of the target 
states were similar in many ways, important differences in the agrarian societies that 
awaited the U.S. Marines in the summers of 1915 and 1916 would ultimately define 
the legacies of their occupations. For the Dominican Republic, the liberal reforms that 
had begun prior to the occupation—namely the penetration of foreign sugar 
plantations into the eastern part of the country during the late 19th century—provided a 
more permissive environment for the occupation’s neocolonial project of promoting 
export monoculture than Haiti’s historical opposition to foreign ownership.  
However, attempts by the occupational government to secure property rights 
for American investors faced a land titling system in the DR as informal and resistant 
to reform as the one they encountered in Haiti. From the Dominican Republic’s 
eighteenth century pastoral roots evolved a proto-enclosure institution whereby 
terrenos comuneros (communal land) was divided into shares called pesos de la tierra 
(land pesos). For a nominal fee speculators were permitted to claim shares of 
communal land, however such shares were easily forged and their possession provided 
no clear means of resolving disputes over specific plots. Low population density left 
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much of this land unused, allowing the system to endure throughout the liberal reform 
period of the late 1800s by absorbing those peasants in need of land for hunting and 
gathering or subsistence agriculture.  
Almost immediately the occupational government set about delivering land 
reforms that would produce more definitive means of establishing ownership in the 
DR. Nominally designed to promote commercial agriculture across the country, in 
practice the new system of land titling overwhelmingly favored large sugar plantation 
interests of the east over peasant smallholders (Turits 2003, 66–77). Executive Order 
no. 363 of 1919 prohibited future accumulation of land through survey, while 
accepting past instances of such means of accumulation. This law was partly intended 
to reduce frivolous land speculation, including the historical practice of peso that had 
been institutionalized by the Dominican Law for the Partition of Communal Land of 
1911. However in practice the law primarily favored sugar companies, many of whom 
had already completed such surveys by 1919. Executive Order no. 511 of 1920 
reversed the prior bias of the original 1911 law, moving towards land titling that 
favored possession over speculation. Adopting the Torrens system imported from the 
British Commonwealth, the reforms imposed by the military governemnt created a 
whole new state institutional apparatus called the Tribunal Superior de Tierras 
(Superior Land Court). This court provided a centralized system of local, regional and 
national land judges to arbitrate land title issues–ostensibly with a bias towards 
possession over the previous system of peso title claims (71). As Turits (2003) 
observes, while on the surface these new land use laws ostensibly favored Dominican 
squatter peasants by recognizing possession over dubious peso titles, the ways in 
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which the Tribunal interpreted possession failed to accommodate the ways that 
peasants used land. By favoring symbolic forms of enclosure over other forms of 
possession, “the 1920 legislation could not provide in itself the social equity it 
promised, because most peasants still practiced shifting agriculture. And while 
peasants rarely had held the same plot long enough to claim property via prescription 
as outlined in 511, the sugar companies generally could claim such ‘squatters’ rights” 
(Turits 2003, 75).  
This favorable legal environment for the land claims of sugar plantations 
prompted a major expansion of foreign investment. Thus, “when in 1925 the 
occupation drew to an end in the Dominican Republic, a quarter of the total area of the 
country belonged to the sugar companies. Of the twenty-two major centrales, twelve 
were American with three-quarters of the total investment and very extensive land-
holdings. Lumber companies controlled an area even greater than that held by the 
sugar industry” (Castor and Garafola 1974, 266).  
Outside of the plantations, however, land titling had barely taken place. As late 
as 1929, Turits notes, only one-sixth of the country had been formally surveyed, with 
an even smaller proportion had been issued legal titles. “The process of determining 
property rights had hardly begun outside the sugar zones” (Turits 2003, 78). 
Although the broader system of land tenure in the DR remained highly 
informal, the nature of the land reforms during the occupation—namely the continued 
encroachment and displacement of peasant smallholders by the plantations—created a 
central axis of conflict within Dominican society. It divided the Dominican agro-
export oligarchy, many of whom associated themselves with and continued to profit 
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from the occupation, from the burgeoning middle classes—especially those in the 
northern Cibao who saw their economic livelihoods threatened by the expanding sugar 
enclaves.  
One such member of the oligarchy, the prominent caudillo and early apologist 
of the occupation President Horacio Vasquez (1924-30), took office after having 
successfully negotiated with the U.S. government the terms of American withdrawal 
(Calder 1984, 29).34 The political coalition of Horacistas underpinning the Vasquez 
government drew predominantly from a dominant class fundamentally committed to 
the dependista agro-export model of national development that took root during the 
liberal reform period and was expanded during the military occupation (Cassá 2004a, 
199).  
On the opposite side of the conflict was an emerging coalition of Dominican 
nationalists—middle class professionals from the northern Cibao valley who viewed 
export monoculture generally, and expanding foreign ownership of the principal 
export sector in particular, as anathema to their economic interests. These ideas were 
born of their direct experience during the U.S. occupation, especially the earlier crash 
of 1921, as well as contemporary knowledge of the disastrous consequences of price 
volatility for the sugar-dependent Cuban economy (Turits 2003, 78). Foremost among 
these was a reformer named Rafael César Tolentino.  Tolentino spoke out persuasively 
in opposition to the enclave-style liberalization unfolding in the east, advocating 
instead for expanding the smallholder model of commercial agriculture that had 
developed in the Cibao.  
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Tolentino was also a member of Santiago's small middle class and an important 
nationalist leader, who had been persecuted during the U.S. military dictatorship 
for his opposition to the occupation. He was also a notable journalist in the late 
1920s and the owner and director of Santiago's daily newspaper, La 
Información. Playing on the traditional phrase of local revolutionaries, “we have 
to take to el monte [the mountains],” a 1927 editorial in Tolentino’s paper 
declared: “We have to take to el monte with plows and machetes as our weapons. 
Our state of poverty is the product of our mistaken orientation, of not seeing the 
salvation of our Country in the only place it can be found: in the 
countryside.” The leaders of the early Trujillo state would heed Tolentino's call to 
turn to the countryside for the salvation of the nation. And they would envisage a 
nation of sedentary, surplus-producing farmers, rather than of foreign 
agribusiness and landless peasants, or of pig hunters and rebels. What is most 
remarkable is that this vision would shape not only the rhetoric but also the actual 
public policies and course of the early Trujillo regime, and indeed the making of 
the modern Dominican Republic. (Turits 2003, 79) 
 
As the quote describes, Tolentino became an influential Secretary of Agriculture 
during the early years of the Trujillo regime. A dark-skinned mulatto who was cut off 
from power by elites that rejected him because of his humble roots, he was part of a 
growing coalition of Dominican professionals who resented both foreign intrusions 
into the Dominican economy as well as the complicity of a discriminatory Dominican 
bourgeoisie. Other advocates of reform rising from this class of gente de la segunda 
included Rafael Abreu Licairac, Joaquín Balaguer, Rafael Vidal, Rafael Espaillat, and 
Rafael Estrella Ureña (Turits 2003, Chapter 2). As the following chapter explores, 
many of these reformers would participate in the coup against Vasquez, ultimately 
becoming prominent leaders within Trujillo’s ruling coalition.  
While the economic liberalization measures pursued by the Dominican 
occupation succeeded in forging some measure of structural change, the economic 
structure of Haiti remained largely unchanged despite a much longer occupation. 
                                                                                                                                       
34 The negotiations that resulted in the transfer of power took place over 1922, resulting in the Hughes-
Peynado Plan (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 57). 
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Foreign direct investment in the Dominican economy reached $69 million by 1929, 
whereas in Haiti that figure had only risen to $14 million (Castor and Garafola 1974, 
269). Given that the Haitian population was roughly twice the size of the Dominican 
one, the per capita differences in investment between these two societies were even 
more stark.  
The absence of comparable levels of foreign investment was not due to a lack 
of interest among the U.S. occupation in Haiti for promoting American commercial 
interests on the western side of the island. The military occupation made substantial 
changes to the Haitian legal landscape in an attempt to reintroduce foreign plantation 
agriculture. Between 1915 and 1930 the occupation government adopted no less than 
33 pieces of legislation in their attempt to circumvent barriers to foreign—especially 
U.S.—investment. Foremost of all was a new constitution in 1918, drafted almost 
entirely by then 36 year-old Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, that, “according to the American presidential candidate, Warren Harding, 
was jammed down the throats of the Haitian people ‘at the point of bayonets borne by 
U.S. Marines’” (Nicholls 1996, 147). Among other features, this document excluded 
Article V of the Haitian constitution concerning the prohibition of foreign 
ownership—arguably the most enduring feature of Haitian political culture since 
independence (Castor and Garafola 1974, 266).  
Yet, despite the granting of more than 100,00 hectares of land to American 
investors in the fertile valleys of northern and northwestern Haiti, by the end of the 
occupation there were only two foreign-owned plantations in operation (Castor and 
Garafola 1974). Investor uncertainty regarding foreign property rights when faced 
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with the prospect of an eventual withdrawal of American forces, coupled with the 
certainty of high transaction costs owing to poor infrastructure, ultimately conspired to 
turn away most foreign investment. Thus, Haitian agriculture remained dominated by 
a smallholder peasantry engaged in a mix of subsistence farming and cash cropping, 
organized under the same system of informal but locally understood landholdings that 
emerged during Haiti’s early years of independence (Gonzalez 2012). As Plummer 
(1984) notes, “Haiti made its main contribution to the Caribbean plantation economy 
in these years by exporting labor to the sugar estates of Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic” (135-6). Despite it’s efforts to integrate the Haitian economy more deeply 
into U.S. markets through tariff rate manipulation and constitutional reforms directed 
towards expanding foreign investment, the military occupation failed to move the 
country substantially closer to becoming an agro-export platform for U.S. commodity 
markets.  
Despite the difficulties encountered by the Americans as they attempted to 
expand plantation agriculture and introduce foreign investment to Haiti, the 
occupation nevertheless succeeded in reinforcing the economy’s dependence on its 
agro-export sector in general and coffee exports in particular. At the onset of the 
military occupation coffee exports comprised 67 percent of total export value; by the 
end of the occupation they comprised 78 percent of all exports.  
Nor were the political structures of Haiti transformed by the U.S. statebuilding 
expedition. While they succeeded in defeating the regional caudillos and consolidating 
power in Haiti’s central government, the historical patterns of predation that 
constituted the relationship between nation and state were merely reinforced by the 
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military occupation. The provisional government continued to favor the redistribution 
of peasant surplus towards the repayment of foreign debts rather than the meaningful 
provision of goods and services in the rural areas (Schmidt 1971, 221). Export duties 
increased from 19 percent to 28 percent during the occupation so that, even during the 
terms of trade crisis of the early 1930s, customs duties continued to make up more 
than 80 percent of government revenues (Trouillot 1990, 102–3). This policy 
represented the continuation of a norm that had been institutionalized in Haiti at least 
as early as President Boyer’s acceptance of the French indemnity as the price of 
diplomatic recognition in 1825. 
What infrastructure was left behind by the occupation’s public works program 
quickly fell into disrepair and decay. For example, the roads that were built to connect 
the capital with the provinces were largely unpaved, requiring continual maintenance 
that was not forthcoming following the U.S. withdrawal (Schmidt 1971, 233–4). In the 
final analysis, among President Wilson’s goals for political liberalization, neither 
democratization nor the de-politicization of the armed forces was successfully 
institutionalized. While central government power was consolidated and the ranks of 
foreign merchants were thinned out with the expulsion of many German expatriates, 
the underlying political economy of Haiti was not changed but rather reinforced by the 
military occupation. 
While the American occupation failed to alter the economic and political 
structures of Haiti, its policies did alter the social structure in ways that would prove 
decisive in the years following the occupation. For the first time the economic basis 
for the emergence of a new generation of black middle class leaders was provided, one 
  130 
that would eventually grow to contest the political power of the mulatto oligarchy. 
Perhaps ironically, the indiscriminate racism by which the military occupation dealt 
with blacks and mulattos not only unified factions of both phenotypes against the 
occupation; it also opened up new occupations and educational opportunities to 
blacks. State jobs and schools in the urban areas previously restricted to mulatto elite 
created new pathways to the middle class for non-elites. “In a letter to a State 
Department official, U.S. Consul Winthrop Scott described a ‘class of young Haitians 
who have served with Americans, since the occupation began, as interpreters, 
supervisors, clerks, etc.’ This group, the core of a nascent middle class, came to 
depend on the American presence” (Plummer 1984, 233).  
Smaller and less politically powerful than the Dominican middle class 
coalition that would bring down Vasquez and form the backbone of the Trujillo 
regime in 1930, American sociologists of Haiti writing in the 1940s mistakenly argued 
that this class was non-existent or merely embryonic (Nicholls 1996, 190). However 
nascent they might have been, the generation of middle classes that emerged during 
the occupation would come of age as leaders in the 1940s and 50s, reshaping the 
distribution of power in Haitian society in decisive ways.  
The government of Sténio Vincent (1930-41) found it useful to cultivate this 
class, and the fall of his successor Elie Lescot in 1946 can partly be attributed to 
his studied neglect of the black middle class, who were almost all excluded from 
office and cut off from state patronage during the period of his presidency. 
… [T]he victory of Dumarsais Estimé in the elections of 1946 is to be understood 
as a partial victory for this black middle class, which also provided much of the 
support for Francois Duvalier in 1956 -7. (Nicholls 1996, 10) 
 
Historically, the mulatto elite had justified their position as the ruling class based on a 
shortage of black Haitians with the education and refinement necessary to govern. As 
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the Haitian political arena began to be comprised of a greater proportion of educated 
and experienced blacks—individuals like Estimé who served as a cabinet officer in 
Vincent’s administration during the 1930s—this justification became less tenable, and 
mulatto discrimination less bearable. A loose middle-class coalition of moderate 
noiristes, radical Marxists and worker organizations, progressives from the 
professional class, and the military united behind Estimé and successfully took down 
the mulatto regime of Lescot in January 1946 (Smith 2009).  
The Estimé regime fell four years later in the face of political stalemate with a 
unified mulatto opposition, as well as divisions within his ruling coalition. 
Nevertheless, the electoral coup of 1946 represented a historic victory for Haitian 
blacks, who for the first time managed to assemble a political coalition derived from 
their own, rather than presiding on behalf of the traditional oligarchy of mulatto elites 
and foreign merchants as had historically been the case.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the consequences of the agro-export model's failure to produce 
strong, autonomous states in Haiti and the Dominican Republic by the end of the 
liberal reform period.  Unable to defend themselves against capture by rent-seeking 
caudillo warlords, the states governing these agrarian societies became swept up in a 
balance of power conflict over sovereign debt and spheres of influence in the early 
1900s, a conflict that culminated in foreign military occupation by U.S. military 
forces.  
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Intended by U.S. President Wilson to restore stability to the island by installing 
constitutional democracies, the military occupations were unwilling or unable to alter 
the underlying patrimonial authoritarian dynamics of these agrarian societies. 
Nevertheless, the occupations made a direct impact on the development of these states 
by restoring political and economic stability, successfully centralizing political 
authority, and leaving behind national armies that eliminated the capacity of regional 
strongmen to mount successful challenges to the autonomy of the state. They were 
also successful in deepening the economic profile of trade dependency and agro-
export monoculture on both sides of the island.  
Finally, the U.S. military occupations indirectly strengthened the middle 
classes within both societies. The multi-generational head start afforded the 
Dominican middle classes by greater levels of trade integration during the antecedent 
period would later allow them to assemble a political coalition capable of seizing state 
power soon after the onset of global economic crisis in 1929. In the Haitian case, the 
middle classes were still embryonic as the society entered the critical juncture of the 
1930s. It would be nearly three decades after the onset of that crisis before a member 
of their class, Francois Duvalier, seized and consolidated state power.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Critical Juncture: Trade shocks and the politics of  
economic adjustment (1929-1961) 
 
 
 
 
England’s eighteenth century industrial revolution beget a consumer revolution that 
brought items like scented soap, refined cooking oils, and cotton undergarments—
goods previously accessible to only the wealthiest Englishmen—within reach of the 
working classes (Müller 1995). “Tea, a luxury beverage of the upper classes when the 
century began, was the daily drink of road workers by midcentury. … What had once 
been regarded as ‘luxuries’ came to be seen as mere ‘decencies.’ Then ‘decencies’ 
became ‘necessities’ and the very definition of “necessities” changed” (33). A century 
later the first wave of globalization had begun to deliver a share of these industrial 
fruits to the agrarian world, providing commodity-exporting countries with the foreign 
exchange currency required to import an expanding array of manufactured goods. In 
exchange for the exportation of primary commodities demanded by the industrialized 
core, middle and upper class consumers of the agrarian periphery were now able to 
purchase new medicines, hygiene products, foods, spices, beverages, and textiles, as 
well as a rapidly expanding array of machines capable of alleviating the strains of 
quotidian life.  
Import scarcities caused by economic volatility and war during the first half of 
the twentieth century disrupted the ability of agrarian societies to consume 
manufactured goods, however. The consumption losses and threats to material security 
generated by these periods of scarcity undermined the coherence of the liberal agro-
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export model, creating political and economic incentives for the periphery to develop 
domestically produced substitutes for those manufactured goods that they could no 
longer afford to import. In no region was this inward-looking means of adjusting to 
the exogenous shocks of the 1930s and 1940s more prevalent than Latin America, 
where early decolonization provided societies with a measure of autonomy over how 
they adapted to economic shocks. Variation in the degree to which Latin American 
countries industrialized during this period, however, suggests that these economies 
faced various constraints on their ability to exploit structural conditions that were 
otherwise favorable to strategies of import substitution.  
The ability of countries to carry out a strategy of import substitution depends 
in part on whether the internal market for such goods—a function of population size 
and the distribution of income across that population—allows markets to realize 
economies of scale. Some have argued that Latin America’s smaller countries may not 
have possessed sufficiently large markets to justify investment in a domestic 
manufacturing sector (Hirschman 1968; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989a). 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989a) argue that inward-oriented industrialization 
requires a ratio of population size to income distribution that provides for sufficiently 
large middle and upper classes—the sectors of society that posess sufficient disposable 
income to purchase and consume manufactured goods.  
Indeed, the size of the internal markets of Latin American countries just prior 
to the economic crisis of 1929 broadly corresponds with the level of industrialization 
they achieved by 1960.  Larger countries were generally more successful in 
developing manufacturing sectors than smaller countries (Table 5.1).  
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[TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Sources: For manufacturing in 1960 and population, MOxLAD (Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald 2003).  
Note: I estimate the size of the internal market in 1928 by using the number of literate persons as a 
proxy for income distribution. I obtain this figure by multiplying population size by the fraction of the 
population that was literate according to data from Vanhanen (1997).  
 
There are, however, several caveats to the general correlation between market size and 
industrialization. First, the relative size of the manufacturing sectors in Chile and 
Uruguay in 1960 were comparable to those of Brazil and Argentina, and greater than 
that of Mexico, despite these countries’ substantially smaller internal markets. Indeed, 
at the onset of the global depression in 1929 Uruguay (an early Latin American 
industrializer) had approximately the same size population as Guatemala. Second, 
there is virtually no correlation between internal market size and industrialization 
among lower-tier manufacturers in Latin America. Several smaller countries were able 
to achieve manufacturing sectors amounting to 15 percent of GDP by 1960 despite 
Table: Internal Market Size in 1928 and Industrialization in Latin America by 1960
Manufacturing, 1960                   
(% of GDP)
Population, 1928 
(thousands)
 Size of Internal Market, 
1928 (thousands)
Argentina 26.7 11,440                     7,779                      
Brazil 26.3 32,230                     11,281                     
Chile 24.8 4,250                      2,678                      
Uruguay 24.3 1,670                      1,169                      
Cuba 19.7 3,510                      2,176                      
Mexico 19.3 16,010                     5,283                      
Peru 17.1 5,480                      1,206                      
Colombia 16.4 7,140                      2,999                      
Ecuador 15.7 1,840                      497                         
Honduras 15.3 910                         273                         
Paraguay 15.1 840                         420                         
Dominican Republic 14.6 1,170                      211                         
Venezuela 14.0 3,040                      760                         
El Salvador 13.9 1,390                      278                         
Nicaragua 13.0 670                         168                         
Costa Rica 12.5 480                         283                         
Guatemala 11.9 1,660                      216                         
Panama 11.7 460                         179                         
Bolivia 11.5 2,340                      398                         
Haiti 8.9 2,360                      236                         
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having internal markets of fewer than 500,000 people, whereas countries with 
otherwise comparable markets were not.  
The empirical records of Haiti and the Dominican Republic reveal that 
economic factors related to the size of the internal market for manufactured goods 
were not a significant constraint on the adoption of a strategy of import substitution on 
Hispaniola—at least at the initial or “easy” stages of substituting consumer goods 
imports. As Table 5.1 illustrates, Haiti and the DR both have internal markets of just 
over 200,000 persons. Yet the DR was able to achieve considerably greater economic 
diversification than Haiti during this period of import scarcity brought about by global 
depression and world war (Figure 5.1).  
[FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
  137 
 
Sources: Factory employment data from Economic Commission on Latin America (1966, 17). 
Population data from MOxLAD (Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald 2003). 
Note: I use figures for total population instead of economically active population because these data 
were not available for all of the country-years between 1925 and 1960.  
 
Beginning in the mid-1930s the Dominican economy produced sustained growth in its 
manufacturing sector, averaging an 11.2 percent annual increase in manufacturing 
employment over this period, meanwhile the Haitian economy remained decidedly 
agrarian.  Why did one agro-export economy respond to structural conditions of 
import scarcity during the 1930s and 1940s by developing a domestic industrial sector 
while another, similar economy did not? 
In this chapter I document that what varied on either side of the island was not 
the absolute size of the internal market and the prospects for industrialization and 
economic diversification that economies of scale permit. What varied was the political 
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will of the ruling coalition to invest state resources in the infrastructure, physical and 
human capital that early industrialization requires.  
In order to develop a more complex and differentiated economy under 
conditions of import scarcity, simultaneous investment must be made in the forward 
and backward linkages required to produce or extract primary commodities and 
transform them into finished goods. On Hispaniola, the initial stages of 
industrialization required the emergence of developmentalist state institutions to 
ensure that these requisite, complementary investments were made simultaneously. 
Where does the political will for state developmentalism come from, and why did it 
emerge in the Dominican Republic but not in Haiti? I find that the willingness of 
rulers to invest in import substitution during the critical juncture of the 1930s and 40s 
was due to variation in the relative size and political power of the middle classes in 
these two agrarian societies.  
In Chapter 2 I presented a theory of economic relations in agrarian societies 
that demonstrates why the middle classes are the biggest losers from a disruption in 
the ability to import manufactured goods and maintain their livelihood based on ties to 
the agro-export sector. In Chapter 3 I explored the nineteenth century historical 
antecedents related to trade integration during the liberal reform period that 
determined class structure across Hispaniola as the island’s two agrarian societies 
emerged from the liberal reform period. Chapter 4 established the comparability of 
these agrarian societies prior to the global depression of the 1930s, arguing that 
nothing about their economic and political development at the turn of the twentieth 
century would have led us to predict the dramatic divergence that would occur on 
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Hispaniola. Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic entered the 20th century with poor 
agrarian economies. These societies were governed by weak states that had fallen prey 
to capture by rent-seeking regional caudillos as well as predatory lending by foreign 
powers. In the run-up to World War I, these foreign powers were engaged in a 
competition over spheres of influence on the approach to the Panama Canal. Facing 
imminent collapse in 1915, both countries found themselves under foreign military 
occupation by the United States forces tasked with consolidating central government 
authority, restoring fiscal solvency, and investing in those public works that would 
allow these countries to be more fully integrated into U.S. markets. 
In this chapter I explore how differences in the relative size and political power 
of middle class coalitions shape the economic adjustment choices made by their 
respective governments during a critical juncture brought about by protracted 
economic crisis. The outcome of competing distributional preferences within national 
political arena, in turn, determine the economic purpose of the state institutions that 
emerged from this critical juncture.  
 
Trade Shocks: Global Depression, War, and Import Scarcity (1929-1950) 
 
Between WWI and the 1929 crash, the international system of trade and payments 
consisted of an economic triangle connecting the world’s leading creditor state—the 
United States—with the debtor states of Western Europe and the non-industrialized 
world (Eichengreen 1992, 222–5). U.S. current account surpluses with European 
countries—consisting of war debts and reparations payments as well as trade 
surpluses—financed its current account deficits with primary commodity exporting 
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countries of the global periphery.  Western European countries, in turn, financed their 
trade deficits and war debts by borrowing from the U.S. and running trade surpluses 
comprised primarily of manufactured goods exports with the periphery. During the 
1920s both industrialized Europe and commodity-exporting regions like Latin 
America depended heavily on lending from the United States in order to finance their 
current account deficits and sustain domestic consumption (Eichengreen 1992, 224). 
Under the system of fixed exchange rates that prevailed at the time, the ability of 
debtor countries to maintain their currency pegs to gold while running balance of 
payments deficits depended on the provision of international liquidity by the United 
States, which used its current account surplus to issue credit.  
Most explanations for the onset of the global depression in 1929 emphasize the 
disastrous consequences of a sharp reduction in international liquidity when the 
leading creditor state began to engage in monetary retrenchment. In August 1928 the 
U.S. central bank made the crucial decision to shrink the money supply, raising 
interest rates in order to stem the availability of speculative credit in domestic 
financial markets (Eichengreen 1992, 222). This was primarily in response to an 
investment bubble that had caused the Dow Jones Industrial Average to double in the 
span of just over a year, expanding from 191 points in early 1928 to 381 points by the 
fall of 1929 (Frieden 2006, 174). Consistent with economic orthodoxy of the day, this 
policy of monetary retrenchment was intended to deflate the bubble and defend the 
dollar’s parity with gold. However, the tightening of credit had the unintended 
consequence of severely constricting global consumption and curbing economic 
growth. Prohibitive interest rates caused the volume of U.S. foreign lending to drop by 
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30% in 1928; by 1929 net U.S. financial flows to Europe reversed and U.S. gold 
reserves began to accumulate rapidly (Eichengreen 1992, 226). Without foreign 
lending to prop up international demand, consumption fell sharply across global 
markets. 
 
Deteriorating terms of trade and import scarcity 
 
The economic losses brought about by financial crisis and the economic depression 
that ensued were not distributed evenly across states. Growth rates and domestic 
consumption declined further in the agrarian periphery than it did in the industrialized 
core during the 1930s, owing primarily to the deteriorating terms of trade for 
agricultural commodities vis-à-vis manufactured goods (Figure 5.2).  
[FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Source: Ocampo and Parra (2003), taken from MOxLAD (Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald 2003) 
Note: U.S. dollar index of prices of internationally traded manufactured goods and primary agricultural 
commodities. Prices re-indexed to 1929 base by author. 
 
Between 1929 and 1932 the relative price for manufactured goods on international 
markets dropped approximately 24 percent, whereas the index price for agricultural 
commodities dropped over 57 percent. Not surprisingly, declining terms of trade 
caused the immediate contraction of agricultural export economies. Among the five 
largest Latin American economies—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and 
Mexico—national income shrank by an average of fourteen points during the early 
1930s (Thorp 1992, 184). 
However by no means did this crisis bring about the end of the agro-export 
sector. In Latin America, commodity export quantums actually increased as producers 
flooded international markets in an attempt to replace the income lost to declining 
prices by increasing volumes. Against the usual narrative of diminshed exports and 
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thus providing the impetus for import-substitution, Thorp (1992) finds that export 
sectors in the larger Latin American economies recovered rather quickly from the 
contractions of the early 1930s. By 1933-1934 their economies were growing again, 
and by 1937 the size of their real GDPs had each returned to pre-crisis levels (184). 
This was achieved through a combination of ongoing commodity exports and surging 
in industrial output. In the temperate climates of the Southern Cone,35 where 
commodities like wheat and cattle were produced, the purchasing power of exports 
were restored by the mid-to-late 1930s (Thorp 1998, 114–5). The purchasing power of 
those commodities produced in the more tropical reaches of Latin America, including 
Central America and the Caribbean, remained a fraction of their 1928 values 
throughout the 1930s.  
In the Dominican Republic, declining trade value was primarily due to the 
collapse in world prices for its principal export commodity, sugar, which declined by 
just over 50 percent between 1929 and 1932 (Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald 2003). 
Similarly, the price of coffee—Haiti’s signature export crop—dropped by nearly 48 
percent. (Figure 5.3 below). 
 
[FIGURE 5.3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                
35 The Southern Cone is the region encompassing Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. 
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Source: Ocampo and Parra (2003), taken from MOxLAD (Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald 2003) 
Note: U.S. dollar index of prices of internationally traded manufactured goods and primary agricultural 
commodities. Prices re-indexed to 1929 base by author. 
 
The price of sugar did not fully recover its 1929 level until 1941, and coffee did not 
recover until 5 years after that.  
With national incomes plummeting and foreign exchange reserves rapidly 
depleting, the global depression created a rupture in the legitimacy of the liberal 
economic reforms undertaken in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
“undermining acceptance of traditional ideas about the international division of labor 
between advanced and backward countries” (Hirschman 1968, 4). Exacerbating this 
crisis for the non-industrialized world, the balance of payments shortfalls caused by 
this disruption in trade could not be offset by international borrowing due to the 
Coﬀee%
Sugar%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
19
26
%
19
28
%
19
30
%
19
32
%
19
34
%
19
36
%
19
38
%
19
40
%
19
42
%
19
44
%
19
46
%
19
48
%
19
50
%
19
52
%
19
54
%
19
56
%
19
58
%
19
60
%
Figure: Price Index for Coffee and Sugar,1926-1960 
(1929=100) 
  145 
financial dimension of the crisis—namely the shortage of foreign capital owing to 
U.S. monetary retrenchment. For Haiti and the Dominican Republic the net value of 
imports and exports were cut in half between 1926 and 1935 (Figure 5.4).  
[FIGURE 5.4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports of the Haitian and Dominican Customs Receiverships (various years). 
 
Exports declined by 59 percent in the Dominican Republic and 61 percent in Haiti 
over this time period. For both countries, foreign exchange losses attributed primarily 
to the export crisis forced a curtailment in the consumption of foreign and 
manufactured goods by reducing the net value of imports by 69 and 61 percent, 
respectively (Annual Reports of the Haitian and Dominican Customs Receiverships, 
various years).  
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Government finance 
 
The collapse of the international trade regime during the 1930s not only affected 
national incomes and patterns of consumption in these two agrarian societies; it also 
decimated their principal source of public finance. Despite the efforts of the U.S. 
military occupations on either side of the island to generate alternative sources of 
revenue through the collection of internal taxes, approximately 80-90 percent of all 
government receipts still depended on duties and tariffs on exports and imports 
collected by the U.S. customs receiverships (Annual Reports of the Haitian and 
Dominican Customs Receiverships, various years). As the value of exports and 
imports declined, customs revenues on an absolute (Figure 5.5) and per capita basis 
(Figure 5.6) eroded quickly as well.  
[FIGURE 5.5 ABOUT HERE] 
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[FIGURE 5.6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Sources: Haitian and Dominican Customs Receiverships (various years). 
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Besides providing the principal source of revenue for government 
expenditures, customs duties and tariffs collected by the U.S. receiverships enabled 
these agrarian societies to service the sovereign debts held by New York banks and 
their bondholders. At the onset of the global depression in 1929 the Dominican 
government was responsible for servicing $20 million (current US dollars) in 
consolidated sovereign debt held by Lee, Higginson & Co., New York, amounting to 
$1.2 million in annual debt payments. Beginning in 1930, just as customs revenues 
were falling precipitously, the DR was required to begin servicing another $20 million 
in bonded debt that had previously been issued by the same institution. This 
effectively doubled the amount of annual payments required to service the debt and 
triggering the need for a renegotiated payment schedule under what was called “The 
Emergency Law” of 1931 (Dominican Customs Receivership 1932, 9–10).36 For Haiti, 
servicing it’s approximately $25 million debt burden amounted to about $2.4 million 
per year. Between 1926 and 1935 the servicing of their national debts consumed, on 
average, over one-third of government customs revenues (amounting to about $1 per 
capita in both countries).  
As the international financial crisis deepened and turned into a global 
depression, declining terms of trade had the consequent effects of eroding the national 
income, undercutting public finances, and compromising the ability of agrarian 
                                                
36 Under the Emergency Law, the Dominican government ceased making payments on the principal of 
its debts (the sinking fund), servicing only the year’s interest accrual. (Dominican Customs 
Receivership 1932; Schmidt 1971, 41). When Brazil eliminated its unilateral coffee valorization 
program in 1937, the Haitian government was granted similar financial concessions as those pertaining 
to the Emergency Law in the Dominican Republic beginning in 1938 (Haitian Customs Receivership 
1939, 102–3, 1940, 64–5). 
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societies to consume imported (especially manufactured) goods. Considering the 
Dominican case, historian Moya Pons (1987) observes,  
The profound shrinking of the internal market during the first years of the world 
depression was comparable only to the collapse of the world market for 
traditional Dominican exports. Sugar, cocoa, coffee and tobacco prices dropped to 
unknown levels and so did the Dominican Republic’s capacity to import. The 
country was then suddenly deprived of resources with which to pay for the 
importation of manufactured goods that Dominicans had become accustomed to 
consume during the preceding twenty years. A calamitous scarcity of all types of 
consumer goods took place. (19-20)  
 
As the figures above demonstrated, these trade shocks were of comparable magnitude 
in Haiti. Nevertheless, differences in how economic losses were distributed across 
economic classes, and the consequences of those differences for long-run political 
development could not have been greater. This was in part the result of the second 
trade shock to hit the island—world war.  
By the end of the decade the economic losses of the early 1930s had largely 
been erased, however the structural feature of import scarcity remained. In the trade 
shock described above, the capacity of an agrarian state to import and consume 
manufactured goods was constrained by a terms of trade crisis that put the national 
trade balance into deficit and drew down foreign currency reserves. A conceptually 
distinct form of trade shock from the one that occurred in the 1930s struck agrarian 
societies during the 1940s as mobilization for the Second World War (1939-1945) 
brought an end to their economic depressions.  
During this period the price of commodities on the international market 
boomed as demand for inputs to sustain the war effort increased, meanwhile 
manufacturing imports remained scarce due to wartime rationing in the industrialized 
world. The result of this for agro-export economies was an externally imposed trade 
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surplus, as income from commodity exports increased but imports remained scarce 
and expensive. Besides contributing to the accumulation of capital in the form of large 
foreign exchange reserves, this trade shock also had the effect of insulating domestic 
producers from international competition. For agrarian economies more closely tied to 
US markets, mobilization for the Korean War (1950-53) had a similar effect.  
Where countries had adjusted to the import scarcities of the 1930s through the 
move to import substitution, as in the Dominican case, externally imposed import 
scarcity, combined with booming commodity prices, reinforced the policies of the 
Trujillo regime by protecting domestic producers and providing the economy with the 
foreign exchange reserves needed to import capital stock and pursue industrialization.  
Where economies remained dependent on the agro-export model throughout the global 
depression of the 1930s, as was the case in Haiti, commodity revenues poured in from 
international markets—particularly after WWII had concluded and European 
consumer markets reopened. In the next section I explore the political and economic 
consequences of these trade shocks for institutional adaptation and development on the 
island of Hispaniola.  
  
Political Crisis, Economic Adjustment, and Institutional Development  
 
Just as the economic hardships born of U.S. monetary retrenchment and declining 
global demand were not distributed evenly across states, with agro-export economies 
witnessing a sharp decline in their terms of trade, the losses inflicted by economic 
crisis were also distributed unevenly within agrarian societies. Virtually all sectors of 
the agro-export economy were tied directly or indirectly to international trade. 
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However the global depression imposed varying costs across agrarian societies, which 
were comprised of rural peasants, urban middle classes, and economic elites.  
Hard times and the distributional conflicts that ensued generated significant 
political upheaval throughout the region, resulting in fourteen revolts across Latin 
America and the Caribbean between 1930 and 1934 (Wiarda 1998, 38). In many South 
American countries the political crisis fed into a regional wave of economic populism 
political inclusion (R. B. Collier and Collier 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens 1992). For the tropical agro-export economies of Central America, where the 
greatest losses of export purchasing power were concentrated (Thorp 1998, 114–5),37 
the nature and extent of the liberal reforms during the antecedent period determined 
the resiliency of incumbent political regimes during the 1930s and 1940s (Mahoney 
2001a).  
In El Salvador, for example, radical liberal reformers in the early 1880s forced 
peasants to abandon communal lands and traditional subsistence farming practices in 
favor of expanding commercial coffee plantations (Paige 1997, 107). Having turned to 
wage labor on the plantations for their livelihoods, the collapse of international 
commodity prices during the early 1930s left these land-poor peasants with neither 
wages nor land for subsistence agriculture with which they might have maintained 
their livelihoods. Thus, the radical nature of liberal reforms in El Salvador created the 
conditions for a peasant revolution in 1932. 
                                                
37 Chile was the exception. There, the purchasing power of exports (PPE) fell the steepest of any Latin 
American country. By 1933, its PPE was 18 percent of its 1928 baseline (Thorp 1998, 114).  
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On the island of Hispaniola, by contrast, predominantly smallholder Haitian 
and Dominican peasantries were insulated from the worst of this economic crisis. The 
patterns of smallholder agriculture that emerged across the island during the 19th 
century provided sufficient land to attend to the basic livelihoods of the peasants. 
Having resisted the transition to wage labor, those peasants who participated in the 
agricultural export economy and thus suffered a loss of income during the 1930s were 
quickly able to adjust their mix of cash cropping and subsistence farming once hard 
times set in.  
And while the material interests of Haitian and Dominican oligarchies—
predominantly trade merchants—were exposed to the crisis, members of this class had 
sufficient assets to weather the economic storm without compromising their basic 
material standard of living. Having amassed extensive savings during normal 
economic times, many economic elites were able to offset rapidly declining income 
from the withering trade sector by economizing and drawing down their savings.  
The sector of society whose livelihood was most vulnerable to the global 
depression was the middle classes. Depending for their economic livelihood on 
income that derived directly or indirectly from the agro-export sector, middle class 
retail merchants, tradesmen, and professionals exhausted their savings relatively 
quickly and, thus, were unable to maintain the standard of living to which they had 
become accustomed. This class was unable to revert to subsistence agriculture as 
easily as smallholder peasants owing to their predominantly urban environs. Not 
having the savings to adjust to the crisis by simply economizing to the same extent as 
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the oligarchy, across the island of Hispaniola it was the urban middle classes that paid 
the greatest material costs.  
Economic crisis quickly translated into political crisis for the incumbent 
governments of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Even prior to the crisis, 
popular perceptions that these governments were puppets to American imperialism 
helped create unified nationalist opposition movements on both sides of the island. 
Public unrest stemming from economic collapse was fueled by the efforts of 
incumbents to extend their terms of office through extra-constitutional means. This is 
where the similarities ended, however. 
Neither the class composition of the Haitian and Dominican nationalist 
coalitions that took power in 1930, nor the adjustment policies they pursued, were 
comparable. In the Dominican Republic, initial moves towards austerity and import 
substitution during the global depression positioned the state to help the national 
economy industrialize during the period of ongoing import scarcity caused by war in 
the 1940s. In Haiti, conversely, the public sector remained bloated. Declining 
government revenues were offset by even greater tax burdens on the agro-export 
sector. Thus, while surging commodity prices and ongoing import scarcity during the 
1940s helped both economies recover and repay the remainder of their sovereign debt, 
this exogenous change in the global economy merely reinforced the policies of import 
substitution industrialization and agro-export dependency pursued by the Dominican 
and Haitian governments, respectively, during the 1930s.  
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Political Crisis and Economic Adjustment in the Dominican Republic 
 
In the DR, as in much of the region, the partial collapse of the agro-export model 
helped usher in a new era featuring the political ascendance of the middle classes. 
Though varied in terms of their role within the governments that emerged, Latin 
America’s middle classes brought to the political arena material interests distinct from 
those of the peasantry and the oligarchy, as well as greater power to pursue those 
interests.  
The global depression had a disastrous effect on the Dominican economy, the 
fiscal health of the state, and political support for the incumbent government of 
President Horacio Vasquez (1924-30). The political coalition of Horacistas 
underpinning the Vasquez government drew predominantly from the so-called gente 
de la primera (first-class citizens), representing a class fundamentally committed to 
the dependista agro-export model of national development that was inherited from the 
liberal reform period (199). Taking office with the blessings of the US government 
through negotiations that led to new elections and the end of the military occupation in 
1924, the Vasquez government was viewed as an entreguista appeaser of Yankee 
imperialism—compliant with ongoing restrictions on Dominican financial sovereignty 
and accepting of the increasing dominance of U.S. investors over the Dominican sugar 
industry (Cassá 2004b, 200).  
The economic crisis of 1929 undermined the coherence of the export-
dependent model, cutting sharply into national income and eroding the revenue base of 
the Dominican government. Predictably, political dissent for the incumbent 
government began to foment throughout the course of the year as the crisis deepened. 
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Opposition emerged from traditional conservatives, the Jimenistas and Frederico 
Velasquez, as well as new opposition figures drawn from the middle classes. Popular 
opposition by petit-bourgeois merchants, intellectuals, and members of the 
professional class was built upon growing resistance to the expanding U.S. sugar 
holdings in the east (discussed in Chapter 4). Moreover, resentment among the middle 
classes of the social discrimination doled out by the traditional aristocracy fueled this 
opposition. Despite the increasing social mobility in the Dominican Republic afforded 
by the expansion of commercial agriculture during the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
social stratification actually increased during this period (Hoetink 1986). Wealth failed 
to translate into social influence and political power for upper-middle class Dominican 
professionals, “who because of skills, education, descent and physical traits, as well as 
income, were distinguished from ‘the people’, but were now no longer able to 
penetrate the national elite” as they once had up until the liberal reforms of President 
Heureaux (1884-1899) (295). They were routinely excluded from elite social clubs 
like the Club Union, relegated to a subordinate class—los de la segunda.  
 
Dominican political crisis  
Resistance to expanding U.S. sugar plantations in the east, deteriorating economic 
conditions across the country, and discrimination by an oligarchy who were 
themselves divided into various factions, culminated in a middle class revolt led by a 
young lawyer from the northern Cibao region by the name of Rafael Estrella Ureña in 
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February 1930 (Atkins and Wilson 1998; Cassá 1982a).38 Having reached out to the 
head of the Dominican army, General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, and won his 
allegiance, Estrella Ureña’s forces were permitted to “capture” an army weapons 
cache in the city of Santiago de los Caballeros and march south towards the capital of 
Santo Domingo (Atkins and Wilson 1998).  
Trujillo’s principal role in the coup was initially a passive one, not deploying 
the Dominican army to resist the exceedingly meager force under Estrella Ureña’s 
command. (Turits 2003, 80–81). When U.S. foreign minister Charles Curtis received 
word from Trujillo of the uprising and the supposed defeat of government forces by 
Estrella Ureña’s contingent in the north of the capital,39 he immediately rushed to the 
outskirts of the city in his diplomatic car where he reported discovering not a single 
trace of confrontation; Trujillo had ordered his forces to stand down (Roorda 1998, 
37).   
Diplomatic cables between Curtis and the State Department conveyed the 
economic nature of the political crisis as well as the displeasure of the diplomatic 
service with the extra-constitutional maneuverings of the opposition: “The measure of 
popular support which the Revolution received was due to the economic depression, 
but at bottom the revolution was caused by the unprincipled ambitions of General 
Trujillo and Estrella Urena” (Roorda 1998, 17). Emphasizing the economic context of 
                                                
38 It is not a coincidence that Estrella Ureña’s movement emerged out of the northern Cibao region. As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, this was precisely the region where trade integration and the 
consequent expansion of the middle class took place during the liberal reform period.   
39 Trujillo reported to Curtis “‘that the government troops had been outflanked and partly surrounded by 
the much more numerous revolutionary forces,’ who he said would soon take the capital” (Roorda 
1998, 37). 
  157 
the revolt, U.S. General Receiver W.E. Pulliam summarized the turn of events as 
follows: 
A revolutionary movement headed by Lic. Rafael Estrella Ureña, arising in 
Santiago on February 23, 1930, gained momentum, marched on to the capital, 
where it was successful in forcing the resignation of President Horacio Vasquez 
and causing a complete turnover of the government. Fortunately there was no 
bloodshed or property damage. Subsequent events proved that Santo Domingo 
was the first of several Latin American countries wherein a revolutionary change 
of government was effected during the year. Without doubt the 
depressed economic condition, from which no section escaped, operated in behalf 
of those seeking the change [emphasis added]. (Dominican Customs Receivership 
1931, 9) 
 
General Trujillo was of decidedly humble roots himself, having risen through 
the ranks from socioeconomic obscurity as a soldier in the Dominican constabulary 
forces during the U.S. military occupation. From a military career that began 
inauspiciously as a guard at a U.S.-owned sugar mill (Hall 2000, 17), he quickly built 
a reputation of competence and loyalty during his service in the armed forces. He was 
appointed by President Vasquez to head the National Guard following the withdrawal 
of American troops. Despite accumulating tremendous wealth and power through this 
position during the latter half of the 1920s, Trujillo, like many who came from his 
class background, remained excluded from elite social clubs like the Club de Unión.40  
Upon the successful takeover of the government by Estrella Ureña’s forces, a 
negotiated bargain calling for new elections between Estrella Ureña and the defeated 
incumbent, Vasquez, installed the leader of the revolt as interim president. This 
agreement barred both Vasquez and Trujillo from contesting elections scheduled for 
May of that year (Roorda 1998, 41). Less than a month later, on March 17, 1930, 
                                                
40 The salience of this insult is best revealed by the fact that, upon taking power, one of Trujillo’s first 
mandates was the closure of a number of these clubs including Club Unión (Hoetink 2000, 216–17). 
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however, Trujillo unilaterally announced his candidacy for president and immediately 
set about putting the repressive power of his military forces into play to achieve those 
ends (Roorda 1998, 44). Trujillo quickly subsumed the opposition movement of 
Estrella Ureña, as well as other smaller political forces, using popular discontent with 
the economic downturn as a pretext for his military coup (Cassá 2004b).  
Responding to pleas from all political actors, including Estrella Ureña, the U.S. 
legation under Curtis remained firmly opposed to the candidacy of the military 
strongman, recommending to Washington a decisive show of force to deter Trujillo 
from taking power. The State Department’s appetite for further intervention was 
constrained, however, by President Hoover’s emerging doctrine of non-intervention in 
the Western Hemisphere (Roorda 1998, 44). Undeterred by the idle threats of the U.S. 
minister, Trujillo’s tactics of persuasion, coercion and outright violence led to a 
boycott by opposition candidate Velasquez and the resignation of the national electoral 
commission (Roorda 1998, 47). Subsequently, Trujillo easily won the May 1930 
elections, receiving “more votes than there were registered voters,” and immediately 
set about consolidating power by arresting and intimidating opposition figures 
(Roorda 1998, 48).  
This newfound influence for the middle classes came largely at the expense of 
the power and privilege of the Dominican oligarchy. When it suited his purposes 
Trujillo made calculated accommodations for the families of leading merchant houses, 
whose economic interests had been undermined by the import crises of the 1930s and 
40s, providing them with state patronage or lucrative tax incentives for import 
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substitution activities (Moya Pons 1987, 74). On balance, however, it was the middle 
classes who benefited most from Trujillo’s rule. As Hoetink (2000) argues,  
[I]t seems fair to say that los de segunda profited more from an increase in 
income and prestige, made possible by the growth of the economy and the 
bureaucracy and by what were perceived as the president's favors; many of them 
were his staunchest supporters for many years, and the intermediate social 
position of this supportive group was undoubtedly of strategic political 
significance. (216-7)  
 
Despite the coercive means by which Trujillo stole the election of 1930, he 
nevertheless sought and maintained the support of the middle class coalition that 
brought him to power.  
This ruling coalition included movement leader Estrella Ureña, who stayed on 
as Trujillo’s vice-president, as well as the cadre of reformist thinkers like Espaillat and 
Tolentino (introduced in Chapter 4) who undergirded the revolt.  
Espaillat and other members of the new generation of reformist thinkers, the 
inheritors of an intellectual movement that had been gradually gaining 
momentum since the early 1880s when “progress” first alighted on the Dominican 
Republic, would become key figures in the early Trujillo state. Under the 
dictatorship, their visions for agrarian reforms and of an alternative modernity 
would be paired with a state apparatus that promised the means necessary to 
realize them. (Turits 2003, 79) 
 
Throughout Trujillo’s rule, the dictator would systematically and self-consciously 
favor and provide immense political and material advantage to individuals from 
backgrounds similar to his own: “‘respectable’ people from small towns or rural 
regions, people with some education, whose families might have a leading role to play 
in their local scene–in the professions, in business, in farming–but who were 
considered de segunda by the “old” bourgoisie [sic]” (Hoetink 2000, 216).  
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Economic adjustment in the Dominican Republic 
The government that emerged in 1930 out of the political bargain between Trujillo and 
Estrella Ureña was comprised of middle class reformists like Rafael César Tolentino, 
individuals who shared an alternative, nationalist vision of modernization—one that 
provided a less-volatile, more distributive model for national development than that of 
the enclave sugar monoculture championed by U.S. investors and the Dominican 
oligarchy. The origins of the nationalist-populist ideology adopted by this governing 
coalition was in part an anti-imperialist backlash against the earlier US military 
occupation (1916-1924), ongoing infringement of Dominican economic sovereignty 
via the customs receivership, and the devastating consequences of dependency on the 
existing agro-export model for the material interests of the middle classes (Cassá 
2004). 
Tolentino, a journalist from Santiago and a leading proponent of the coup 
against Vasquez, became Secretary of Agriculture under Trujillo and was an architect 
of the economic adjustments of the 1930s (Turits 2003, 88). The deepening economic 
crisis provided these reformers with the opportunity to reshape the development 
trajectory of the country, away from the liberal dependista model and towards national 
self-sufficiency. These representatives of rising middle classes, “imbued with a 
profound sense of opportunism, saw a brilliant career beneath the wings of the new 
Cesar that had begun to protect them” (Turits 2003, 81). By one estimate, Trujillo 
incorporated 149 middle class intellectuals into the regime—one third as high-level 
policymakers and the majority as mid-level bureaucrats (Cespedes 1989, 27; Turits 
2003, 81). The middle sectors, foremost of all the intellectual class, accepted the 
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repressive nature of Trujillo’s rise and rule as the cost of national modernization and 
the economic and political mobility it promised. 
Foremost, this modernization project entailed state-led coordination of 
domestic production of those goods that the Dominican Republic could no longer 
afford to import. Initial efforts to develop import substitutes were not focused on 
manufactured goods like textiles and machinery, however. The strategy adopted by the 
regime to adjust to the terms of trade crisis of the 1930s was to free up foreign 
exchange for the continued importation of manufactured goods from the industrialized 
world by bringing the subsistence peasantry into the fold of commercial agriculture. 
Pursuing the strategy that Bulmer-Thomas (2003, 202) describes as import 
substitution agriculture (ISA), the DR moved away from agro-export monoculture and 
its associated dependency on international trade for national food security. The 
ministry of agriculture promoted the development of domestic substitutes for 
commodities like rice and beans, as well as processed goods like butter, cheese, soap, 
and beer, that had previously been imported but whose production challenges were 
relatively modest compared to the manufacture of more complex goods.  
This process began with a set of rural reforms designed to upgrade the growing 
capacity of Dominican peasants through land titling, followed up with investments in 
infrastructure and public services. As Chapter 4 discussed, the system of property 
rights and land tenure that the DR inherited from the 19th century was as poorly 
institutionalized there as it was in Haiti. “By 1929 only an estimated sixth of the 
country’s area had been surveyed, and less still had completed the process of title 
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adjudication. The process of determining property rights had hardly begun outside the 
sugar zones” (Turits 2003, 78).  
Reforms began during Trujillo’s first years in office with national speaking 
tours in the hinterlands, many of which had no historical record of having ever seen a 
head of state. During these tours the dictator promoted sedentary commercial 
agriculture as a national duty. By 1933 this rhetoric began translating into practice 
and, eventually, policy. During this year Tolentino, as Trujillo’s agricultural minister, 
began advocating squatters rights on untilled private land. The following year, Trujillo 
dispatched an emissary to the southwest, Major Rafael Carretero, tasked with 
investigating the land tenure situation in the southwest, began an ad-hoc campaign to 
distribute thousands of hectares of land to an equal number of residents in that part of 
the country. Wherever necessary he resolved disputes by invalidating the property 
claims of latifundistas who had not tilled the land in decades, if ever, redistributing 
those lands to local farmers (Turits 2003, 90–1). Allies in the ideological movement to 
expand smallholder agriculture in the Republic, Carretero and Tolentino successfully 
petitioned Trujillo in 1934 to begin a nationwide policy of land reform that built upon 
Carretero’s campaign. 
The measures entailed in this land distribution policy, what Turits (2003) 
argues was “one of the Trujillo state’s most important” (91), entailed the creation of a 
centralized national system of juntas protectoras de la agricultura (agricultural 
support boards) capable of issuing binding legal contracts that would allow for the 
expanded cultivation of unused public, private, and communal lands by peasants—
many of whom were accustomed to roaming subsistence agriculture. Turits’ central 
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thesis is that, caught between uncertain land tenure rights under the previous regime 
and the threat of expulsion or absorption by the expanding foreign agribusinesses to 
the east, Trujillo’s bargain with the peasants to transition from subsistence to 
commercial agriculture in exchange for secure property rights and state support was a 
popular one. Between 1934 and 1936, 107,202 hectares of land had been distributed to 
nearly 54,494 households—an average of approximately 2 hectares (5 acres) per 
household (96). By 1955 these numbers doubled, the Trujillo regime having 
distributed 222,016 hectares to 104,707 households.41 The rate of land distribution 
peaked between 1935 and 1940, during which time the total area of national cropland 
increased by 47 percent (96-7). 
In order to ensure that these land reforms translated into increased agricultural 
productivity, the Trujillo regime made complimentary investments in infrastructure 
and social development across the country. The national transportation network 
installed by the U.S. occupation between 1916 and 1924 to connect the capital of 
Santo Domingo to other major cities and ports was expended under Trujillo to link up 
hundreds of smaller rural communities with the internal market (Moya Pons 1987, 12). 
Between 1930 and 1960 road infrastructure was expanded from 171km to over 5,000 
km (Turits 2003, 215). Whole stretches of irrigated land were created and distributed 
via Trujillo’s program of public aqueducts (215-216). Basic health and hygiene 
improved dramatically in rural areas as the government laid out requirements for the 
use of footwear and latrines, as well as expanding the number of hospitals in the DR 
from 8 in 1930 to 51 by 1958 (225). In terms of education and literacy, children’s 
                                                
41 Note that these figures are in addition to the land rights granted to existing squatters by the regime. 
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school attendance rose from 13 percent in the early 1930s to 43 percent by 1954—
aided by the expansion of public schools from 526 to 2,570 over the same period.  
By liberating peasants from various forms of usurious land/labor relations with 
large landholders and improving their material wellbeing, the regime consolidated 
popular support in both rural and urban areas. Under the condition of import scarcity, 
land reforms were designed to restore the consumptive capacity of urban dwellers by 
compelling peasants to trade their subsistence farming practices under the condition of 
uncertain land use for commercial agriculture and the economic security of titled land. 
Besides improving the economic security of peasant farmers, the increased cultivation 
of crops improved the availability of various agricultural commodities in the urban 
areas, whose demand had gone increasingly unmet do to the disruption in the 
international trade regime during the 1930s.  
Beyond the regime’s efforts to expand commercial agriculture destined for 
domestic markets through land reform, the primary focus of import substitution was an 
expansion of food and beverage manufacturing during the 1930s—converting basic 
commodities like tobacco, cacao and grain into finished products like cigars/cigarettes, 
chocolate, liquor, beer, and flour. For example, in current dollars the importation of 
butter and cheese fell from $62,676 and $91,398 in 1930, to $7,142 and $7,099 in 
1935, respectively (Monteagudo 1936). Additionally, the Dominican state actively 
promoted the production of commodities like pasta, rice, and beans—staples of the 
Dominican diet that had previously been imported. The gradual build-up of a state-
directed processed food sector during the late 1930s and 1940s helped make the 
economy largely food self-sufficient by the 1950s (Moya Pons 1987, 23). 
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One consequence of the Dominican Republic’s move towards food self-
sufficiency during the economic crisis was that it freed up increasingly precious 
foreign exchange for the importation of other types of goods. Overall, the importation 
of manufactured goods as a proportion of total imports actually increased over the 
1930s, meanwhile the importation of raw commodities stagnated and processed 
foodstuffs declined (Figure 5.7). 
[FIGURE 5.7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Source: Dominican Customs Receivership (various years). 
As Turits (2003) concludes, it was through the transformation of the political 
economy from one favoring landed elites to one favoring the popular sectors that the 
regime established its legitimacy.  
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Had Trujillo structured his political base upon a landed elite, property claims 
based on peso titles, troches, and private surveys would have prevailed over 
squatters’ rights and land ‘distributions.’ In sum, Trujillo was a dictator whose 
policies impeded more than they favored the consolidation and expansion of a 
pre-existing landed elite. These material foundations lent credibility to Trujillo's 
paternalist and populist claims. Although the regime helped eliminate many of 
peasants' traditional practices, it also proclaimed an important role for them as 
small farmers in an incipient commercial economy and modernizing nation. 
When peasants were approached by the state on these terms, and when they faced 
alternative prospects of dispossession and nonviable agriculture without state 
support, they embraced their incorporation by the national state and specifically 
by the Trujillo regime. The vision of nationalist intellectuals who prior to 
Trujillo's seizure of power had come to idealize a small farmer mode of 
modernization began to be realized. (114) 
 
The industrial stage of the Dominican Republic’s import substitution strategy did not 
begin until the 1940s, particularly after the Second World War when capital 
machinery from the industrialized world once again became available for importation. 
But already by the end of the 1930s a stark contrast emerged between the predatory 
logic of the Dominican state at the turn of the century—when patrimonial rulers 
merely fed off of the economy—and the emergence of a developmentalist investor-
state by the end of the global depression. 
The first of these policies in support of industrialization was the adoption of 
the “Law of Industrial Franchises” (ley No. 672) of April, 1934, intended to further 
alleviate the foreign exchange crisis through a set of tax incentives that the Dominican 
state hoped encourage the formation of domestic industries capable of directly 
transforming raw commodities into finished goods (Moya Pons 1987, 24).42 The effect 
of this law was minimal, however, as fears of expropriation by the dictator effectively 
reduced the incentives for business establishments to register themselves for the tax 
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breaks. Furthermore, throughout the 1930s industrialization remained adversely 
affected by the tariff regime installed by the U.S. occupation in 1919—one that raised 
the costs of both raw inputs as well as capital stock for would-be industrialists. 
By the early 1940s, several exogenous factors had shifted in ways that 
promoted Dominican industrialization and reinforced the broader set of adjustment 
policies related to import substitution that had been pursued during the international 
economic crisis. First, the onset of WWII in 1939 increased global demand for 
Dominican sugar and molasses and contributed to an increase in the national income 
and the consequent expansion of the internal market for manufactured goods (Moya 
Pons 1987). Second, at the same time that commodity prices were increasing, war 
mobilization and rationing in the industrialized world effectively prolonged the import 
crisis of the 1930s, decreasing the availability of manufacturing goods on world 
markets. As a consequence of this international trade shock, foreign exchange reserves 
began to accumulate quickly in agro-export economies.  
In the DR this facilitated the accelerated repayment of its foreign debts, 
creating the necessary conditions for a third factor: the termination of the customs 
receivership and the restoration of financial sovereignty to the Dominican state. 
Acknowledging the improved prospects of Dominican bond repayment and desirous 
of improved relations so as to promote hemispheric defense during WWII, the United 
States concluded the Trujillo-Hull treaty with the Dominican government in 1940. 
                                                                                                                                       
42 Up until the conclusion of the Trujillo-Hull treaty in 1940, the Dominican Republic could not set its 
own tariff rates and thus could only attempt to protect domestic industry through manipulation of 
internal taxes (Cassá 1982a). 
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This treaty returned control over fiscal matters, the collection of customs revenues, 
and the setting of tax and tariff rates, back to the DR.  
Immediately the Trujillo regime went to work drafting a new constitution that 
reflected the government’s expanded power to tax and promote economic 
development. In particular, Article 90 of the 1942 constitution set forth the policies 
designed to directly incentivize import substitution industrialization (ISI) and foreign 
investment (Moya Pons 1987, 41). During WWII the Trujillo regime exerted tight 
control over the availability of scarce manufactured goods, creating a monopoly over 
imports and restricting manufacturing exports.  
This system of war controls for the supply of manufactures was widely abused 
and served as a means for Trujillo to accumulate substantial sums by selling many 
strategic imports, such as automobile tires, gasoline, replacement parts, clothes 
and shoes at monopoly prices or by collecting commissions for the granting of 
import licenses. The enormous savings which Trujillo made during those years 
made him more eager to invest in new industrial ventures to substitute imports. 
He had already been involved in the construction of a vegetable oil plant and a 
cement factory, as well as in a meat processing plant and in the acquisition of a 
beer factory, so that when the war broke out, he was already an incipient 
industrialist with several years of experience. The Depression years had shown to 
him the advantages of import-substitution industrialization, but the constraints 
imposed by the Dominican-American Convention of 1924 and the 1919 tariff had 
prevented him from moving forcefully in that direction. (Moya Pons 1987, 43) 
 
With American financial constraints removed, and flush with foreign exchange 
reserves owing to the positive trade balance during WWII, the Trujillo government 
deepened its investments in the existing ‘easy’ food and beverage industries made 
during the 1930s, while at the same time expanding into more sophisticated product 
transformations. Thus, while cottage industries attempted to exploit the favorable 
economic climate for import substitutes by ramping up their low-capital 
manufacturing operations, the Dominican state was coordinating capital investments 
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in a variety of industrial initiatives that would transform the scope and scale of import 
substitution beyond basic goods.  
During WWII a class of Dominican entrepreneurs that had acquired sums of 
wealth as import merchants during the period of export liberalism began to reorganize 
around the nascent ISI sector. As import scarcities continued, this sector increasingly 
pressed the state for favorable government concessions such as the tax exemptions 
provided for by Article 90 (Moya Pons 1987, 46–47).  
The first contract under this article was a textile mill to be operated by the 
Armenteros family, who had owned commercial houses in San Pedro de Macorís since 
the turn of the century and “controlled a large part of the country’s import trade” up 
until the global depression (Moya Pons 1987, 47). Textiles represented a substantial 
portion of Dominican imports during this period, comprising nearly one-fifth of all 
imports by the onset of WWII in 1939 (Dominican Customs Receivership 1940). The 
cooperative venture between the Dominican state and the Textilera Dominicana, C. 
por A. was inked with the passage of Resolution No. 762, a contract whereby the 
Armenteros family would begin the construction of a textile mill comprised of a 
minimum of 100 automatic looms, as well as the promotion of cotton cultivation in the 
hinterlands (Moya Pons 1998, 46).  In exchange for developing the backward and 
forward linkages of input production and product transformation required to 
inaugurate a domestic textiles sector, this contract made the following provisions for 
state action: 
The State is willing to facilitate the establishment and exploitation of new 
industries in the country, particularly those that the Textilera Dominicana, C. por 
A., proposes to install to produce articles of wide consumption in the Dominican 
Republic which are presently imported from abroad; this will not only contribute 
  170 
to reduce the export of foreign exchange but will offer bigger employment 
opportunities to Dominican workers and will promote the exploitation and 
development of national raw materials to be used by the aforementioned new 
industries... 
The State recognizes and admits that without the economic guarantees and 
facilities that the company has stipulated, the company cannot carry out its 
intention to initiate the manufacture of cotton fabrics in the country nor promote 
raw cotton production... 
The company will be exempted and exonerated, according to the provisions of 
Article 90 of the Constitution, from all duties, or obligatory fiscal or municipal 
impositions established by any governmental body, in effect presently or in the 
future, which tax machinery, equipments, replacement parts, etc., and which are 
deemed necessary to eliminate in order to assure the establishment and 
development of the company… 
The company will also be exonerated and exempted from all taxes on imported 
raw materials, products and other foreign articles which will have to be used in 
the fabrication of textiles and in the other operations of the company; it will also 
be exonerated from taxes on raw materials, manufactured products and other 
items that the company may export abroad... . (Moya Pons 1987, 45–6) 
 
This earliest example of industrial promotion under Article 90 clearly identifies the 
state’s economic interest in developing a textile sector, as well as the firm’s need for 
state support in order to nurture such a sector and achieve commercial viability. 
Within five or so years, two additional contracts would be established under Article 
90. Comparable to the terms granted to the Textilera Dominicana, the first of these 
provided for commercial activity directed towards intensified cotton, sisal, and other 
textile fibers (47-8). The second contract provided for expanded manufacturing by La 
Algodonera, C. por A.. Originally an import house that had developed a side business 
manufacturing shirts and socks during the Second World War, the Lebanese-
Dominican owner of La Algodonera, José Antonio Najri, eventually followed 
Armenteros and transitioned completely from merchant to industrialist (49-50).  
 Even clearer examples of the role of the state in coordinating investment in the 
forward and backward linkages required by early-industrializers are to be found in 
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those ventures where the state held a controlling interest. In 1948, Trujillo and an 
American businessman by the name of Luis I. Pokrass formed Destilería Universal, C. 
por A., a joint venture intended to decrease the Dominican Republic’s reliance on 
gasoline imports by producing gasohol—blending imported gas with alcohol to be 
distilled from domestically produced molasses. It was hoped that this venture could 
reduce Dominican fuel imports by as much as 40 percent and alleviate some of the 
shortages that were frequent during the war (Moya Pons 1987, 51).  
To this end, the State committed itself “[t]o deliver each year to the company for 
a period of twenty years beginning as soon as the plant begins its operations, a 
sufficient quantity of molasses for the distillation of approximately two million 
five hundred thousand gallons of industrial anhydrous alcohol, and to pay for this 
distillation in monthly payments a sum representing a net profit of no less than 
ten cents per gallon which will be liquidated in monthly payments.”  
 The State also agreed to construct the water and sewage system, streets and 
other infrastructure needed for the operation of the factory and, of course, to 
exonerate it from the payment of import duties on machinery, replacement parts, 
equipment and construction materials destined to the building of the plant or to 
future expansions and repairs, all this “in accordance with the provisions 
contained in Article 90 of the Constitution of the Republic.” (52) 
 
Not only did the Dominican state agree to provide tax and tariff exemptions and 
guarantee a stable supply of raw inputs—in this case molasses; it also committed itself 
to investing in the public infrastructure required to operate the factory.43  
Similar provisions for the production of other light industrial goods like 
cement, chocolate, and vegetable oil under Article 90 illustrate the degree to which the 
Trujillo regime transformed the Dominican state into a developmentalist institution 
capable of coordinating economic investment and promoting industrialization. 
                                                
43 Moya Pons (1987, 53) notes that, while the economic viability of gasohol ultimately collapsed with 
the increasing availability of fuel from the Dutch Antilles, the plant was eventually sold at only modest 
losses to a joint venture that would develop the trademark Dominican rum, Brugal.  
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Overall, investment in the industrial sector increased by nearly 200 percent between 
1945 and 1955 (Franco 2008, 291). 
The remarkable material progress achieved by the Trujillo regime during the 
1930s and 40s came to an end during the late 1950s as the Dominican economy slid 
into decline and the regime responded to mounting political opposition with greater 
and greater acts of repression.  
Ten years earlier, nothing about the performance of the regime would have 
predicted its demise. The popularity of the peasant land reforms in rural areas, coupled 
with the extensive investments in national infrastructure that connected these areas to 
national markets, had provided a lasting base of support among this popular sector. 
This was combined with rising quality of life in the urban areas during the 1940s due 
to the effect of state-coordinated investment in an accelerated program of import 
substitution industrialization and the attendant expansion of the internal market and 
middle class economic opportunity. By the end of World War II, Trujillo’s popularity 
was such that the US ambassador to the Dominican Republic, George Butler, 
remarked in 1946 that Trujillo would easily triumph were the dictator to hold 
competitive elections (Turits 2003, 232).  
It was not until 1961, when the state failed to deliver sound economic 
governance during a prolonged downturn, that members of his middle-class coalition 
turned against Trujillo and assassinated him. Financial mismanagement on the part of 
the dictator became pronounced during the 1950s. The patrimonial character of 
Trujillo’s use of state resources is best exemplified by his obsessive efforts to acquire 
foreign-owned sugar companies using the public purse, only to order the state to sell 
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these holdings back to his family at below market rate prices. Additionally, his 
government was guilty of exorbitant spending on an “International Fair for the Peace 
and Brotherhood of the Free World” in 1955, which left the state treasury drained 
going into the late 1950s. When the international terms of trade for Dominican exports 
took a sharp dip in 1959, political opposition to the regime both domestically and 
among Dominican exiles (supported by Venezuela and Cuba) became emboldened.  
Trujillo responded by dramatically increasing the regime’s expenditures on 
military hardware, compounding the Dominican fiscal problem even further (Turits 
2003, 248–249). When the regime attempted to compensate for its fiscal 
mismanagement by imposing additional taxes on the Dominican middle classes, 
formal opposition to the dictator began to congeal inside the confines of the University 
of Santo Domingo. “U.S. ambassador Joseph Farland reported at the close of 1958 that 
there was now evidence of ‘a very self-conscious professional group centering around 
the University and that they are reportedly trying to change the government via ‘liason 
… with disgruntled or ambitious military elements’’” (250).  
This opposition, “composed primarily of university students, young 
professionals, and merchants” (Turits 2003, 233), ultimately succeeded in 
assassinating the dictator in 1961 with the cooperation of key elements within 
Trujillo’s government, who were acting on the imploding popularity of the regime in 
urban areas. The subsequent coup d’état failed, and the conspirators were either 
captured or fled. However within eight months the Trujillo family and the regime’s 
puppet president, Joaquín Balaguer, were all forced into exile in anticipation of the 
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competitive elections that ensued (233). The Trujillo regime had been deposed by a 
middle class coalition not unlike the one that brought him to power in 1930.  
 
Dominican outcomes 
Despite the swift collapse of Trujillo’s economic and political legitimacy in the late 
1950s, he left a legacy of investment in infrastructure, physical and human capital that 
would provide a platform for Dominican growth and development over the second 
half of the 20th century. As Moya Pons (1987) summarizes, 
One of the most impressive features of Dominican import substitution 
industrialization from 1938-1960 is the sustained secular growth of all its 
indicators. During that period the number of manufacturing establishments almost 
doubled; capital investment multiplied nine times; the number of workers and 
employees grew almost two and a half times; the amount of salaries paid by the 
industrial sector was ten times more in 1960 than what it was in 1938; the value 
of national raw materials used by the manufacturing sector also multiplied 
fourteen times; fuel and lubricants expenditures went up twenty two times; 
industrial sales also multiplied more than twelve times from $13.3 million to 
$164.4 million, an impressive growth in a twenty two year period. (123) 
 
The transformation of the Dominican economy was not simply the result of private 
firms responding to new market signals—namely higher prices for foreign imports due 
to international economic crisis and war. Rather, the rapid transformation of the 
Dominican economy from agro-export dependency to one capable of producing 
domestic substitutes for imported goods was the result of a deliberate constellation of 
policies adopted by the Trujillo regime beginning in 1934, and the institutional 
changes that those policies beget. Neither the general state of political repression that 
permeated the regime, nor its patrimonial character and the personal enrichment that it 
afforded the Trujillo family and their associates, prevented it from pursuing 
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developmentalist strategies of state-led import substitution when faced with a 
protracted economic crisis.  
 
Political Crisis and Economic Adjustment in Haiti 
Compared to the rest of Latin America, the Dominican experience was unique neither 
in the magnitude of crisis of the 1930s nor the political pressure for a policy response. 
Yet for Haiti, the political fallout from the international economic crisis of the 1930s 
was more muted. Unlike the Dominican Republic, where the ruling merchant 
oligarchy was replaced in 1930 by a decidedly middle class coalition composed of 
military officers, journalists, and intellectuals, in Haiti the oligarchy of merchants44 
and public officials remained firmly in control of the state throughout the 1930s and 
early 1940s. Exhibiting a proportionally smaller and politically weaker middle class, 
Haiti’s social structure failed to provide the same impetus for political change and 
economic transformation that occurred in the Dominican Republic and throughout 
much of Latin America. By the time the Haitian middle classes did take state power in 
the late 1940s and 1950s under Dumarsais Estimé (1946-1950) and the Duvaliers 
(1957-1986), the critical juncture and its attendant incentives for institutional 
transformation through state-led development had passed. Moreover, the political 
power of the traditional oligarchy was never displaced as it had been in the DR. What 
emerged instead was a political stalemate between the black middle classes and the 
                                                
44 Whereas Germans had comprised the most important block of import/export merchants up until 
World War I, in the early years of the U.S. occupation many of these families either fled or were 
imprisoned; Haitian mulattos and Levantine immigrants emerged to take their place during the 
occupation (Trouillot 1990, 104) 
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mulatto elite, one that produced an uncomfortable modus vivendi rather than 
meaningful economic reform and institutional development. 
 
Class and economic crisis in Haiti 
In Haiti, as in the Dominican Republic, the peasants were spared the worst of the 
economic fallout from the 1929 crisis. Unlike plantation economies such as El 
Salvador, where peasants that had been forcefully converted from subsistence farmers 
into plantation wage laborers during the liberal reform period soon found themselves 
without either wages or means of subsistence following the collapse of commodity 
prices export markets during the early 1930s (Paige 1997, 107), the collapse of the 
plantation system following the Haitian revolution, as well as the disincentives for 
peasants to participate in markets due to the predatory nature of the state, led to lower 
intensity cash cropping and continued reliance on subsistence agriculture. As the 
Financial Adviser-General Receiver of the U.S. Customs Receivership in Haiti, S. De 
La Rue, discussed in his annual report to Washington towards the end of the third year 
of the crisis (1931, 43–44), 
In some respects the fiscal year 1930-31 was not so unsatisfactory as might be 
supposed from the admittedly discouraging record of declining foreign trade, of 
lower prices for export commodities, of poor crops, business stagnation, and 
greatly diminished revenues. On the whole, the country has adjusted itself 
surprisingly well to changed conditions.  
Haiti in a way is fortunate in having a population the great mass of which lives 
upon the land, and is able to supply its few wants for the most part directly from 
the products which it raises. The distressing problem of obtaining sufficient food 
and shelter does not present itself with the same force as in colder climates or in 
highly industrialized countries. Unemployment exists only in the few towns and 
cities of any size, and even then it affects comparatively few of the two and a half 
million inhabitants of the country. The small land-owners and the peasants hardly 
feel the effects of the depression save that the small crops of coffee or of cotton 
which they have grown on their farms produce only a portion of the income which 
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they received in former years. Consequently, they buy fewer cotton goods and 
smaller quantities of imported foodstuffs, and devote a greater portion of their 
land to rice and vegetables [emphasis added]. … 
 
Being unaccustomed to consuming great quantities of imported goods during normal 
economic times, the Haitian peasant’s standard of living was not greatly compromised 
by reduced export revenues or import scarcity during hard ones.  
And, as in the Dominican Republic, the Haitian oligarchy were also able to 
weather the economic storm and maintain some measure of their capacity to consume 
by economizing and drawing upon savings. It was the smaller establishments in the 
urban areas and their middle class proprietors that bore the brunt of the economic pain. 
The administrator of the Haitian customs receivership (1931)  continues: 
…Household requirements for salt, sugar, tobacco, soap, and other simple needs 
are supplied by peddlers who move about from market to market, but it is only in 
the larger country markets and in the towns and cities that cotton cloth, machetes, 
kitchen utensils, and other articles of common use in Haiti ordinarily can be 
purchased. Most of these articles are imported from abroad, and they are sold by 
retail merchants who carry relatively small stocks. The retail merchants, together 
with the exporters and importers, have felt the effects of the business depression 
in Haiti more severely than any other class; and it is from these merchants, or 
more properly, from the foreign commerce which they handle, that the 
government derives by far the greater part of its revenues.  
Besides the imports, exporters, and retail merchants, a large proportion of 
whom are foreigners, and the peasants, small land-owners and more prosperous 
country people, there are only two classes of people in Haiti. First the relatively 
large number of government employees, officials and other persons deriving their 
incomes from the State; and secondly, the small group in the larger cities 
composed of lawyers, doctors and others who are professionally trained.  
Up to the end of the last fiscal year the full force of the world economic 
depression had been felt directly only by that class which carries on the foreign 
and retail trade of the Republic. The weaker establishments were forced out of 
business, either through business failure or through the serious and demoralizing 
threat to commercial credit of discriminatory legislation. Other houses, including 
all of the more important business establishments, have managed to survive. The 
unemployment problem in the cities is due to the fact that these establishments, in 
order to economize, have had to reduce their personnel; and such reductions 
progressively have affected all of the urban population to a severe extent 
[emphasis added]. (44-5) 
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As the crisis dragged on, the economic fallout spread from Haitian import-export 
merchants—who were directly affected by the collapsing international trade regime—
to virtually all sectors of the cash economy. Increasing signs that incumbent president 
Luis Borno (1922-1930), who was popularly perceived as a puppet of the American 
occupation, intended to pursue an additional term of office contrary to constitutional 
provisions, evoked even greater opposition from nationalist figures as the economic 
situation deteriorated.  
 
Political crisis in Haiti 
Widespread Haitian protests of the U.S. occupation erupted in the fall 1929 as the 
economy began to falter. “Economic distress caused by falling coffee prices and 
increases in government taxes were coupled with discontent over the postponement of 
the 1930 legislative elections and the apparent continuance of Borno as client-
president” (Schmidt 1971, 196). It began with violent street demonstrations in Port-au-
Prince in October 1929, triggered by an announcement by a U.S.-administered school, 
the Service Technique, that scholarships to urban students were to be reduced. 
Eventually joined by urban intellectuals and opponents of the military occupation, 
these protests quickly spread to other urban areas, from Cap Haitien in the north to 
Jacmel and Petit Goâve in the south. By December these uprisings had spread outside 
the cities as their ranks grew in number. Consequently, the head of the U.S. 
occupation, High Commissioner John H. Russell, declared martial law and requested 
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from Washington an additional 500 Marines as reinforcements.45 Escalating tensions 
culminated in a violent confrontation between occupying Marines and an angry mob 
of 1,500 Haitians in the southern port city of Les Cayes on December 6. The mob was 
protesting recent arrests by the occupation in an attempt to put down these 
insurrections, as well as underlying grievances related to tax hikes on alcohol, tobacco, 
and other consumer goods. The local press reported that 24 Haitians had been killed 
and 51 more had been wounded by the U.S. Marines during the incident (Schmidt 
1971, 199–200). Dubbed the “Les Cayes Massacre,” the embarrassment it caused the 
U.S. on the international stage compelled President Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) to 
dispatch a fact-finding mission to Haiti led by William Cameron Forbes.  
The Forbes Commission arrived in Haiti in February 1930. It provided a 
sobering assessment of the state-building accomplishments of the 15 year-old 
occupation and its rapidly deteriorating legitimacy among the Haitian people, 
expressing skepticism that the institutional reforms implemented by the military 
government would persist following the withdrawal of American forces. Among the 
recommendations of the commission were the immediate convening of free and fair 
elections, the transfer of virtually all government ministries back to the Haitian 
control, and accelerated preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. Marines (Shannon 
1996, 94). Hoover endorsed Forbes’ report immediately and set about implementing 
its recommendations. On October 14, 1930 Sténio Vincent (1930-1941), a mulatto 
nationalist outspoken in his opposition to US occupation and his demand for 
                                                
45 While the requested forces were dispatched by ship, taking station off the coast of Haiti, the State 
Department declined to authorize their landing out of concern that further repression of Haitian 
protestors would only further damage the standing of the United States in the court of international 
public opinion (Schmidt 1971, 201).  
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withdrawal, was elected president in what were regarded as the first elections free of 
U.S. interference since the beginning of the occupation (Trouillot 1990, 107).  
By the end of 1931 the Hoover administration had completed the transfer of 
control over most government ministries besides those concerning the collection of 
customs revenue to the Vincent government (Trouillot 1990, 107–108).  
In conjunction with the election of Vincent, the United States appointed Dr. Dana 
G. Munro as civilian minister to Haiti, replacing High Commissioner Russell. The 
removal of Russell, following the earlier departure of Borno and Freeman, 
marked the end of American military dictation. Munro was instructed to assume 
the functions hitherto exercised by the high commissioner, but he was to avoid 
interfering with the freedom of action of the new Vincent government as much as 
possible in the view of the new United States policy towards Haiti. (Schmidt 
1971, 220) 
 
Increasing pressure by the Vincent government (and the nationalist coalition 
undergirding his administration) to recover full sovereignty from the United States led 
to a series of concessions by Munro as related to American authority over the 
administration of public works and the national guard. Efforts to promote American 
investments in the country were all but abandoned in favor of reducing all practical 
involvement in Haiti besides the collection of sovereign debt payments (Plummer 
1988, 242).  
The final agreement for the termination of the U.S. military occupation of Haiti 
was adopted on August 7, 1933. It provided for the withdrawal of remaining U.S. 
forces the following year to be followed by continued American control over customs 
and an advisory role on matters concerning fiscal solvency, such as the government 
budget, foreign indebtedness, and changes to tariffs and taxes (Schmidt 1971, 226).  
While the U.S. government retained an advisory role over Haitian fiscal 
matters, the ongoing receivership had neither the incentives nor the coercive power to 
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oppose the Vincent administration on key distributional questions integral to the 
political survival of his coalition. President Hoover’s reluctance to deploy additional 
forces in the fall of 1929 in response to the riots only intensified under his successor, 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy. In response to a 1933 
request by the Vincent administration to end the last measure of U.S. financial control, 
namely collection of the remaining $11 million in sovereign debt, Roosevelt 
responded, “Except for this obligation upon which the bondholders are entitled to 
insist, my Government would be only too glad to discontinue at once its connection 
with financial administration in Haiti” (Schmidt 1971, 227).   
The limited nature of U.S. involvement in Haitian affairs and the costs 
associated with such involvement indicates that, had the Haitian state desired to pursue 
a coordinated strategy of import substitution and industrial promotion similar to the 
strategy adopted by the Trujillo regime,46 it certainly could have done so. What was 
lacking in Haiti, rather, was the political will of the ruling coalition to move away 
from the agro-export model in pursuit of a new means of providing for domestic 
consumption.  
The range of economic adjustment policies that were possible in Haiti was 
constrained by the distributional preferences of the ruling coalition. Whereas the 
nationalist coalition that swept Trujillo to power was comprised of the middle classes, 
Vincent—a member of the mulatto elite from the south whose rise to power had been 
                                                
46 The Trujillo regime did not regain sovereignty over the collection of customs and the setting of tax 
and tariff rates in 1940 at the conclusion of the Trujillo-Hull treaty, however restrictions on the debt 
repayment schedule and control over Dominican currency were not lifted until the debt had been repaid 
in 1947. Similarly, the collection of Haitian debt was transferred in 1941 from the U.S. receivership to 
Haiti’s Banque Nationale, “which remained under United States supervision until full redemption of the 
1922 loan was completed in 1947” (Schmidt 1971, 229).  
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bankrolled by a prominent member of Haiti’s financial sector—secured the election 
through nationalist and populist rhetoric matched with the full support of the 
traditional oligarchy (Shannon 1996, 95). Following the transfer of government 
ministries to Haitian control in 1931, President Vincent set about assembling a durable 
political coalition comprised of elite Haitian business interests and a critical mass 
drawn from the “small black urban middle class, which began at this time to play an 
important role in political affairs” (Nicholls 1996, 10). Middle class incorporation 
under Vincent was motivated not by the competing distributional interests of this class 
but, rather, the baser logic of assembling a minimum winning coalition.  
The representative of Haiti’s black middle class in the 1930 election, 
prominent public intellectual Jean Price-Mars, was easily defeated in part because his 
rhetoric regarding Haiti’s class structure alienated him from the economic elite and 
their crucial financial backing (Shannon 1996). A moderate, progressive nationalist, 
Price-Mars advocated total American withdrawal combined with a set of 
developmentalist reforms intended to increase Haiti’s national wealth and lead to “a 
viable Haitian state.” He sidestepped the questions of race that preoccupied members 
of the negritude movement, instead choosing to frame Haiti's societal problem—
pervasive illiteracy and poor health—as a problem of class relations between the lower 
and upper classes rather than race relations between black and mulatto. “In essence, it 
stemmed from the fact that a small but powerful group, composed of both blacks and 
mulattos, dominated and directed the 'immense majority of job workers, non-
specialized workers, unemployed workers of any color, and especially the great mass 
of rural workers, the innumerable multitude of peasants” (Shannon 1996, 98). 
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Having defeated Jean Price Mars through elite backing and populist rhetoric, 
President Vincent committed himself publicly to a new era of reformism akin to 
Roosevelt's New Deal and sought to deepen ties with the United States the Dominican 
Republic. Despite his rhetoric there were, however, few changes in Haiti’s economic 
and political structures. Government policies continued to reflect the interests of the 
ruling class and its oligrarchic benefactors, providing little in the way of progress for 
the peasantry and the urban working classes (Smith 2009, 13–14).  
Nevertheless, this period of economic crisis that marked the end of the U.S. 
military occupation coincided with the growing power of the predominantly black 
middle class. This class drew strength from an emerging ethno-political movement, 
negritude, which politicized race relations and the persistent failure of the traditional 
ruling class to represent Haiti’s black majority. These years produced a new 
generation of political leaders. Dumarsais Estimé, one member of this emerging 
middle class, served as a cabinet minister in Vincent’s government before eventually 
taking state power at the head of a middle class revolt in 1946. Another member of 
this class was Francois Duvalier, a medical student during the U.S. occupation who 
would rise to lead the negritude movement and bring the middle classes back to power 
in 1957.47  
 
 
 
                                                
47 Several Haiti scholars, most prominently Nicholls (1996, 163) and Castor (1988), have pointed to the 
emergence of a black middle class, as well as the buttressing of mulatto political hegemony, as the two 
most important legacies of the US military occupation of Haiti (1915-1934).  
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Economic adjustment in Haiti 
For the wealthiest mulatto and foreign merchants who controlled the import-export 
houses, reductions in income due to the declining trade in coffee exports during the 
1930s could be offset, even during a prolonged economic crisis, by dipping into their 
saved assets. For the political class and the public sector, however, declining customs 
revenues were compensated for through increased rates of taxation on the remaining 
trade volume. To provide for the repayment of Haiti’s $20 million of sovereign debt 
while continuing to sustain the large public sector and the political class of Mulatto 
elites that depended on it, export duties increased from 19 to 28 percent of total value 
during the course of the U.S. occupation; import tariffs—primarily on basic goods 
consumed by the masses—doubled from 23 to 46 percent over the same period 
(Trouillot 1990, 103).  
Prior to the global depression, overall taxes on imports and exports comprised 
over 20 percent of Haiti’s total trade value. This figure represented more than twice 
the rate of extraction on Dominican trade. Thus, while collapsing coffee prices in 
1929, preceded by a poor harvest the year prior, caused the value of Haitian trade to 
plummet, basic indicators of government finance (including customs revenue, 
expenditures, and sovereign debt payments) remained comparatively flat. The Haitian 
state responded to declining trade revenue by increasing the proportion of trade value 
that it extracted through customs taxes (Figure 5.8 about here).  
[FIGURE 5.8 ABOUT HERE] 
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Source: Haitian and Dominican Customs Receiverships (various years). 
 
While the net value of Haitian trade fell by more than 61 percent between 1926 and 
1935 (an average annual decrease of 6.8 percent), the customs revenues accruing to 
the state fell by only 40 percent (an average annual decrease of 4.5 percent). (Figure 
5.9).  
[FIGURE 5.9 ABOUT HERE] 
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Source: Haitian and Dominican Customs Receiverships (various years). 
 
With customs revenues still in decline, the restoration of government spending 
between 1933 and 1935 was largely financed by marginal increases in internal 
revenues, principally taxes on consumer goods like alcohol and tobacco consumed by 
the masses. 
However, the ability of the government to finance itself by taxing its citizens 
indirectly at the ports through export duties rather than through direct taxation, an 
institution of Haitian political economy virtually since independence, remained the 
principal means of government finance throughout the 1930s despite the terms of trade 
crisis. As the U.S. Financial Advisor to Haiti, S. De La Rue, remarked,  
It had long been questioned whether Haiti's tax structure was basically as sound 
and well balanced as could be desired. It was generally agreed and constantly 
reported that there was too great a dependence upon customs and particularly 
upon the export duties on coffee, with consequent fluctuations from year to year 
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in government revenues depending upon the of the coffee crop. … Efforts were 
made from time to in the direction of such a change. The formation of the Internal 
Revenue Service, for example, had as its avowed objective the reduction of duties 
on coffee. Internal taxes, however, and particularly excise were not popular and 
the Internal Revenue Service has not succeeded in carrying internal revenues to a 
level sufficiently high to permit the abolition or substantial reduction in coffee 
duties, and at the same time maintain the budget at the necessary level. Collection 
of revenue by means of the export duty on coffee while world prices were good 
was the easier way, and governments cannot readily relinquish easy sources of 
revenue when the alternative is the enforcement of unpopular taxes. (Haitian 
Customs Receivership 1938, 55) 
 
Following the final withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1934, export duties on coffee 
continued to increase until the termination of Brazil’s coffee valorization policy in 
1937 triggered the collapse of international coffee prices. This forced the Haitian 
government and the U.S. receivership to accept a 50 percent reduction in the rate of 
coffee export duties. Rather than follow a path of austerity, the Vincent regime 
increased taxes on imports in order to compensate for the declining value of its 
exports. The apathy of the Haitian state to the consequences of extortionate coffee 
taxes for the peasant producers is reflected in the further observations of U.S. fiscal 
representative to Haiti: 
Most countries have not looked upon export taxes as the best means of raising 
revenues. It is reasoned that the burden of ·export taxes tends to diminish the 
production of export commodities. … 
 Still, it was argued in Haiti until recently, that these considerations did not 
apply here, that there was no evidence that export taxes on coffee were retarding 
coffee production. The Haitian peasant was supposed to pick whatever coffee the 
untended and uncultivated trees produced and bring it to market for whatever 
price was offered him. If it were low he was to make no very conscious effort to 
abandon coffee and invest in other crops. He had no costs to consider. If the price 
happened to be high it was assumed he would not, for that reason, make any great 
effort to increase his coffee production by additional planting, and indeed the long 
continued dead level of Haitian coffee exports did support these easy views. 
 In more recent years it has become evident that these ideas are not accurate, at 
least in so far as decreasing production is concerned. Large numbers of peasants 
now are known, while low prices have been prevalent, to have destroyed their 
coffee trees and planted bananas, beans, or other crops. Furthermore during recent 
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years it has become evident that the peasant will not harvest the coffee crop as 
readily when he considers his return too low for the hard physical labor involved. 
Estimates of production in 1937-38 placed the probable crop at 30,000,000 kilos. 
Export statistics show 25,000,000 kilos were marketed. What proportion of the 
difference is attributable to neglect of the harvest on account of the low price 
offered can not be known. It certainly was a factor. (Haitian Customs 
Receivership 1938, 57) 
 
It was only with the near complete collapse of coffee prices in 1937,48 when efforts of 
the Haitian government to tax these exports further still led to a decline in domestic 
output, that the tariff structure was reconsidered.  
Yet even after the end of Brazilian valorization eroded the remaining terms of 
trade for Haiti’s principal export, the only recourse of the Haitian government was to 
increase the proportion of total government revenue derived from imports and internal 
revenue. (Figure 5.10).  
[FIGURE 5.10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                
48 Between 1937 and 1941 the price of Haitian coffee fell by 39 percent (Benoit 1953, 29). 
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Source: Haitian Customs Receivership (Haitian Customs Receivership 1940, 99) 
 
While all external, trade-based revenue declined between 1926 and 1940, the 
proportion of government receipts made up of import tariffs grew from 58 percent to 
68 percent over this period.  Conversely, the share of receipts comprised of exports 
declined from 28 percent to 11 percent.  
 Yet before the structure of the Haitian economy and its government finance 
was altered completely, the descent of Haitian coffee prices on international markets 
was arrested. Between 1941 and 1952 the price of Haitian coffee recovered 
dramatically, rising by 422 percent (Benoit 1953, 29). As Figure 5.3 further above 
illustrated, prices for both Haitian coffee and Dominican sugar rebounded during the 
1940s and early 1950s as war and reconstruction in Europe were followed by the onset 
of the Korean War (1950-1953). As Figure 5.11 below shows, overall terms of trade 
Imports 
Exports 
Internal  
Revenues 
 -    
 1,000,000  
 2,000,000  
 3,000,000  
 4,000,000  
 5,000,000  
 6,000,000  
 7,000,000  
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
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for agricultural commodities and manufactured goods converged during the second 
half of the 1940s once consumption levels in European markets began to recover.  
[FIGURE 5.11 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Source: Ocampo and Parra (2003), taken from MOxLAD (Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald 2003) 
Note: U.S. dollar index of prices of internationally traded manufactured goods and primary agricultural 
commodities. Prices re-indexed to 1929 base by author. 
 
For countries like the Dominican Republic who adjusted to the trade shock of 
the 1930s through policies of investment in import substitution, World War II and the 
Korean War reinforced these policies as well. By simultaneously sheltering domestic 
manufacturers from international competition and allowing for the accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves, the DR was able to repay its foreign debts and import 
additional capital stock in order to accelerate the process of import substitution 
industrialization (Moya Pons 1987).  
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Just as ongoing import scarcity during the 1940s reinforced the Dominican 
state’s strategy of import substitution, the decision of Haitian rulers to continue with 
the existing agro-export model through the 1930s was equally reinforced by the 
second wave of trade shocks of the 1940s. Having responded to the global depression 
with intensified predation on the already diminished surplus value of peasant export 
cash crop production (Trouillot 1990, 102–103), the international wartime economy 
generated windfalls from the agro-export model as higher trade volumes provided the 
country with greater revenues to be divided among the political elites and the 
merchant oligarchy (Smith 2009, 118).  Rather than providing an impetus for 
investment in industrialization, using foreign exchange to import capital stock as 
occurred in the DR, the high prices agricultural commodities commanded in world 
markets enabled Haitian elites to replenish their depleted savings and continue 
importing manufactured goods throughout the 1940s. 
The evidence I have presented here suggests that the limited effect these 
international trade shocks had on Haiti’s agro-export economy does not imply that the 
interests of the middle class were less adversely affected during this period. Indeed, 
the timing of the street protests by the emerging class of black professionals in Port-
au-Prince in 1929 is consistent with the theory of this dissertation that the material 
interests of the middle classes were disproportionally affected by the collapse of the 
international system of trade and payments during the 1930s. The token gestures of 
middle class political inclusion by President Vincent did not translate into a new 
ideology of nationalist developmentalism, as happened in the DR, but merely the 
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inclusion of a narrow segment of the black middle classes into the ruling coalition 
mulatto elites.  
This coalition of blacks from the middle sector did not remain politically 
inconsequential, however. When the administration of Vincent’s heir, mulatto 
President Elie Lescot (1942-1946), began systematically cutting the middle class out 
of the state patronage that Vincent had extended, his government fell and was replaced 
by the first elected representative of that class—Dumarsais Estimé.  
President Estimé was swept into power as the result of a military coup that 
ousted Lescot in 1945 and instituted new elections. Estimé left office the same way he 
came in, via military coup; his political survival having fallen victim to a weak, 
fragmented middle class coalition of leftist-Marxists and representatives of the 
negritude movement that carried him into power, as well as the united opposition of 
the traditional elites who opposed his populist political and economic agenda.  
Among other attempts at economic reform—including aborted attempts at 
import substitution—Estimé tried to lower the coffee tax so as to stimulate production 
by giving Haitian peasants a greater proportion of the value. The ruling elite in the 
legislature whose livelihood depended upon state patronage provided for by coffee tax 
opposed this, forcing him to reverse the policy. Perhaps most crucially, he attempted 
to raise taxes on black market imported goods, a market that the oligarchy historically 
profited from, in an effort to consolidate legitimacy with his fragmented middle class 
coalition: 
On occasion he was compelled to overstep the carefully demarcated boundaries 
between economic and political control to demonstrate his commitment to social 
reform. His treatment of the pervasive problem of the black market provides a 
useful example. The increase in demand for imported goods after the war proved 
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to be a mixed blessing for elite businessmen. They gained substantial returns from 
the brief postwar boom, and the black market in cooking oil, basic food items, 
soap, and fabrics, which the more powerful participated in, thrived. Responding 
to pressures by his cabinet, Estimé introduced severe restrictions on the market. 
Much to the chagrin of the elite, he also introduced the first income tax in 1948. 
As a show of force, Jamaican-born tycoon O. J. Brandt, who not only benefited 
from the brief rise in coffee exports, but also saw his fortunes grow in the black 
market, was imprisoned for three days, though he was made an honorary citizen 
of Port-au-Prince shortly after his release. Yet such obvious efforts at 
appeasement did little to alleviate the noiriste attitude of the new politicians or 
create an environment of reconciliation between the social axes. (Smith 2009, 
118) 
 
The inability to get his measures past the opposition in the Senate, the unpopularity of 
his attempts to get around the legislature via constitutional reform, and several well-
publicized examples of institutionalized racism on the part of the black government 
against the mulatto class, culminated in political deadlock and a premature end to his 
term. Ultimately, Estimé was overthrown by a military coup organized by an unlikely 
alliance between a radical leftist faction within Estimé’s middle class coalition 
unhappy with the pace of reforms (the Popular Socialist Party) and a unified mullato 
oligarchy who provided the financing for the coup (Nicholls 1996; Smith 2009).  
 Replacing Estimé following the successful coup was a black military figure 
installed by the oligarchy named Paul Magloire (1950-1956). As Nicholls concisely 
puts it, “the regime of Magloire represents the last successful attempt by the old elite 
to reassert its political pre-eminence behind the mask of the black colonel” (1996, 
191). As had occurred periodically throughout the country’s national history, the 
mulatto class found it convenient to attempt to govern Haiti through a black 
“understudy” (la politique de doublure).  
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This time the return of mulatto control was not sustainable however, owing to 
the growing size and power of the black middle classes. Following several years of 
dismal economic performance by the Magloire administration, a protracted contest for 
rule unfolded over 1956-57 that culminated in the election of Francoise Duvalier.  
A leader of the noiriste movement, Duvalier sought to legitimate their rule vis-
à-vis the black masses by equating class with race, campaigning on the platform that 
racial homogeneity provided a bona fide guarantee of his commitment to improving 
the wellbeing of the black peasant. Unfortunately for the peasants, the regime that was 
born with the election of Papa Doc Duvalier in 1957 and fell with the exile of “baby 
Doc” Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986 ensured that state resources only served the 
interests of a narrow political class.  
The conviction of the griots that black middle-class politicians would be natural 
allies of the masses stemmed from their conviction that their common racial 
makeup generated shared values and interests. Far from being the emancipatory 
medium of these masses, this racialist ideology became instead a moral mask 
hiding the reality that the rule of the emerging small black middle classes turned 
into nothing but rule for the small black middle classes. When these classes 
eventually captured political power, they used it to acquire wealth and privilege, 
which eventually allowed them to forge an uneasy alliance with their erstwhile 
enemies in the dominant and mulatto classes. (Fatton 2007, 178) 
 
The regime endured through a tense bargain, or modus vivendi between the middle 
class and the mulatto and foreign business elite (Trouillot 1990, 28).   
Examining the sweep of rulers that governed Haiti from the onset of the 
economic crisis in 1929 we observe the pervasive weakness of the middle classes vis-
à-vis the oligarchy both out of and once in power. Under the Vincent regime the 
interests of the traditional oligarchy were represented, joined by only a token number 
of individuals hailing from the black middle class. Under Lescot, elite interests were 
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pursued and favors bandied about with total disregard for the exclusion of the middle 
classes; this economic policy of exclusion helped lead to his overthrow and the 
installation of noiriste president Estimé. By pursuing middle class interests 
aggressively while all the while never successfully confronting the power of the 
oligarchy, Estimé was ineffectual in dealing with the Haitian legislature. His lack of 
political power culminated in his removal by a coalition of radical leftists and mulatto 
elites.  
Having observed the failure of Estimé to consolidate his political coalition and 
establish dominance vis-à-vis the traditional elites, Duvalier maintained a balance of 
political power between himself and leading economic actors virtually immediately. 
By distributing state patronage to a narrow subset of middle class professionals, by 
refraining from threatening the interests of economic elites, and by using state 
repression to brutally prevent the emergence of challengers, Duvalier set up a regime 
that proved enduring but lacking in incentives to invest in the infrastructure required to 
achieve greater levels of economic growth and industrialization.  
Thus, the same political forces that reproduced the Haitian government’s 
dependence on customs taxes from 1804 independence until the 1930s continue to 
operate in the present day. As Lundahl (1992) observes, no fiscal contract ever 
emerged between the Haitian state and the peasant-producers who pay for that state. 
“The peasants have been severely taxed without receiving any corresponding benefits 
from government actions. The Haitian tax system continues to rely very heavily on 
export and import taxes. On the export side, coffee has most often borne the brunt of 
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taxation. Concerning imports, necessities consumed by the masses rather than luxury 
goods have been taxed” (39).  
And while the US occupation and control of Haitian customs engendered the 
same nationalist backlash there as the wave that brought Trujillo to power in the DR, 
the economic policies that resulted from the government of Vincent lacked the 
populist, anti-dependista character of the Trujillo-Estrella Ureña government. 
Ultimately, the small size of the urban middle classes and the amount of wealth and 
political power held by the mulatto oligarchy at the critical juncture, coupled with 
greater reliance on subsistence living in Haiti’s rural areas, alleviated domestic 
pressure on the regime to adjust to the international economic crisis via import 
substitution. In the DR, by comparison, popular backlash against the failing economic 
policies of the incumbent Horacista elites between 1928 and 1929 allowed general 
Trujillo to seize power and directly shaped the policies he adopted in response to the 
crisis.  
 
Haitian outcomes 
Whereas the political fallout of the 1930s global depression altered the patrimonial 
dynamics of the Dominican state, the Haitian political economy remained unaltered in 
this regard despite almost 20 years of foreign attempts at statebuilding. Not 
surprisingly, then, the investments in infrastructure made over the course of the 
American occupation deteriorated over the subsequent years and decades. In 1969, 
Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., the Marine officer who served as head of the U.S. 
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military mission to Haiti between 1958 and 1963, estimated the legacy of the 
occupation’s public works projects to be negligible: 
“Telephones are gone. Roads are approaching non-existence. The satellite ports 
are obstructed by silt and wrecks, their docks crumbling away. Urban 
improvements are in decay and collapse; sanitation and electrification are, to say 
the least, in precarious decline. Curiously, the only effective survivor of the 
occupation's infrastructural benefits is the modest network of grass air-strips 
which, unchanged since 1934, now provide Haiti with its sole pervasive system of 
transport—other than the bourrique [donkey].” (Schmidt 1971, 233) 
 
In stark contrast to the behavior of stagnation and decay in Haiti described by Colonel 
Heinl Jr. over the decades following the end of the U.S. occupation, by 1960 the 
Dominican Republic evidences a significant level of investment in the infrastructure, 
physical, and human capital required to sustain its import substitution policy (Table 
5.2).  
[TABLE 5.2 BELOW] 
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In the ten years that separate these figures from the ones in Table 1.1 (Chapter 1) the 
differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic only magnified. The 
investments in electrification, manufacturing, health and education required to move 
the Dominican economy away from the agro-export model provided a foundation for 
sustained economic growth over the second half of the 20th century. For Haiti, 
meanwhile, underinvestment and continued dependency on the coffee export sector 
produced levels of physical and human capital that were unable to sustain more 
diversified economic activity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The puzzle that this dissertation began with was why the people inhabiting one side of 
Hispaniola invested in the infrastructure, physical and human capital required to attain 
Haiti Dominican Republic
Infrastructure and Physical Capital
Electrification (GwH per capita) 16.6 114.8
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (% of GDP)1 50 29
Manufacturing (% of GDP) 8.9 14.6
Factory Employment (% of total population)2 0.5 1.5
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP), 1963 7.3 13.8
Human Capital
Urbanization (%) 15.6 30.2
Life Expectancy, 1960 (years)3 36.1 51.8
Hospital beds, 1960 (per 1,000 persons)3 0.6 2.3
Primary School Enrollment (per 1,000 persons) 66 166.8
Literacy (% of total adult population)4 10 43
1Mitchell 2007
2ECLA 1966, "Process of Industrialization in Latin America", p17
3World Bank, World Development Indicators
4Vanhanen 1997 (data are for 1958)
Sou ce (unless f otnoted): Astorga, P., A. R Bergés, and E. V.K FitzGerald. 2003. “The Oxford 
Latin American Economic History Database (OxLAD).” The Latin American Centre, Oxford 
University.  Accessed online, April 2009.
Table: Investment in infrastructure, physical and human capital in Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, 1960
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some measure of industrialization while the people inhabiting the other side did not. 
This chapter provided an answer to that question by examining the politics of 
economic adjustment to import scarcity within these two agrarian societies.  
The international division of labor that emerged from the liberal reform period, 
and the dynamic of trade dependency that resulted, proved a recipe for disaster during 
the 1930s as the terms of trade for agricultural commodities plummeted and 
manufactured goods imports became scarce. Rapid declines in the terms of trade for 
agricultural exports had an immediate and devastating effect on the material interests 
of the urban middle classes. This crisis undermined not only the coherence of the agro-
export model, but also the political and economic institutions underneath it. Yet while 
the Dominican economy underwent a state-led transformation over the 1930s and 
1940s from agro-export dependency to a mixed agro-industrial society—one capable 
of producing domestic substitutes for a variety of manufactured goods that they could 
no longer afford to import—the Haitian economy remained tied to the agro-export 
model inherited from the 19th century.  
Why did the global depression have a profound impact on the institutions 
regulating the relationship between state and markets on one side of the island but not 
the other? It was out of the political necessity to service the material interests of a 
middle-class ruling coalition, as opposed to those of the traditional oligarchy, that the 
Dominican state developed the capacity and the institutional purpose of 
developmentalism. This impetus for dramatic institutional changes in the relationship 
between state and markets manifested itself as a middle class political revolt 
emanating from the north, one that provided a popular basis for the military coup that 
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installed the dictator Trujillo. The popular basis for Trujillo’s rise to power did not 
deteriorate into classic patrimonialism once the dictator was installed. Rather, the 
middle class coalition underpinning the new regime set about promoting a series of 
developmentalist economic reforms in order to adjust to the ongoing crisis. Beginning 
with rural land reforms in 1934 intended to restore food security to the urban areas and 
make the Dominican Republic food self-sufficient, the Dominican state quickly 
transformed into an entrepreneurial investor that actively intervened in markets to 
coordinate the development of the forward and backward linkages required to develop 
domestic substitutes for those goods that the country could no longer afford to import.  
During the 1940s, the global war economy reinforced the adjustment policies 
pursued by the Dominican state. Its role as provider of capital and market coordination 
deepened as booming prices for primary commodities and continuing import scarcities 
due to war rationing in the industrialized world left the government flush with capital 
and domestic producers of manufactured goods sheltered from international 
competition. Although Trujillo’s regime came to a swift and violent end in 1961 when 
the economic performance of his regime began to falter, the legacy left behind by this 
institutional transformation was a foundation of state capacity, infrastructure, physical 
and human capital. Inherited by the political coalition of domestic capitalists and 
industrialists that Trujillo left behind, this foundation allowed the Dominican Republic 
to become the fastest growing economy in Latin America over the second half of the 
20th century (World Bank 2009). 
If the legacy of the trade shocks of the 1930s-50s was one of transformative 
institutional change and development for the Dominican Republic, for Haiti the period 
  201 
is marked by a continuation of the institutions and modes of accumulation that have 
defined its national political economy virtually since its 1804 independence. The 
smaller and politically weaker middle class was unable to wrest political power from 
the mulatto oligarchy during the critical juncture of the 1930s, and as a result the 
Vincent regime was able to weather the economic storm by increasing the rate of 
extraction of peasant surplus and coopting a minimum winning coalition of middle-
class leaders through state patronage and clientelism.  
The Haitian and Dominican cases demonstrate how the class structures that 
emerged from the liberal reform period in the late nineteenth century shaped which 
distributional coalitions would dominate their respective political arenas during the 
hard times of the 1930s, which in turn shaped economic adjustment policies in ways 
that had consequences for institutional development in these societies.  
The central theoretical contribution of this finding is that the economic 
institutions that determine the rate of investment and growth of national production are 
not themselves historically pre-determined. Rather, institutions are produced and 
reproduced over time based on the distributional preferences of the ruling class and the 
coalitional politics that determine which sectors of society comprise that class. The 
case of economic transformation in the Dominican Republic during the 1930s and 40s 
reveals how the economic institutions governing that shape investment behavior can 
change quickly when domestic crises alter the distribution of material wellbeing across 
society in ways that create new axes of distributional preference around which 
coalitions of political actors may organize. The failure to achieve economic 
transformation in the Haitian case demonstrates why, if historically inherited 
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economic institutions persist, it is because the underlying distribution of power and 
preference within the society also persists.  
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
 
 
How generalizable is the development story that emerges from the Hispaniola puzzle? 
To better understand the scope conditions and mechanisms driving variation in 
industrialization and economic growth across the region during the 20th century, I 
explore the relationships between trade, class structure, and industrialization for the 
population of 20 Latin American countries from the dawn of the liberal reform period 
c. 1870 to the ISI period well underway by 1960. While important and potentially 
confounding scope conditions vary, Latin America is unique in that the most crucial 
scope condition is fulfilled: as countries within the global south, each of these states 
had achieved independence prior to the onset of the liberal reform period and thus 
were more-or-less free to adjust to emerging opportunities and constraints posed by 
global markets.  
Given the preliminary nature of this statistical exercise, nevertheless, potential 
for endogeneity and omitted variable bias is ubiquitous. I rely primarily on the causal 
process tracing developed in the DR-Haiti case studies to increase the reader’s 
confidence regarding the plausibility of the causal inferences I make here. The 
empirical test of the theory derived from this paired comparison is laid out in 3 
hypotheses:  
H1) International trade integration during the liberal reform period had a positive 
effect on the size of the middle classes in 1928 by creating greater demand for non-
agricultural occupations and literacy. 
 
H2) International trade exerted a direct and positive effect on industrialization 
independent of its effect on class structure through the gains from trade. 
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H3) The size of the middle classes in 1928 has a positive effect on the level of 
industrialization by 1960 by creating greater demand for state-led investment in import 
substitution during a protracted period of import scarcity.  
3a. The absolute size of the middle classes in 1928 has a positive effect on the level of 
industrialization by 1960 due to the size of the internal market and its 
consequences for economies of scale. 
3b. The relative size of the middle classes in 1928 has a positive effect on the level of 
industrialization by 1960 due to the political incentives they provided for import 
substitution industrialization during the period of import scarcity of the 1930s and 
1940s.  
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3a represent alternative explanations for the relationship between 
trade, class structure, and industrialization. I test these hypotheses using data for 20 
Latin American countries between 1868 and 1960 (Table A.1). 
 
[TABLE A.1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Hypothesis 1: Trade and Class Structure 
 
Does international trade integration lead to the expansion of the middle classes in 
agrarian societies? The first hypothesis to test is whether or not the pattern of societal 
transformation that took place in the Dominican Republic over the course of the liberal 
reform period holds true for other Latin American countries. Using two different 
estimates for the size of the middle classes by 1928, the percentage of the population 
employed in non-agricultural occupations and the percentage of the population who 
Concept Measure Description Source(s)
Exports per capita, 1913 (current US$) Cross-national measure of the relative 
value of exports in Latin America just 
prior to the outbreak of WWI
MOxLAD (2011)
% Non-agricultural Population, various years Percentage of the population that does 
not derive income directly from 
agricultural production
Vanhanen (1997)
% Literacy, various years Percentage of the adult population that is 
literate
Vanhanen (1997)
Size of non-agricultural population, 1928 
(thousands of persons)
Calculated by multiplying the 
percentage of literate persons by the 
total population
MOxLAD (2011), 
Vanhanen (1997)
Factory Employment, 1925 Percentage of total population employed 
by factories
Economic 
Commission for 
Latin Amreica 
(1966)
Change in factory employment (%), 1925-1960
Difference between 1960 factory 
employment and 1925 factory 
employment.
Economic 
Commission for 
Latin Amreica 
(1966)
Manufactured Goods VA as a % of GDP, 1960 The share of GDP contributed by 
manufacturing value-added (VA)
MOxLAD (2011)
Average per capita GDP growth rate, various 
years
Average annual GDP growth rates per 
capita of cach Latin American state
World Bank WDI
Long-run economic growth
Independent/Intervening/Control Variables
Table:  Variables, Measures and Sources
International economic integration at the end of the liberal reform period (1870s-1920s)
Relative size of the middle class income distribution prior to 1929 economic crisis
Industrialization
Dependent Variables
Prior Industrialization
Absolute size of internal market prior for manufactured goods prior to economic crisis
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were literate in that same year, 49 I find that the level of trade integration achieved by 
1913 (prior to the outbreak of the First World War) correlates highly with these 
proxies for class structure in 1928 (Figure A.1).  
[FIGURE A.1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure A.1: Trade integration and class structure during Latin America’s liberal 
reform period 
 
 
The correlation between trade in 1913 and the proportion of the population employed 
in non-agricultural occupations in 1928 is .90 across Latin America; for literacy rates 
the correlation is .79.   
As Mahoney (2012) pointed out, however, the social structure of Latin 
American countries at the time of their early-19th century decolonization was not 
constant but varied based on factor endowments of land and labor and the timing and 
goals of the colonizers. Accordingly, a more revealing measure of the relationship 
between trade and class structure would be to consider the effect of trade prior to 
WWI on the change in class structure over the course of the liberal reform period. 
Figure 6.2 below considers differences in non-agricultural occupations and literacy 
between 1928 and 1868.  
                                                
49 Although not perfectly collinear, these two variables correlate highly at 0.81. 
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[FIGURE A.2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The correlations between exports per capita in 1913 and changes in non-agricultural 
employment (.84) and literacy (.71) are very high. Comparing Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic to the smaller subset of agrarian societies in Central America in 
figures 6.3 and 6.4, the pattern basically holds. Looking more closely at the tropical 
agrarian societies of Central America as compared to Hispaniola, the pattern basically 
holds as well, although there is clearly unexplained variance that this bivariate model 
is unable to account for.  
 
[FIGURE A.3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure: Trade integration and class structure across Central America and Hispaniola 
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Figure: Trade integreation and class structure during Latin America's liberal reform period. 
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Compared to the first figure featuring the full population of Latin American states, the 
correlation between exports per capita in 1913 and the percentage of the population 
employed by non-agricultural occupations (.65) and literate (.93) in 1928 for Central 
America and Hispaniola, remain high. Looking again at change in class structure 
between 1868 and 1928 in Figure 6.4 below, the results are mixed.  
[FIGURE A.4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
While there appears to be little correlation (.17) between trade integration and change 
in non-agricultural occupations during this period, the correlation between exports and 
increasing literacy is very high (.94).  
On balance, the preliminary evidence is not inconsistent with my claim that 
agrarian societies that traded more during the liberal reform period grew larger middle 
classes. Nevertheless, this simple bivariate model focusing on the consequences of 
trade leaves much variance unexplained. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997; 2000) find 
that geography affects social structure by determining the kinds of economic activity 
the climate can support. Mahoney (2010) argues that differences in the density of 
indigenous populations and the timing of colonization played a significant role in 
Figure: Trade integreation and class structure during Latin America's liberal reform period, Central America and Hispaniola. 
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determining the kinds of economic and social structures that emerged from the 
colonial encounter.  
Nothing in my argument regarding the positive effect of trade on social 
structure—particularly the size of the middle class income distribution—contradicts 
the findings of these scholars.  The crucial point to be made here is that not all 
determinants of social structure can be attributed to geographic endowments or the 
nature of colonization. More contingent variables like the level of international trade 
integration can also play an important role in shaping and reshaping social structure.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Trade and Industrialization? 
Under what conditions does trade lead to industrialization? Previous chapters have 
argued that greater international economic integration during the liberal reform period 
(c. 1870s-1920) ultimately led to greater industrialization in the Dominican Republic 
as compared to Haiti.  I claim that class structure, namely the size of the middle 
classes, contributed to subsequent industrialization and higher levels of economic 
productivity by shaping the politics of adjustment to economic crisis.  
It is conceivable that these changes in class structure and the political crises 
that ensued during the 1930s were merely epiphenomenal, however. An alternative 
explanation is that trade itself contributed to industrialization by fostering more 
competitive firms and attracting the capital required to raise productivity rates. Does 
industrialization simply follow the growth in national income and the accumulation of 
capital that is expected to occur through trade? A central hypothesis of classical liberal 
economics is that trade sets countries on a virtuous path to economic growth and 
development, in part by supplying the domestic population with capital in exchange 
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for the exportation of those goods that they produce most efficiently. Furthermore, 
increases in income are expected to lead to improvements in the ratio of capital to 
labor as firms respond to increasing returns at the market with productivity-enhancing 
investments.  
Even though the level of GDP per capita on either side of the island doesn’t 
begin to diverge until 1950, did the formation of a more vibrant export sector during 
the late 1800s leave behind a qualitatively different form of economic organization— 
one that lent itself more easily to industrialization from the 1930s through the 1950s? 
[FIGURE A.5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure: Average value of exports (1920s) and change in factory employment, 1925-
1960 
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The correlation between the average value of exports per capita in 1913 and 
industrialization by 1960 is non-trivial (.50) and statistically significant (Figure A.5 
above and Table A.2 model I, below).  
 
[TABLE A.2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
In the basic bivariate model (I), a one-dollar change in the value of exports per capita 
in current 1913 US dollars (with a population mean of $23.76) corresponded to a 
.015% change in factory employment as a percent of the total population (with a 
population mean of 1.26%).  
However, when class structure is controlled for (using either occupational or 
educational proxies in models II and III, respectively), the sign of the coefficient for 
trade reverses and the coefficients themselves become no-longer statistically 
significant. The proxies for the size of the middle class, however, are properly signed 
DV: Change in Factory Employment, 1925-1960
Independent Variables I II III
Value of exports per capita, 1913 0.015** -0.012    -0.005    
(.006)   (0.012)   (0.009)   
% Non-agricultural occupation, 1908 0.059**  
(0.014)    
% Literate, 1908 0.041**
(0.015)   
Constant 0.894*** -0.096  0.352   
(0.207)    (0.424) (0.268)  
R² 0.252     0.463   0.478   
n 20 20 20
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note:&OLS$Regression$Coefficients$(standard$errors$in$parenthesis)$
Models
Table: Predictors of industrialization across 20 Latin American states, 1960
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and statistically significant. Holding the level of trade integration constant, a unit 
change in the percentage of the population employed in a non-agricultural occupation 
(population mean of 27.6%) resulted in a .059 percent change in factory employment. 
The coefficient for the alternative measure of class structure, 1908 literacy, is also 
properly signed and statistically significant. A unit change in the 1908 literacy rate 
(population mean of 25.3 percent) corresponded to a .041% change in factory 
employment. Given that mean for change in factory employment (1925-1960) across 
Latin American states was 1.26 percent, these represent meaningful effects. If trade 
integration exerts a positive effect on industrialization, that effect appears to be 
conditional upon whether or not it translates into the expansion of the middle class 
portion of the income distribution.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Class Structure and Industrialization—Politics or Economics? 
 
What is the mechanism linking class structure to industrialization and the attendant 
investments in infrastructure, physical and human capital? In order to properly test the 
mechanism linking larger middle class income distributions with state-led 
industrialization there are two hypotheses to be tested here as well, although they are 
not necessarily competing or mutually exclusive. Having found empirical evidence for 
a statistical relationship between measures of middle class social structure and 
subsequent industrialization, I now turn to the question of whether it was the absolute 
or relative size of the middle class that mattered more for determining the extent to 
which states industrialized. 
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Essentially, this is a question of politics versus economics. Was the possibility 
for selecting ISI as the adjustment policy choice during the trade shocks of the 1930s-
50s constrained primarily by market factors, namely the absolute size of the domestic 
market for finished goods and the implications that market size had for the ability to 
manufacture such goods in quantities that realized economies of scale? Or was the 
policy choice and the extent of ISI reform constrained more by the reform politics of 
winners and losers, and the relative political power of the middle classes to shape 
adjustment policies?  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Economies of scale 
Murphy et al. (1989a) argue that while increases in national income, such as those 
generated by export booms, are a necessary condition for the industrialization of 
agrarian states, the ability of a country to industrialize is constrained by the amount of 
demand for such goods that such income generates. Only when the national income 
that accrues from international trade is distributed to a large enough segment of 
society that it creates a demand market that allows for domestic manufacturing to 
benefit from economies of scale will national income be invested in import 
substitution industrialization (ISI). In other words, the effect of trade on the long-run 
economic development and industrialization of agrarian states is contingent upon the 
absolute size of the middle and upper classes, and the disposable income they have to 
consume at levels above mere subsistence. 
One observable implication that Murphy et al. (1989) draw from this theory is 
that more populous agrarian states should be more likely to industrialize due to their 
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ability to reach the critical threshold of absolute market size even at comparatively 
higher levels of income inequality, as compared to smaller countries. If market size 
were the determining constraint to the successful adoption of ISI reforms we would 
expect that Haiti, though exhibiting income distribution that was significantly more 
unequal than the DR in relative terms, should have provided a sufficient market for 
finished goods to bring about import substitution policies due to the significantly 
larger size of the population (approximately double that of the DR at the onset of the 
1929 global depression). 
 Variation in the absolute size of the middle classes that we observe in Haiti and 
the DR does not allow me to test this hypothesis directly as the Dominican middle 
classes in 1928 were larger in both absolute and relative terms as compared to Haiti 
according to the proxies I have adopted here. Therefore, I turn to the comparative data 
on Latin America to examine this question. I operationalize the absolute size of the 
class capable of providing an internal domestic market for manufactured goods by 
multiplying the population figure for each country by my two proxies for income 
distribution—the fraction of that country that was literate or held a non-agricultural 
occupation. The results are presented in Figure A.6 below: 
 
[FIGURE A.6 ABOUT HERE] 
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Figure A.6: Absolute Market Size and Industrialization across Latin America      
 
 
Across Latin America, the absolute estimated size of the market for manufactured 
goods in 1928 (calculated by multiplying the size of the population in 1928 by the 
fraction of that population were literate or had non-agricultural occupations) shows a 
strong correlation with the size of the manufacturing sector in 1960 (~.76 in both 
models). This is broadly consistent with the expectations of Murphy et al. (Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1989a). However, note that there are several examples of 
countries with smaller absolute numbers of literate, non-agricultural persons—such as 
Chile and Uruguay—who nevertheless manage to achieve substantially greater levels 
of industrialization by 1960. These would seem to contradict some of the core 
assumptions of Murphy et al. 1989 regarding the sensitivity of ISI, at least in its 
“early” non-durable consumer goods stage, to market size and scale economies. 
 The measure of manufacturing as a share of GDP captures both prior 
industrialization as well as the level of industrialization achieved during the critical 
juncture of the 1930s and 1940s. If instead I substitute change in factory employment 
between 1925 and 1960 as the dependent variable, the correlation with the size of the 
internal market falls to less than .16 (Figure 6.7). 
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[FIGURE A.7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Alternatively, as I argued in Chapter 5, perhaps it is the relative political power of 
different social classes that determines how agrarian societies adjust to a decline in 
terms of trade for their agro-export commodities. Examining the “politics” hypothesis, 
I explore the relative size of the middle class prior to the 1929 Great Depression and 
its correlation with subsequent industrialization in order to estimate the relative size 
and political power of the middle class vis-à-vis the oligarchy.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Distributional politics 
Building upon the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter 2, I begin with the 
assumption that the oligarchy is opposed to economic reforms that dramatically alter 
the established mode of wealth accumulation. I further assume that the middle classes 
are for import substitution reforms as they increase their capacity to consume under 
conditions of import scarcity, and that the larger the middle classes are relative to the 
society as a whole, the more political power they posses to pursue such reforms. 
Figure: Absolute Market Size and Industrialization across Latin America
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 As above, I test this hypothesis using both measures of industrialization: 
manufacturing’s share of GDP in 1960 and change in factory employment 1925-1960.  
[FIGURE A.8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Beginning with the former, we see a strong correlation between manufacturing in 1960 
and both the fraction of the 1928 population who were employed in non-agricultural 
occupations (.77) and the fraction of the population who were literate (.68). (Figure 
A.8). 
Unlike the results obtained for the bivariate relationship between absolute size 
of the internal market and industrialization, however, the correlation holds when we 
account for the early industrialization (predominantly in the southern cone countries) 
by focusing only on the change in factory employment between 1925 and 1960 
(Figure A.9). 
[FIGURE A.9 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure: Relative size of the middle classes and industrialization across Latin America
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Here the proportion of the population employed in non-agricultural occupations 
correlates with industrialization during the 1925-1960 period at .65; for the literacy 
rate proxy the correlation is .57.  
Though mixed, the cross-national evidence is partly consistent with hypotheses 
2a and 2b—it was both the absolute size of the market for finished goods and the 
relative political strength of that market determined opportunities for industrialization 
across Latin America. However, while market size appears to be a good predictor of 
industrialization by 1925, it is a poor predictor of the degree to which Latin American 
countries were able to expand manufacturing between 1925 and 1960 (Figures A.10 
and A.11 below).  
[FIGURES A.10 AND A.11 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure: Relative size of the middle classes and industrialization across Latin America
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Figure: Size of internal market and industrialization by 1925
Figure: Size of internal market and industrialization between 1925 and 1960
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This interpretation holds in an OLS regression comparing the two variables—
absolute size of internal market and relative size of the middle classes (Table A.3).  
[TABLE A.3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
In models I and II, respectively, I use the fraction of the 1928 population engaged in 
non-agricultural occupations and the fraction of the 1928 population that is literate as 
demographic predictors of industrialization between 1925 and 1960. In neither model 
is the absolute size of the internal market for manufactured goods a statistically 
significant predictor of industrialization during the critical juncture of the 1930s-
1950s. Depending on the measure of middle classes chosen, a ~3-5 percent increase in 
the size of the middle classes in 1928 corresponded to a 1% increase in factory 
employment between 1925 and 1960. Again, given that the mean increase in factory 
DV: Change in Factory Employment, 1925-1960
Independent Variables I II
Absolute size of internal market for mfg, 1928 (Non-ag) -0.000   
(0.000)  
Absolute size of internal market for mfg, 1928 (Literacy) -0.000   
(0.000)  
Relative size of middle classes, 1928 (Non-ag) 0.036***
(0.010)    
Relative size of middle classes, 1928 (Literacy) 0.022** 
(0.008)    
Constant 0.139   0.477   
(0.340)  (0.308)  
R² 0.426   0.329
n 20 20
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note:!OLS!Regression!Coefficients!(standard!errors!in!parenthesis)!
Table: Demographic predictors of industrialization across 20 Latin American states, 1960     
Models
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employment (as a percentage of total population) across the region during this period 
was 1.26 percent, this is a non-trivial effect. Against the expectations of Murphy et al 
(1989a), these preliminary findings suggest that it was the relative size of the middle 
classes within the national political arena, rather than the absolute size of the internal 
market, that enabled or constrained early industrialization in twentieth century Latin 
America.  
 
Discussion 
Class structure and industrialization across Latin America were the function of myriad 
different factors, including both factor endowments and the nature of the colonial 
encounter. This preliminary exercise in evaluating the generalizability of my argument 
provides evidence consistent with my claim that there were other important and more 
historically contingent determinants of class structure and import substitution 
industrialization. First, Latin American societies that achieved greater levels of trade 
integration during the liberal reform period (1870-1928) tended to grow larger middle 
classes over the same period. The size of the middle classes, in turn, was an important 
predictor of industrialization across the region between 1925 and 1960—a period 
where systemic shocks leading to import scarcity provided incentives for middle-class 
political coalitions to pursue import substitution industrialization. Together, these 
findings suggest that variation in post-colonial development depends as much on 
historically proximate variables related to trade and adjustment to economic crisis as it 
is structurally determined by accidents of geography or colonial history.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
In most countries it was through investments in the infrastructure, physical and human 
capital required to transform raw inputs into finished goods—industrialization—that 
the common person gained access to education, health care, and the income to 
purchase those goods and services that add value to their material lives. Where 
industrialization takes hold, marginal increases in worker productivity, income, and 
the provision of public goods can trigger a virtuous, self-reinforcing cycle of 
investment and growth. For societies that fail to industrialize, however, the absence of 
economic activity necessitating upgraded skills, capital and infrastructure reduces the 
incentives of both government and private entrepreneurs to invest. The Dominican 
Republic was no exception to this trend. 
The Haitian case illustrates how the failure to invest in a modern economy can 
extend to virtually all indicators of a society’s standard of living, producing higher 
rates of infant mortality, shorter life expectancy, and greater incidences of illiteracy 
and household poverty. Absent the formation of infrastructure, physical and human 
capital, many agrarian societies become trapped in an equally self-reinforcing but 
vicious equilibrium of underinvestment, poverty, and economic stagnation.  
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Industrialization and Prosperity in the Periphery 
At the dawn of the 20th century, prior to the international shockwaves of war and 
economic volatility that would sweep the globe over subsequent decades, the 
population of industrialized states was at most 20 or so countries.50 With the 
exceptions of Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States, these countries were 
exclusively confined to Europe. And with the partial exception of oil and mineral-
exporting states, the remaining non-industrialized countries possessed economies 
based primarily on agricultural production.  By the second half of the twentieth 
century, however, industrialization was underway to greater or lesser degrees across 
the global south.  
By 1950 the global economic landscape was beginning a dramatic 
transformation, witnessing an expansion of industrialization and economic 
development across East Asia and Latin America. At the same time, other societies 
have been unable to transition from agrarian-based to more industrialized economies.  
 
[FIGURE 6.1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Figure 6.1 depicts the dramatic divergence in economic growth among the regions 
comprised of historically non-industrialized, predominantly agrarian societies.51 What 
explains this dramatic variation in the economic performance of historically agrarian 
regions during the second half of the 20th century? Why were East Asia and Latin 
                                                                                                                                       
50 Here the measure used is those countries that, by 1913, had attained even a modest fraction of 
Britain’s 1900 level of manufacturing output per capita (Bairoch 1982, 286). 
51 Note: by constraining the scope of this dissertation to agrarian societies I deliberately exclude the 
mineral rentier states of the Middle East. There are several theoretically grounded reasons why the 
regimes of mineral exporting countries would be expected to operate under a distinct form of political 
economy featuring significantly different constellations of incentives, opportunities and constraints than 
those confronting the regimes of agrarian states. For a recent treatment of these mechanisms, see Ross 
(2012), The Oil Curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. 
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America further along than Africa and South Asia at investing a portion of the national 
income in future productive capacity instead of consuming it in the present?  
For many agrarian societies, the timing of decolonization may go far in 
explaining persistent underinvestment in manufacturing capacity. Understanding why 
the global south did not pursue import substitution industrialization (ISI) during the 
1800s, at the same time as much of the global north, is instructive here:   
There are various historical reasons why the countries of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America did not undergo ISI at the time of, or right after, the European 
ISI’s. Colonial policies of European countries provide much of the explanation 
for the former two cases, while socio-economic structure helps explain the Latin 
American case. The presence of attractive external markets for the region's 
primary exports, which benefited the elites, meant that there was little political 
desire to change the structure of the economies. Also in the nineteenth century 
and early part of the twentieth century, Latin American countries did not have the 
entrepreneurial classes, labor force, infrastructure, market size, or administrative 
capacity to cope with an extensive industrialization process. Also in the case of 
some countries, like Brazil, European powers had enough leverage to force 
governments to maintain free trade policies, thus in effect blocking any 
possibility of ISI. (Baer 1972, 96) 
 
Just as the lack of policy autonomy among Africa, Asia, and still portions of Latin 
America helps explain why they did not begin to industrialize during the 19th century, 
the same lack of policy autonomy among the late-late decolonized played a crucial 
role in determining the development trajectories of agrarian societies during the 
critical juncture of the mid-twentieth century. Post-1945 decolonization insulated 
agrarian societies in vast portions of Asia and Africa from adaptive pressures during 
the trade shocks of global depression in the 1930s and wartime scarcity during the 
1940s—pressures that drove the adoption of import substitution industrialization in 
Latin America.  
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Yet autonomy from the metropole cannot account for why much of East Asia 
outperformed Latin America despite having been decolonized after the Second World 
War—more than a century later and at the tail end of the critical juncture I identify 
here. If global depression and wartime scarcity during the 1930s and 1940s played a 
crucial role in bringing about the institutional changes that determined economic 
growth rates on Hispaniola during the second half of the twentieth century, why did 
East Asian agrarian societies like South Korea manage to perform so well even though 
it did not gain its independence until the military defeat of its Japanese colonizers in 
1945? 
Scholarship concerned with the importance of transitioning from import 
substitution to export-oriented industrialization has shed much light on the underlying 
reasons for variation in economic performance across the newly industrialized 
countries of East Asia and Latin America (Evans 1995; Haggard 1990; Mahon, Jr. 
1992; Sachs 1985). Among those agrarian societies that had acquired a foundation of 
industrial development by the 1950s, some countries—including Northeast Asian 
states like South Korea and Taiwan—began actively transitioning away from their 
earlier inward-looking import substitution industrialization (ISI) model. While 
ongoing flows of foreign exchange from the agro-export sector alleviated the need for 
most Latin American states to move towards export-oriented industrialization (EOI), 
in East Asia the weakness of this sector made the transition from ISI to EOI an 
imperative (Amsden 2001). Not enjoying the same level of primary commodity 
exports as Latin American states, these countries found themselves dependent upon 
foreign exchange revenue that stemmed from U.S. aid during the post-war period in 
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order to finance the importation of manufactured goods.  During the late 1950s and 
early 1960s the flow of that aid began to slow, however, forcing them to replace 
declining foreign exchange through the development of low-wage industrial sectors 
that produced competitive manufacturing exports (Mahon, Jr. 1992, 245).  
Many Latin American countries, by comparison, remained committed to 
import substitution during this period. This was in part because of the continued 
availability of foreign exchange from primary commodity exports, and in part because 
of the entrenched economic interests favoring ongoing protectionism that stemmed 
from the sectoral coalitions that emerged under ISI (Mahon, Jr. 1992). Thus, while the 
origin of the foreign exchange crisis was different, the mechanism was the same. For 
East Asian economies to prosper they would need to acquire new sources of foreign 
exchange through industrialization. 
Moreover, the relative absence of international threats from the Cold War 
comparable to those which existed in Northeast Asia made it politically unfeasible for 
Latin American regimes to impose the kinds of currency devaluations and labor wage 
restraints that domestic manufacturing would have required in order to be competitive 
in export markets (Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005; Zhu 2002).  Given these 
differences in domestic economies and geopolitical threat environments, it is less 
puzzling why some industrializing societies pursued outward, export-oriented markets 
for their manufactured goods while others remained focused on internal markets. 
Collectively, the adaptive pressures posed by foreign exchange and 
international security crises created the political will for Northeast Asia’s agrarian 
societies to industrialize. Those agrarian societies whose decolonization processes 
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began even later were constrained by the set of economic policy options available to 
them during the mid-1900s. As such, these societies were deprived of their moment of 
institutional crisis, never reaching a critical juncture that might produce the kinds of 
adjustment policies that lead to state development and economic growth.  
But while the politics of foreign exchange crises and international threat 
environments help us understand variation in the form that industrialization takes 
between East Asia and Latin America, we still lack a clear understanding of why some 
agrarian societies undertook import substitution in the first place while others did not. 
Minimizing variation in regional security threats and the timing of decolonization, 
why did developmentalist institutions of import substitution emerge some Latin 
American societies but not others, and where were they most successful in laying a 
foundation for future economic growth? 
Any attempt to explain that variation empirically is immediately confronted 
with a bewildering array of confounding factors, including geography, institutional 
legacies of European colonization, political regime type, and varying exposure to the 
kinds of international shocks like security threats or trade volatility that are theorized 
to exert adaptive pressures on states. Is variation in the rates of industrialization that 
we observe across the developing world simply a function of geography exerting its 
causal weight by constraining trade opportunities or conditioning the formation of 
economic institutions? If so, why do we see meaningful variation in economic 
development between Haiti and the Dominican Republic—tropical states with 
comparable endowments of climate, terrain and natural resources? Does 
industrialization require competent bureaucratic institutions capable of supplying 
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firms with public goods like sound industrial policy, infrastructure and a reasonably 
healthy, educated workforce (Evans 1995)? If so, where do the institutions and the 
political will to invest in such goods come from? Alternatively, if it is industrialization 
itself that provides the economic incentives to invest in infrastructure, physical and 
human capital, how do firms overcome the initial coordination problems associated 
with constructing a manufacturing production chain before investments in these 
crucial goods have been made? Perhaps the inflow of capital from international trade 
in primary commodities can break the cycle of underinvestment in agrarian states and 
provide a platform for national development. But what prevents a trade-dependent 
mode of accumulation, and the powerful merchant coalitions that it generates, from 
simply locking agrarian societies in an international division of labor based on 
comparative advantage in the production of unfinished commodities? In the following 
two sections I summarize my argument and compare it to alternative explanations for 
variation in institutional development and economic growth among late-industrializing 
countries. 
 
Globalization and State Development on Hispaniola 
Chapter 2 identified the investment coordination problems involved with late 
industrialization. In part it explored why the uncertainties market actors face at the 
beginning stages of industrialization might result in a failure to invest in the forward 
and backward linkages such an economic transformation requires. This game-theoretic 
framework helps illustrate why strong domestic capital markets or state institutions 
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capable of resolving investment coordination problems are a prerequisite for 
industrialization to take root.  
Absent such capital markets, non-industrialized societies across the global 
south have looked to their state institutions to fulfill the investment coordination 
functions that market actors and private capital markets are unable to do themselves. 
However, societies faced with similar sets of opportunities and constraints have varied 
dramatically in their ability to produce such developmentalist institutions, particularly 
in contexts where historical patterns of state predation and patrimonialism have been 
the norm.  
This dissertation provides answers to difficult questions related to why 
developmental states emergence in some societies but not others. By exploring the 
causal mechanisms that connect trade and institutions with economic growth on the 
island of Hispaniola, it contributes to our understanding of why some non-
industrialized countries developed manufacturing capacity during the 20th century 
while others remained mostly agrarian and poor.  
The historical narrative of political and economic development on Hispaniola 
began in Chapter 3, where I identify the conditions antecedent to the critical juncture 
of the 1930s that were critical for determining class structure and the underlying 
distribution of income across the island. Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic ended 
the colonial period with highly polarized societies comprised of a vast subsistence 
peasantry and a narrow class of economic elites. Over the course of the late nineteenth 
century, however, Dominican economy and society were transformed by the expanded 
opportunities for selling agricultural commodities on international markets. The 
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foreign exchange that poured in through trade not only provided for the importation of 
a new class of manufactured goods emanating from the industrializing world; it also 
stimulated demand for new professions and trades that provided the material basis for 
the expansion of the Dominican middle classes. In Haiti, by comparison, trade levels 
stagnated over the course of the century following the decline of the sugar plantation 
model. Following the revolution, an aversion to coercive labor relations on the part of 
the Haitian peasantry foreclosed the possibility that the nation’s elite might take over 
and resume the plantation model established by the French. Forced to identify a new 
mode of accumulation, predominantly mulatto elites retreated to the port cities where 
they were able to provide for their livelihoods through the private consumption of 
public resources; they financed that patrimonial state almost entirely by taxing the 
peasants indirectly through customs taxes on coffee exports. This predatory behavior 
was reinforced by international factors, namely the economic embargo imposed by the 
French and Americans shortly after Haiti’s 1804 independence; a blow to the Haitian 
economy ameliorated only after agreeing to pay the French an indemnity of ₣150 
million imposed in exchange for diplomatic recognition and the restoration of trade 
relations.  Collectively, the domestic and international factors particular to the Haitian 
case explain why it was unable to develop as vibrant an agro-export sector as the 
Dominican Republic. As a result, the DR entered the critical juncture of the 1930s 
with a middle class that was an order of magnitude larger than that found in Haiti. 
Despite having achieved different levels of trade integration and middle class 
expansion, Chapter 4 documents how both the Dominican Republic and Haiti began 
the twentieth century as poor agrarian societies with weak state institutions that had 
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fallen victim to repeated overthrow by rent-seeking caudillo warlords. Finding 
themselves in the center of a geopolitical contest between emerging world powers 
over spheres of influence along the shipping lanes to the Panama Canal, these 
patrimonial regimes took on significant amounts of sovereign debt that they financed 
by using future customs revenues as collateral.  Eventually, political instability and 
financial insolvency provoked U.S. military interventions on both sides of the island 
so as to ward off encroachment by European creditor-states. These interventions 
established customs receiverships to the end of securing repayment of the sovereign 
debt, restored political stability, and implemented a series of public works and land 
reforms in an attempt to fold these tropical economies more fully into U.S. markets for 
agricultural commodity imports and manufactured goods exports. Attempts to alter the 
land tenure systems to these ends generally fell short on both sides of the island, 
particularly in Haiti where historic opposition to foreign investment precluded the 
formation of foreign agricultural enclaves like those that emerged in the Dominican 
Republic’s eastern province. Nevertheless, the United States occupation was 
successful in defeating the caudillo movements, concentrating coercive power in the 
hands of the central government, and installing a basic foundation of infrastructure. 
Despite these modest successes in statebuilding, at the termination of the U.S. 
occupations both societies were agro-export dependent economies governed by 
patrimonial authoritarian regimes.    
The development profile that emerges from this exploration of historical 
antecedents in Chapters 3 and 4 is of two agrarian societies united by tropical 
geography, economic dependence on the agro-export sector for the consumption of 
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manufactured goods, and an institutional legacy of weak, patrimonial states that 
preyed on the surplus value generated by this agro-export sector without providing 
public goods in return. The critical difference between them for understanding the 
processes of state development that unfolded on Hispaniola during the twentieth 
century was the differing ability of these two societies to capitalize on the commercial 
opportunities afforded by the rapid expansion of the global economy during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Where agrarian societies were better able to do 
so, as was the case for the Dominican Republic, trade provided greater social mobility 
as new occupations created income-generating opportunities for an emergent middle 
class. It is the relative size and political power of the middle classes, then, that 
represents the antecedent condition that was critical for predicting long-run growth 
and development in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 I identify the consequences of variation in this critical 
antecedent condition for institutional development and economic investment during 
the 1930s and 1940s, a period that I argue represented a critical juncture for 
determining the relationship between state and markets. Systemic trade shocks borne 
of global economic depression, followed by world war and reconstruction, created a 
protracted period of import scarcity that reshaped the economic environment faced by 
these two agrarian societies. Political crisis quickly followed the economic crisis of 
1929, and by 1930 new rulers had seized power in both Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. Whether or not this political crisis translated into institutional 
transformation, however, depended on the relative size and power of the middle 
classes within their respective national political arenas. While the losses inflicted by 
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economic fallout from the 1929 financial crisis were felt most strongly by the middle 
classes on both sides of the island, in Haiti this emerging distributional coalition was 
smaller and weaker relative to their equivalent in the DR. Haiti’s predominantly black 
middle class was undergoing their own gradual, belated expansion, however by the 
1930s they were still a comparatively smaller fraction of society. Thus, they were 
easily coopted by the Haitian ruler that seized power in 1930, a representative of the 
mulatto class who was drawn from the same elite coalition that had ruled either 
directly or indirectly since independence. Lastly, in the statistical appendix to Chapter 
5 I test the generalizability of this analytic narrative using a dataset comprised of 
historical measures of class structure, trade integration, industrialization, and 
economic growth for 20 Latin American countries between 1868 and 2011. The 
empirical results generated by this preliminary statistical exercise provide broad 
support for this analytic narrative.   
 
 
Contributions to Development Theory: Geography, Institutions, and Trade 
 
Early attempts by economists to couch the diverging economic development 
trajectories of Asia and Latin America in terms of the triumph of market-oriented 
reforms over state-led models of industrialization (Sachs 1985) sparked a vibrant 
debate among development scholars that culminated in what Kohli (2002) called the 
“statist turn.” A series of research findings born out of the Asian development 
experience rejects scholarly claims about the futility of state intervention. Deyo (1987) 
highlighted the variety of ways in which the developmental state was successful in 
promoting industrialization, namely interventionist banking sector reforms and the 
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importance of autonomous state bureaucracies. The literature that followed found that 
the success of East Asian economies was predicated on a series of state policies that 
sought to “manage markets,” rather than “manage economies” as was the case with ISI 
(Amsden 1989, Wade 1990). This literature also found that the key to 
institutionalizing these policies stemmed from the ability of the state to insulate 
policymakers from capture by the traditional oligarchy, who favored rent-seeking over 
competition and investment (Haggard 1990).  
Summarizing the statist perspective that emerged, Kohli notes, “the basic 
message of this new research was that it was not the degree but the quality of state 
intervention that was essential for understanding developmental outcomes; state 
intervention was not only compatible with but responsible for rapid economic growth 
in some parts of the developing world” (2002, 110). State institutions were coming to 
be perceived as an essential ingredient for calibrating the incentives of domestic 
economic actors in such a way as to allow a developing country to alter its place 
within the international division of labor and exploit the opportunities presented by 
expanding global markets.  
A central question confronted by this project concerns the political dynamics 
that determine the degree and kind of state intervention that emerge. Why does the 
government of one agrarian society respond to the international economic crisis of the 
1930s with a coordinated series of investment policies centered on import substitution 
while the government of another agrarian society confronted with identical systemic 
pressures does not? 
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My findings are broadly consistent with approaches to state development that 
focus on adaptive pressures brought about by international or domestic threats to the 
political survival of the regime. Yet while other scholars have focused on the 
international security environment as the source of adaptive pressure (Doner, Ritchie, 
and Slater 2005; Tilly 1985, 1992; Zhu 2002), I identify conditions under which 
institutional transformation occurs endogenously through domestic pressure for 
economic adjustment during an economic crisis. I argue that Haiti’s failure to 
industrialize during the 1930s and 40s illustrates why, if historically inherited 
economic institutions persist, it is because the underlying structure of political power 
and distributional preference within the society also persists. The case of 
industrialization in the Dominican Republic reveals how gradual changes in the size 
and relative power of different sectors of society after independence, combined with 
rapid realignments in the sectoral interests of those classes during an economic crisis, 
can create a critical juncture where the institutions that determine economic outcomes 
can be transformed relatively quickly.  
This theory of institutional development conforms to the framework proposed 
by Riker (1980), who understood institutions as the congealed preferences of the 
powerful. A central implication of this theory is that, in order to understand the 
relationship between institutions and variation in post-colonial development, we must 
look past institutions to class structure and the arena of distributional politics that 
underpin them.  
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Geography and institutions 
 
Recent scholarship investigating the mechanisms linking institutions with economic 
development outcomes has focused on underlying factors of income distribution and 
social structure. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) 
trace the cause of variation in social structure and development outcomes across the 
Americas back to initial factor endowments of land and labor. They differentiate 
between tropical climates and soils conducive to the cultivation of labor-intensive 
commodities like cotton or sugar—commodities that profited heavily from slave 
labor—and temperate climates more conducive to the harvesting of less labor-
intensive crops like wheat. Labor endowments in the Americas were differentiated by 
whether or not there existed dense native populations whom survived colonial contact 
and could be enslaved. Engerman and Sokoloff argue that these endowments shaped 
long-run development trajectories in the Americas by generating more or less equal 
social structures. Using the example of the northern and southern British colonies of 
the New World that would become the United States, they find the southern 
economies feature self-reinforcing patterns of elite privilege that deliberately sought to 
limit both liberal economic competition and human capital formation. The authors 
argue that, over time, these patterns of social relations become institutionalized, 
reproducing the inequalities in wealth, human development, and political power that 
we observe today across the Americas. 
 The work of William Easterly et al. (2006; 2001, 2007) extends the findings of 
Sokoloff and Engerman beyond the Western Hemisphere, identifying significant and 
robust worldwide correlations between land and labor endowments, class structure, 
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and the outcomes of institutional quality and economic development during the second 
half of the twentieth century. The quality of economic institutions, in their framework, 
is endogenous to the social structures that constitute them—principally the size of the 
middle classes. Agricultural endowments and the patterns of income distribution that 
emerge from plantation versus smallholder cultivation, then, are taken to be the 
primordial cause of institutional quality and economic performance.  
The theory of class structure and coalitional politics developed here is 
consistent with the expectations of Engerman, Sokoloff, and Easterly et al. concerning 
the endogeneity of economic institutions to social structure. However, the geographic 
endowment mechanism hypothesized by Engerman and Sokoloff is not able to explain 
the variation in class structure on the island of Hispaniola.52 Concerning the impact of 
land, the climates and soils of Haiti were initially comparable with those of the DR—
featuring a tropical climate conducive to both high rates of malaria as well as the 
cultivation of labor-intensive crops. The small geographic differences in mountainous 
terrain and precipitation that exist between Haiti and the Dominican Republic cannot 
explain the historical origins of income distribution and class structure in these two 
countries.  
Regarding labor endowments, within four decades of Haitian independence 
sugar plantations collapsed. Liberated black slaves, fleeing attempts by the affranchis 
mulatto class to continue the coercive labor practices of the French, recolonized the 
land in the form of small-holder plots—a process that has been labeled marronage 
                                                
52 The coercive labor policy of slave mineral extraction adopted by the Spanish crown during the 15th 
and 16th centuries, coupled with the spread of European diseases, exhausted much of the accessible 
precious mineral wealth of the island and at the same time all but exterminated the indigenous Taíno 
peoples who lived there. 
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(Gonzalez 2012). Beginning in the 1870s, the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, 
embraced plantation agriculture in the southern part of the country when Cuban sugar 
producers, fleeing their civil war, brought the centrales model to the DR. While this 
mode of accumulation was not conducive to the emergence of an egalitarian society by 
any means, it did contribute to the material basis for the emergence of a middle class 
that had been laid a few decades earlier in the northern Cibao region. 
Other recent work examining the mechanisms by which social structure 
produces variation in development outcomes has argued that relative levels of 
development across Latin America were determined by the different social structures 
and modes of accumulation transmitted by Spain during colonization—modes that 
varied depending on the timing of the colonial encounter (Mahoney 2010). Mahoney’s 
central insight is that the same colonizer at different periods of time brought with them 
different kinds of colonial institutions, and that differences among these institutions 
determined the relative prosperity or backwardness of Latin American countries that 
we observe today.  Whereas northern Central America and the Andes were more 
densely populated by indigenous civilizations, a condition attractive to 16th and 17th 
century Hapsburg Spain and its brutal and extractive mercantilist colonizers, the 
southern and more sparsely populated regions of Central and South America were 
settled by liberal colonists of Spain’s 18th century Bourbons. Although absolute levels 
of development across the region have improved in most cases, he finds that most 
Spanish American states are still as rich or poor relative to one-another today as they 
were when they emerged from the colonial period in the early 1800s. This is attributed 
to the persistence of the social structures that developed under mercantilist or liberal 
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Spanish institutions, which can be differentiated by whether they obstructed or 
promoted commercial investment. 
By unpacking the treatment effect(s) of Spanish colonization, Mahoney makes 
an important contribution to our understanding of the consequences of the colonial 
encounter. He locates the influence of the colonial past on the development present at 
the juncture where colonization shaped the structure of society. In his framework, 
institutions themselves are distributive outcomes to be explained. “When employing 
an institutional approach, therefore, it is essential to treat institutions as the objects of 
contestation among actors differentially implicated in their resource allocations. Only 
this perspective can capture the prominent role that power and conflict play in actual 
patterns of institutional formation and change” (2010, 17). Any coordinating activities 
that emerge from these institutions represent outcomes corresponding to the 
distributional preferences of those who have the power to set the rules. The persistence 
of institutions, then, is a contested process involving different coalitions of actors 
endowed with varying power within the national political arena.  
My analytical framework conforms to Mahoney’s understanding of institutions 
as the congealed distributional preferences of the powerful. Turning the empirical lens 
away from Central and South America and towards the Caribbean basin, however, we 
find that social structures and economic development trajectories were not as static as 
Mahoney’s framework suggests. As Figure 1.1 revealed, the convergence of 
Dominican economy with the average per capita GDP of Latin America during the 
second half of the twentieth century tells a different story. Given its relatively 
backward position among Latin American states at the end of the liberal reform 
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period, why was the Dominican Republic able to achieve the fastest rate economic 
growth across the region between 1950 and 2011? Furthermore, the changes in social 
structure across the rest of Latin America during the same period (Figures A.2-A.4 in 
the statistical appendix to the preceding chapter) reveal the dynamic nature of social 
structure following decolonization.  
Like Easterly, Engerman and Sokoloff, and other scholars who have focused 
on the importance of initial factor endowments for shaping the social structures that 
determine development outcomes, Mahoney (2010) advances our understanding of 
where institutions that promote investment and growth come from. However, his 
theory obscures important changes in social structure during Latin America’s liberal 
reform period and minimizes the importance of the critical juncture of the 1930s and 
1940s for reshaping the relationship between state institutions and markets across the 
region. The empirical records of Haiti and the Dominican Republic suggest a much 
more dynamic and historically contingent process of class formation and institutional 
development than Mahoney’s thesis would expect.  
These findings have important implications for other theories connecting 
geography and institutions with development outcomes. As Rodrik (2003) points out, 
geography is the only truly exogenous variable in the development puzzle, accounting 
for the factor endowments of land and labor, mineral wealth, soil and climate, as well 
as the density of the population and its vulnerability to disease. The region in which 
societies are situated within the international community also affects development by 
determining their exposure to trade, colonization, and geopolitical threats. 
Collectively, these geographic variables have been shown to matter for shaping the 
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formation and strength of state institutions and determining trajectories of economic 
growth.  
In a landmark piece of scholarship on the influence of geography on 
development, Diamond (1999) identifies a series of factors, including the orientation 
of continental axes and the geographic distribution of mammals capable of 
domestication, that ultimately allowed the peoples of the European sub-continent to 
dominate the societies that inhabit other regions of the world. Subsequent literature 
has examined the consequences of geography for the income gap that we observe, 
finding that temperate climates favored the development of more productive 
technologies that ultimately decided which region would be the first to industrialize 
(Sachs 2001). While these works have provided us with provocative macro-historical 
hypotheses for big variation in development trajectories, attempts to use geographic 
variables to account for more modest but non-trivial differences in development 
outcomes across the tropics fall down.  
In his preliminary treatments of causes of development variation on the island 
of Hispaniola, Diamond (2005, 2010) argues against treating the island as a 
geographical constant, emphasizing differences in precipitation, deforestation, terrain, 
and population density on the western and eastern parts of the island. Because the 
trade winds blow from east to west, the Dominican Republic receives a greater 
proportion of the annual precipitation today than does Haiti. The mountain ranges that 
traverse the island feature wider valleys more suitable for cultivation on the 
Dominican side, especially the fertile and economically important Cibao valley. 
Finally, he notes that the greater population density of Haiti, whose surface area is 
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approximately half the size of the DR, introduces greater pressure on the environment 
and contributes to the deforestation that has reduced both arable land and the 
availability of subsistence fuel. 
 A closer examination of the determinants of economic growth on the island 
reduces our confidence in the causal import of these differences. A recent study by 
Jaramillo and Sancak (2009) finds that Haiti and the DR are sufficiently similar in 
geographical terms to make development comparisons. While Haiti is more 
mountainous and contains regions that receive lower rates of precipitation, a history of 
successful agro-exportation right up until the slave revolution suggests that differences 
in climate and terrain did not prevent the peoples inhabiting the western side of the 
island from developing the most wealthy and productive colony in the French empire 
during the 18th century. Indeed, Haiti’s leading export commodity, coffee, is well 
suited to cultivation in mountainous terrain. Furthermore, historical data on 
precipitation (Alpert 1941) and settler mortality rates caused by the incidence of 
malaria (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001) put Haiti and the DR clearly within 
a comparable tropical climate. Finally, regarding demography, Jaramillo and Sancak 
note that existing studies find population density to be positively correlated with 
economic growth among top-performing east-Asian economies.  
Institutional explanations for variation in economic growth, on the other hand, 
have found that geographic explanations exert, at most, an indirect effect by shaping 
how institutions emerge and evolve over time (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 
2004). Building from the work of Douglas North (North and Thomas 1973; North 
1981, 1990), a large literature has emerged that links contemporary relations between 
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state and markets to the enduring legacies of colonial encounters. Some scholars argue 
that it matters whether states were colonized for settlement (with corresponding state 
institutions to govern that expatriate society) or merely to facilitate the extraction of 
primary commodities (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Others focus on the 
effect of colonial encounters on bureaucratic culture to explain why some states were 
better positioned than others to implement state-directed industrialization (Kohli 
2004).  
While the varied colonial histories of the DR and Haiti cannot discount this 
factor a priori, the Hispaniola cases present several problems for the colonial thesis. 
First, the data have associated not Spanish but British colonization with institutional 
legacies conducive to economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; 
Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; North, Summerhill, and Weingast 1998; Wiarda 
1998). Second, neither in the Dominican nor the Haitian case did economic 
institutions from the colonial period survive the 19th century. At the time of 
independence in the early 1800s, a semi-feudal class of hacendados that emerged 
during the colonial period dominated society in the Dominican Republic and across 
much of Latin America. This class controlled vast swaths of land and peasantry in an 
economic relationship known as Latifundia, one that produced little more than 
subsistence agriculture, pastoral ranching, as well as meager exports of timber and 
sugar. This socioeconomic arrangement went unchallenged from the time of 
independence in the 1820s until the onset of the liberal reform period, when a new 
class of economic and political actor grew out of the booming agro-export sector. In 
the DR, this process began in the northern Cibao valley between roughly 1850 and 
  245 
1870. Political conflict between the liberal merchant capitalists and the feudal 
landowning aristocracy erupted into a civil war during the 1860s and 1870s, 
culminating in a decisive victory for the liberals.  
In the Haitian case the break with historical institutions was even more abrupt. 
The collapse of Haitian sugar exports in the first decades after independence was 
principally due to a shortage of cheap labor. Having successfully prosecuted the slave 
revolution of 1796-1804, peasants resisted returning to coercive plantation labor 
relations. Many of these peasants fled to the mountainous countryside where they 
squatted, engaging in smallholder subsistence agriculture coupled with the 
uncoordinated harvesting of coffee trees planted during the colonial period. Haitian 
elites failed in their attempts to force peasants back onto the plantations through legal 
decrees against vagrancy such as the 1825 Code Rural. Faced with a collapsing mode 
of accumulation, Haitian elites were forced to abandon the plantation model developed 
by the French during the colonial period. In its place, they developed a parasitic mode 
of accumulation that combined agro-export mercantilism and the collection of customs 
duties in the port cities, coupled with the use of the powerful but underemployed 
Haitian Army to act as tax collector, preying on the surplus value of peasant 
production in the countryside.  
Third, if Kohli’s hypothesis concerning the positive effects of certain 
statebuilding colonial projects for the development of administrative capacity were 
true, the longer duration of the foreign interventions in Haiti should have left it in a 
better position to execute a developmentalist strategy following the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces than the DR. US interventions in Haiti (which effectively came to an end in 
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1930) and the Dominican Republic (which ended in 1924) were both provoked by the 
desire to install stable governments that might restore fiscal solvency and stave off any 
pretext for the incursion of European creditor-states into the Western hemisphere. 
Both were US Marine Corps units that suppressed regional challenges to the autonomy 
of the central government, trained and equipped constabulary military forces, seized 
control of state fiscal operations, and implemented extensive public works projects 
and administrative reforms. In short, nothing about the institutional development of 
Haiti or the DR prior to the onset of the economic crisis in 1929 would lead existing 
development theories to predict which side of the island was more predisposed to state 
developmentalism and economic growth than the other.  
Comparisons of economic growth in East Asia and Latin America have gone 
far in helping us understand the role of state institutions in creating conditions 
conducive to economic development (Evans 1995; Haggard 1990), but they have 
provided few insights about where developmentalist state institutions come from in the 
first place. Does the developmentalist state require a professional bureaucracy to keep 
policymakers both autonomous from rent-seeking entrepreneurs while at the same 
time closely embedded with them by institutional (as opposed to personal) ties, as 
Evans suggests, or can these institutions be bootstrapped, cultivated over time by 
entrepreneurs who rely on personal commitments from the government or are 
integrated into the state itself, as the recent work of Haber et al (2003) suggests? 
My findings also make two important contributions to our understanding of the 
origins and development legacies of import substitution industrialization. First, the 
economic performance of the Dominican economy following the 1980s debt crisis and 
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the collapse of the ISI model suggests that the investments in infrastructure, physical 
and human capital made under the guise of ISI was nevertheless crucial for shaping 
future growth during the subsequent period of neoliberal reforms. Challenging the 
received wisdom about ISI, the Hispaniola cases demonstrate how a mixed strategy 
featuring inward-oriented development and ongoing agro-exports produced higher 
rates of investment and growth than reliance on agro-exports alone. Second, the ability 
of a small island country like the Dominican Republic to successfully pursue ISI 
suggests that the size of the internal market has a much smaller effect on the prospects 
for the industrialization of agrarian states than existing scholarship would expect, at 
least at the early stages of non-durable consumer goods production (Hirschman 1968; 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989b).  
Although institutions matter greatly for determining development outcomes on 
the island of Hispaniola, in both cases the causal mechanism driving institutional 
development and economic growth during the post-colonial period was not a 
historically determined reproduction of the economic and political institutions these 
countries inherited from their colonial encounters. Nor was institutional development a 
product of different geographical factor endowments. Rather, it was the ways in which 
two agrarian societies responded to the opportunities and threats posed by the global 
economy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that determined the differences 
in poverty and prosperity that we observe today.  
 
Trade and development? 
 
I conclude with several observations concerning the enduring question, “is trade good 
for development?” A superficial read of the analytic narrative offered here would 
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appear to suggest such an interpretation: trade leads to the expansion of the middle 
classes, and all good development outcomes stem from that. A closer examination of 
the conditions under which trade openness led to economic growth and development 
on Hispaniola reveals dynamics that challenge the theoretical propositions of trade 
integrationists and skeptical institutionalists alike.  
Contrary to the received wisdom about import substitution industrialization, 
my research demonstrates that a mixed strategy featuring both inward-oriented 
development and ongoing agro-exports produced higher rates of investment and 
growth over the long run than reliance on agro-exports alone. 53 Yet I also find that 
prior trade integration created the very class coalitions that later became a decisive 
political force for the emergence of protectionist ISI policies and the developmentalist 
state institutions that implemented them. These findings suggest a more conditional 
causal relationship linking trade and institutions to economic growth and development 
than either strand of the trade and development literature presently allows.  
The contemporary debate about long-run gains from trade was structured 
largely in terms of comparisons between the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) 
models of East Asia and the ISI models of Latin America and parts of Africa and 
South Asia. The historical particularities of the 1980s when these comparisons were 
initially made, namely exogenous shocks emanating from the United States, limit the 
                                                
53 This extended time horizon by which structural adjustment policies exerted causal effects on growth 
also suggests that many cross-national studies regressing aggregate economic performance against more 
contemporary economic policy (e.g. Jaramillo and Sancak 2009) employ insufficient lags for their pubic 
policy variables. For industrializing countries, getting the right policies for economic takeoff appears to 
be a generational affair. 
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degree to which their findings allow us to make generalizations about the economic 
performance of the state-led import substitution model.  
In the 1970s, emerging markets attempting to finance industrialization were 
flooded with foreign capital as the international financial system, awash in petro-
dollars, began to favor sovereign lending. Typically denominated in U.S. dollars and 
set to variable interest rates, this easy foreign money became a major liability to debtor 
countries during the 1980s as efforts to curb U.S. inflation through monetary 
retrenchment—beginning in 1979 with the so-called “Volker Shock”—sent interest 
rates into the double-digits. The US prime lending rate rose from an annual average of 
7.59 percent between 1970 and 1978 to an average of 14.08 percent between 1979 and 
1984 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2013). As Sachs (1985) 
observes, while several East Asian states were as exposed to international debt as 
Latin America, the continued availability of foreign exchange provided by their EOI 
sectors prevented all East Asian economies save the Philippines from being forced to 
reschedule their debt payments. Conversely, the twin crises of unsustainable debt 
payments and declining terms of trade for primary commodity exports forced all major 
Latin American countries except Colombia to reschedule their debt. While East Asian 
economies were able to continue growing at an average rate of 3.4 percent between 
1976 and 1985, growth rates in Latin America and Africa were a meager 0.3 percent 
and 0.4 percent, respectively (Dollar 1992, 523).  
It was in the context of this international debt crisis that a series of papers 
presented evidence that deeper integration into world markets was significantly 
correlated with higher rates of economic growth and income convergence between 
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developed and developing economies. Beginning with Sachs (1985), this literature 
concluded that the greater economic performance of the EOI model over the ISI model 
during the 1970s and 80s indicated that policies favoring deeper integration with 
global markets were the fastest way to economic growth (Dollar 1992; Sachs and 
Warner 1995) and income convergence (Ben-David 1993).54 
In response to the emerging narrative about the benefits of lower barriers to 
trade, an institutionalist perspective emerged in the late 1990s that challenged the 
integrationist consensus. In their update to the review on the trade and growth 
literature provided by Edwards (1993), Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) repeat the 
challenge to more specifically identify the mechanism(s) linking international 
economic integration to development. Concerned that numerous cross-national studies 
of the effect of trade on growth have relied on indirect proxies or indices of trade 
integration, Rodríguez and Rodrik find that neither tariff nor non-tariff barriers are 
negatively correlated with growth. Furthermore, attempts by the authors to replicate 
the positive results of the leading studies connecting trade to growth find that these 
results are highly sensitive to model specification issues, particularly those related to 
omitted variable bias. Vamvakidis (2002) finds that, even using the measures of trade 
openness employed by the integrationists, the positive relationship between trade 
openness and growth is temporally bounded; between 1870 and 1970 the correlation 
between integration and growth disappears, except for the 1930s when it actually flips 
                                                
54 Enthusiasm about the use of trade policy as a means to bring about economic development was 
tempered by the findings of Frankel and Romer (1999), who instrument geographic location for the 
effects of trade due to the potential co-variance between policies of trade liberalization and other 
policies that could lead to faster economic growth. They conclude that while trade is an important 
determinant of income, geographic barriers are an important exogenous determinant of trade.  
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negative.  In place of trade, a group of scholars have argued that institutions—namely 
property rights and the rule of law—are the mediating variable that determines 
whether trade will translate into economic growth (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 
2004). Finally, a nascent literature has begun to explore the endogenous relationships 
that exist between trade and institutions. Dollar and Kraay (2003) problematize the 
large correlation between trade and institutional quality for cross-national studies 
attempting to measure the relative importance of these two factors as predictors of 
growth.  
Exploiting historical data on international trade, social change, and institutional 
development among European countries between 1500 and 1850, Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2005) demonstrate that the ascendance of Western Europe over other 
parts of the subcontinent was driven by the transformation of European institutions 
through the political ascendance of a middle class comprised of Atlantic traders. This 
merchant class drove institutional change by moving against the monarchy to 
constrain the state’s power to tax and expropriate property. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) develop a variant of this argument formally, constructing a model that explains, 
in part, why trade integration may promote institutional quality. By introducing 
technologies and economic opportunities that provide a material basis for the 
expansion of the middle classes, mounting political pressure for better public goods 
like private property rights as well as lower rates of taxation could enable societies to 
reform or replace inefficient rulers and regimes. The improvements to institutional 
quality predicted by these two studies are theorized to produce economic divergence 
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with less-integrated countries as economies that encourage investment become more 
productive, yielding increasing returns from trade openness.  
The generalizability of these findings in the contemporary period was explored 
by Bhattacharyya, Dowrick, and Golley (2009) using panel data on 59 European and 
non-European states between 1980 and 2004. They identify a positive and statistically 
significant interaction between trade and institutions, finding that the level of 
institutional development moderates the effect of trade integration on economic 
growth; it is only once a certain threshold of institutional quality has been reached that 
integration leads to growth.  
While the literature on trade and institutions has demonstrated both 
theoretically and empirically that trade and institutional development move together, 
the shortcoming of relying on large cross-national studies is that they have great 
difficulty moving beyond pattern detection in order to identify the causal mechanisms 
actually driving the endogeneity (Bhattacharyya, Dowrick, and Golley 2009; Edwards 
1993; Rodríguez and Rodrik 2000). As Bhattacharyya, et al. conclude, “the key 
challenge is to move beyond broad cross-country comparisons to detailed workings of 
institutions and trade policy within each country in order to understand more fully how 
they interact and impact on economic development” (2009, 328).  
A detailed analysis of the process of institutional development and economic 
growth on Hispaniola reveals that greater exposure to international trade during Latin 
America’s liberal reform period had important consequences for the way that agrarian 
societies adjusted to international trade shocks during the first half of the 20th century. 
The positive impact of trade integration on institutional development and long-run 
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growth in agrarian societies is conditional on whether the gains from trade are 
distributed in such a way as to create economic opportunities for the expansion of the 
middle classes. Future research should seek to refine further the scope conditions of 
this theory. Whereas the smallholder agricultural models in both Haiti and the DR 
were permissive of the rise of a middle class, in agrarian economies where the income 
from trade is concentrated in the hands of a narrow few—as is often the case in 
plantation economies like those of El Salvador—the effects of trade integration on the 
expansion of the middle classes may be more modest.  
The interplay between outward-oriented trade integration and inward-oriented 
import substitution that drove Dominican growth and development has important 
implications for the literature on trade and development. Foremost, it suggests that we 
should reconsider the development consequences of the ISI model for future growth in 
the neoliberal era. The impressive growth rates sustained by the Dominican Republic 
following the collapse of the ISI model and the neoliberal reform period of the 1990s 
suggests that the investments in infrastructure, physical, and human capital that 
enabled Latin American economies to pursue ISI may also be helping to drive their 
growth rates under more liberal development models. Relatedly, the ability of a small 
island country like the Dominican Republic to successfully pursue ISI suggests that, at 
least at the early stages of non-durable consumer goods substitution, the size of the 
internal market has a much smaller effect on the prospects for the industrialization of 
agrarian states than existing scholarship (Hirschman 1968; Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1989b) would expect. 
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The theory that emerges from this analysis sheds new light on the ways that 
class structure and coalitional politics shape the relationship between state institutions 
and markets, illustrating how a protracted economic crisis can create a critical juncture 
where the continuity of existing institutions becomes contested. During such junctures, 
the relative power of different class coalitions vying for their respective material 
interests can play a decisive role in determining whether historically inherited 
institutions change or persist. Where state institutions promote investment in the 
determinants of labor productivity—especially infrastructure, physical and human 
capital—their economies grow faster. 
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Port-au-Prince,  Haïti: Institute Haitien de Statistique. 
Bértola, Luis, and José Antonio Ocampo. 2012. The Economic Development of Latin 
America Since Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  256 
Bhattacharyya, Sambit, Steve Dowrick, and Jane Golley. 2009. “Institutions and 
Trade: Competitors or Complements in Economic Development?*.” Economic 
Record 85(270): 318–30. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2013. “Historical Data: Selected 
Interest Rates (Daily) - H.15.” 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (March 10, 2013). 
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge  UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bourguignon, François, and Thierry Verdier. 2000. “Oligarchy, Democracy, 
Inequality and Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 62(2): 285–313. 
Buck-Morss, Susan. 2000. “Hegel and Haiti.” Critical Inquiry 26(4): 821–65. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Alastair Smith, and Randolph M. 
Siverson. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Bulmer-Thomas, V. 1995. “The Latin American Economies, 1929-1939.” In The 
Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge [England]; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 63–116. 
———. 2003. The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Calder, Bruce J. 1984. The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During 
the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Cassá, Roberto. 1982a. Capitalismo Y Dictadura. 1a ed. Santo Domingo, Repu ́blica 
Dominicana: Editora de la Universidad Auto ́noma de Santo Domingo. 
———. 1982b. “Reflexiones Sobre La Estructura de Clases Entre 1900 y 1930.” In La 
Sociedad dominicana durante la Segunda Repu ́blica, ed. Tirso Mejía-Ricart G. 
Santo Domingo  Repu ́blica Dominicana: Editora de la Universidad Auto ́noma 
de Santo Domingo, 43–63. 
———. 2004a. 2 Historia Social y Economica de La Repu ́blica Dominicana. Santa 
Domingo: Editorial Alfa y Omega. 
———. 2004b. Historia Social y Económica de La República Dominicana. 16th ed. 
Santo Domingo  R.D.: Alfa & Omega. 
Castor, Suzy. 1988. L’occupation Américaine d’Haïti. [Port-au-Prince  Haïti]: Société 
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———. 1939. 1938-1939 Report. Port-au-Prince,  Haïti: Imprimerie de l’Etat. 
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